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Terrorism Bill

My Lords, it is a sad reflection that after 30 years of terrorism in Northern Ireland we are still introducing terrorism Bills and that we may have more Bills of this nature in the near future. I declare an interest. I am a member of the Northern Ireland Policing Board. We have learnt in Northern Ireland that legislation alone cannot beat terrorism. There are two other vital factors: first, the application of the legislation and anti-terrorist measures by the security services, the police and other agencies—perhaps a national strategy; and, secondly, the reaction of communities that may be involved. I believe that we do not have a coherent national strategy; that is, joined-up thinking and operating between our different agencies and also between the Government and them. In England and Wales we have the Government, the Serious Organised Crime Agency, NIS, security services five and six, and Metropolitan Police, SO13 and SO18. In Scotland the position is not the same. We have the Scottish police and various other agencies which may come in from time to time. In Northern Ireland we have the Police Service of Northern Ireland and perhaps a different cocktail of agencies. Noble Lords will be aware that even in a small place like Northern Ireland, where some of these agencies were in the same buildings as each other, joined-up communication was not operating as it should have been until recently—post Patten perhaps. Now, in this case geographically we are talking in much larger terms. I assure noble Lords that within all this there are empires within empires and they are jealously guarding their independence from one another. I am not suggesting that they should be all joined together. Many of these have had different aims from the start. For instance, the police have a legal mandate to prevent crime and, where crime occurs, to investigate and bring people to justice. The aim of the security services is, perhaps, to protect the national interest. That includes political direction and, perhaps under certain circumstances, not charging certain people for certain things and allowing operations to run. So they do not exactly coincide with their aim. It is not a wonder that we are being asked to sanction prolonged detention without charge. The geographic spread, the lack of communication, co-operation and transparency, and, indeed, sometimes agencies misleading each other falls far short of a coherent national strategy. There is no one really pulling all this together. Instead, they protect their empires and ask for debatable measures, such as extension of detention. We have heard from the media about the time taken to analyse IT information and forensics. This is surely a matter of resources, as has been mentioned already. Quite clearly, if we doubled them we could do things twice as fast, and so on. As a result of this lack of co-ordination, the Government are asking for extended detention, to a greater extent than virtually any other comparable democracy. However, at the same time, the Government sometimes dismiss commonly used measures, such as continued interview after charge, and the admissibility of intercept evidence. All we hear from the Government is that these measures on their own will not eliminate terrorism. We know that, but a cocktail of measures inconveniences people on evil bent. The methods that terrorists have to use to circumvent such measures may bring them to our notice. Perhaps we can think of fish going up a river. They are unseen until they have to jump over or round an obstacle, thereby revealing themselves to the practised eye. We must consider that point. The second subject that I wish to discuss briefly is dealing with suspects and the effect on their communities. Hearts and minds are all important, as in Northern Ireland. However, this is an entirely different situation. First, we are dealing with suicide bombers who have little or no links with any command structure other than their original indoctrination. The devices and systems are low-tech and have little or no dependency on others during their operation. For instance, in Northern Ireland there were scouts, cover parties, drivers, getaway cars, and so on. All those people came from the community and were therefore actively involved. We have seen that in this case terrorists are able to prepare and operate without the knowledge of their families and close community. Indeed, those groups abhor and condemn such activities. Earlier the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, talked of the intellectual argument and justification for our actions and anti-terrorist measures with which I entirely agree. But I would go further. We have the most valuable commodity of all—the support of the community and the families. We must not jeopardise that; we do so at our peril. The Government must justify their actions in practical—not just intellectual—ways to maintain that support. That surely gives us unique opportunities. Your Lordships may think that I am na&-uml;ve but I have a couple of ideas, combinations of which and some of which the judicial and law enforcement agencies may regard as threatening to their traditional position. However, we are no longer dealing with the traditional. This is a new game. We should therefore use parallel thinking, or whatever—intelligent management and consider moving community support even higher up our agenda. Is there a case for taking the families and perhaps their close friends into our confidence at an earlier stage, after arrest? I think of restorative justice-type meetings and conferences even if the suspect does not co-operate. After all, under normal circumstances, people who are suspected of wanting to commit suicide are covered by the Mental Health Act, and there are case conferences involving exactly the agencies with whom those families might like to communicate. Political and religious indoctrination is a mental state and is a psychological problem with a political or religious base. Your Lordships may have noted that we have DPPs—district policing partnerships—in Northern Ireland. The forces of law and order must find novel ways, with government support, of becoming closer and closer to communities. DPPs or such like give the latter a stake and a forum for communication. I shall say no more, but I believe that regardless of how successful people believe they are at community relations, a lot more can and should be done. It will not defeat all terrorism, but it will mean that the entire society will be supportive. That is half way to succeeding in our aim to disrupt terrorism. I support the Bill with reservations.