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Proceeding contribution from Lord Harris of Haringey (Labour) in the House of Lords on Monday, 21 November 2005. It occurred during Debate on bill on Terrorism Bill.


Terrorism Bill

My Lords, I declare an interest as a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority with specific responsibility for overseeing the work of the Met in respect of counter-terrorism. Last month, myself and the noble Lord, Lord Chidgey—who is not in his place today following the terrible road accident in which he was involved; we all wish him well for his recovery—attended on behalf of your Lordships a conference in Moscow on international terrorism. We were greeted there by a senior representative of the Russian Duma, who welcomed the United Kingdom to the ““modern world”” as far as terrorism was concerned—forgetting the history, which was referred to earlier, of the Birmingham bombings, or even back 400 years to Guy Fawkes. But the important point about that welcome to the modern world was the recognition of the changing nature of terrorism. There is a difference between the terrorism we face today and the terrorism that was faced 10 or more years ago—and that difference is that the objective of the terrorists is not to achieve a political end, a specific outcome of a nature which can be determined by political means. This means that it is not possible, even were it desirable, to negotiate one’s way out of terrorism. Furthermore, mass killing is in itself an objective. That is a very different situation from the one in which terrorists were acting to achieve a political objective and where mass killing might alienate those who made the decision. The third key difference is the willingness, indeed the desire, to commit suicide as part of a terrorist atrocity. That again is something very different, because the terrorists we have faced in the past wanted to escape; they wanted to live to perpetrate further acts. It makes the investigation that much more difficult—along with, of course, the handling of potential terrorists. I am glad that a number of your Lordships have referred to what happened in London on 7 July: 56 dead, 300 hospitalised, and thousands of body parts left at the scenes. The terrifying thing about what happened that day is that it could have been a great deal worse. Indeed, all the prior assessments as to what that kind of incident might have led to suggested it would be worse. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, said the police have not made a case for more than 14 days. I disagree with his conclusion for a number of clear reasons. I am conscious that, following the 7/7 bombings, there was a raid on a property in Yorkshire, the alleged bomb factory—or rather, as I do not know whether one should still call it ““alleged””, the bomb factory. The police entering the property came across tubs of suppurating gloop. I have seen the videos. I have seen the bubbles forming on the surface of the material. It took two weeks for there to be safe access to the property, during which there was a constant risk that the whole street would be blown away had things gone wrong. It took a further six weeks to complete the examination of the property. Had there been arrests in that case, with the two weeks ticking—or even the 28 days—that would not have been sufficient time to collect evidence from that property. In another case, the police seized from one property 650 gigabytes of computer material. Much of that was heavily encrypted. The best code-breaking experts in the country take an extremely long time to process that amount of material. Again, it is impossible to see how two weeks or 28 days would be sufficient to get to the bottom of the material contained there. Above all else, though, because of the changing nature of the terrorism we are talking about, there is a need to intervene earlier because of the risks of getting it wrong, and of people slipping through the net and being able to carry out the acts they are planning. The lines of inquiry—in one case, involving 27 overseas jurisdictions—mean that being at a stage where one can intervene safely with enough knowledge to do so is much more difficult than it has been in the past. With regard to the London bombings, 25,000 CCTV tapes have had to be reviewed. There are hundreds of documents in Arabic, and there are insufficient translations. Why did we end up with the proposal for 90 days? The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, through his assessment of the material he was provided with, came to the conclusion that 90 days was an appropriate length of time to allow suspects to be held, subject to judicial review of various sorts, before charge. The police’s professional judgment was that 90 days was the appropriate time. We all rely on professional judgments of one sort or another; for example, when we visit a physician. We have heard today a number of professional judgments from legal experts, QCs and lawyers. Here we had the professional judgment of the police. Now, I am not trying to weigh the relative merits of an Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police against a learned QC and say which is the better in terms of professional judgments. I am quite clear, though, that we should listen to the judgment of the police, and take it extremely seriously. This is not a scientific matter, just as it is not a scientific matter for the lawyers who tell us that, in their professional judgment, something is wrong. It is a judgment; a professional best estimate. That is what the police provided the Government with, which is why the Government initially came forward with the 90-day view. Various noble Lords have speculated about what may happen if different periods of time are put before this House. I do not yet know whether that will happen. Moving from 14 days to 28 days is an important step in the right direction, but it clearly falls short, by quite a long way, of what was the professional judgment of the police who are involved in these cases. I have also heard it said that one of the alternative solutions is much greater investment—that if, for example, you were to invest in much more intensive surveillance of terrorist suspects, this risk would perhaps go away. The reality is that a group of individuals will have 200 close contacts. It may have 2,000 contacts in a wider network. To maintain proper, 24/7 surveillance, as the noble Baroness, Lady Park of Monmouth, said, requires teams of perhaps 10 people. Three teams have to cover 24 hours, perhaps with back-up staff to assess the information that they collect. To cover that kind of number of people would require a force engaged just in surveillance of twice the size of the entire Metropolitan Police service. That cost of that, I suspect, would be rather more than we could afford. It would be several billion pounds. I close by commending some of the remarks of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark. If we take the measures in the Bill before us, whether amended or otherwise, we must do so in the knowledge that they are only one part of combating terrorism. At the same time, we must address the long-term issues which provide a flow of young people who are prepared to become suicide bombers; for example, what converts a normal adherent of Islam into somebody who might be prepared to act as a suicide bomber? To do that, we have to address the long-term issues that are regarded as matters of grievance by the Muslim community around the world, be it in the Middle East, Kashmir or Chechnya. Unless those grievances are removed, the message that they receive will still seem to have validity. At the same time, in the measures that we take here, we must act proportionately and clearly. To do so, we must explain what we are doing and why we are doing it. I believe that the measures in the Bill, whether the 28-day detention period is amended or not, are proportionate. They are certainly appropriate. If we explain them properly and use them wisely, they will be part of an effective contribution to dealing with international terrorism.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
675 c1478-81 
Session
2005-06
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
Related items
Deposited Paper HDEP 2005/570
Monday, 21 November 2005
Deposited papers
House of Lords
Subjects
Disclosure of information Civil liberties Criminal investigation Detainees Chemical weapons Intelligence services Incitement Judges Libraries Internet National security Police Organised crime Powers Nuclear weapons Proscribed organisations Police custody Publications Sentencing Universities Terrorism Stop and search Training Trespass Right of search Remand in custody Interception warrants Encouragement of terrorism Sunset clauses
Legislation
Terrorism Bill 2005-06
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk