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Terrorism Bill

My Lords, I follow my noble friend Lady Williams of Crosby in her passionate yet chilling speech, which so eloquently demonstrated the threat to freedom of intellectual discussion and research in this country that is posed by some of the provisions of this Bill. It was notable that my noble friend Lord Carlile also, speaking in his independent capacity, expressed his strong opinion that the Bill has the potential to criminalise academic and parliamentary research, and indeed serious journalism. The provisions of the Bill have been carefully considered by many in the library community. Among them is the British Library, a great range of library associations, associations of librarians, the Association of University Teachers and Universities UK. All these respected members of the library and academic community fear the impact of this Bill on teaching and research and the ability of libraries to support those activities. There is a grave danger that institutions, academics, researchers and lecturers will unwittingly fall foul of the Bill as currently drafted. The key provisions are those in Clause 2 which prohibit the loan or making-available-for-loan of a terrorist publication as defined. This clause is clearly intended to apply to libraries. Its impact depends on the meaning of ““terrorist publication”” and how it is to be determined whether a particular publication falls within the definition. However, the definitions in Clause 2(2) are wide and uncertain. Clause 2(2)(a) defines as a terrorist publication one which provides,"““direct or indirect encouragement or any other inducement to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism””;" or, under subsection (2)(b), one which contains,"““information of assistance in the commission or preparation or such acts””." How far does Clause 2(2)(a) go? Would it apply to a book about the Easter Rising of 1916? Would it apply to Nelson Mandela’s memoirs or old SWAPO pamphlets? In practice, it will impossible for a librarian to know whether even apparently innocuous material might serve as an indirect encouragement to an individual. As Universities UK states, Clause 2(2)(b) could cover even the most basic chemistry textbook, let alone more advanced material in subjects such as biology, physics and engineering. Even material in the fields of literature, political science and history could be argued to be useful to some degree in the hands of a potential terrorist. The provisions of this clause, as it is currently drafted, are so wide as to make it extremely difficult for a librarian to know whether making certain material available for loan would expose him to the risk of prosecution. As a result, librarians may withdraw from loan standard text as a result of fear of prosecution. As was pointed out by many noble Lords, Clause 2 lacks any requirement of intent. In a speech to the House of Commons on 26 October, the Home Secretary said:"““The Bill extends the provisions to those who disseminate terrorist material, including on the internet, but makes clear that those who simply transmit material that does not reflect their views will not be caught””.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/10/05; col. 334.]" However, the Bill is not at all clear in this regard. It goes even further than Clause 1, flawed as it is, which provides a defence to an academic who publishes a statement that glorifies terrorism so long as he did not intend to encourage terrorism. Under Clause 2, if the publication is simply disseminated, the librarian would still be open to prosecution. Furthermore, the definition of ““terrorist publication”” is highly subjective. Under Clause 2(6), the definition is dependent on time and context, not merely on content. The same publication may therefore be deemed a terrorist publication in one instance, but not in another. Even more tellingly, as my noble friend Lady Williams pointed out, there is a significant reversal in the burden of proof, from the prosecution on to the defence, in requiring a defendant to establish the defences that are set out in subsections (8) and (9). Indeed, it may be impossible for libraries to avail themselves of some of the defences. Libraries could be deemed to have examined a publication through the act of cataloguing it and to have endorsed it by the act of selecting it for purchase or accepting it under legal deposit. As my noble friend also pointed out, these provisions could also put the British Library in statutory conflict with the British Library Act 1972 and Legal Deposit Libraries Act 2003. To vet and possibly exclude a number of items from its collection would put the British Library in breach of its obligations to collect a copy of every publication produced in the UK and Ireland. Sadly, I do not have time to deal with the provisions of Clauses 3 and 6, but they, too, give rise to major concerns in the library and academic community. I shall make one final point. It is usual for a sponsoring department to help those who are affected by particular provisions. In this case, there was little good in the library community asking the DCMS for assistance. It was asked directly by the libraries to make representations to the Home Office. It failed to do so. The DCMS consulted neither the library community nor the academic community about these provisions. The libraries and the universities have had to make direct representations to the Home Office. That is simply not good enough. Legitimate intellectual debate and discourse must not be curtailed, nor must genuine research be undermined. This Bill must be amended.