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Terrorism Bill

moved Amendment No. 130:"After Clause 24, insert the following new clause—"    ““EVIDENCE (1)   The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (c. 23) is amended as follows. (2)   In section 5(3)(b) for the words ““or detecting”” substitute ““detecting or prosecuting””. (3)   In section 17(1) after the words ““Subject to section 18”” insert ““and section 18A””. (4)   After section 18 insert— ““18A   EVIDENCE (1)   Notwithstanding section 17, evidence of— (a)   the contents of an intercepted communication, and (b)   communications data, shall be admissible in criminal proceedings to which this section applies. (2)   This section applies to— (a)   proceedings in respect of serious crime; (b)   proceedings in respect of an offence or offences relating to terrorism. (3)   An application for permission to introduce such evidence may be made by the prosecution for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution to which this section applies, and not otherwise. (4)   Unless and until an application has been made by the prosecution in any such proceedings, the provisions of section 17 shall continue to apply in connection with those proceedings. (5)   In deciding whether to admit evidence under this section, the court shall take account of all relevant considerations, including in particular— (a)   any application by the Secretary of State to withhold the evidence or part of the evidence on the grounds that its disclosure, or the disclosure of facts relating to the obtaining of the evidence, would be contrary to the public interest, and (b)   any submission that the evidence was obtained unlawfully.”””” The noble and learned Lord said: Ten days ago we had a debate in this House on the Interception of Communications (Admissibility of Evidence) Bill, the purpose of which is to make intercept evidence available in cases of serious crime, including terrorism. I hope that that Bill will in due course be referred to a Select Committee, for the reasons that I gave 10 days ago. This amendment has exactly the same objective but takes a more direct approach. The events of 7 July make it more than ever necessary to use every shred of available evidence to convict those suspected of being terrorists before they commit their atrocities. The recent decision of the House of Lords that evidence obtained by torture is no longer admissible underlines that necessity. We have gone over that ground many, many times in this House. I have some sympathy with the noble Baroness for having to listen to my arguments yet again. I shall outline them as quickly as I can. As recently as 20 July this year, the Prime Minister said that he was, in principle, in favour of intercept evidence being admitted in court, subject of course to suitable safeguards. He said that he would consult the security services again to see whether something could not be worked out. Many others have expressed the same view, including the Newton committee, Sir Ian Blair and Sir David Calvert-Smith, the retired Director of Public Prosecutions. We all know that the security services, and GCHQ in particular, are concerned that their techniques should not be compromised. But I believe that a way can be found to admit evidence in at least some terrorist cases without revealing their methods. Similarly, a way can be found to protect those who work for mobile telephone companies. I have in my hand a letter from the Mobile Broadband Group, which comprises all the main mobile telephone companies. It says that it has no objection in principle to this evidence being admitted provided that its witnesses can be given anonymity, which they point out is the case in France, Germany, the United States and Canada. That brings me back to a point which I have mentioned over and over again. We still are the only country in the world, other than Ireland, which does not admit this evidence. In Australia, the federal director of prosecutions has said, as recently as 22   February 2005, that he could not do without intercept evidence. Australia has a system of separate warrants, which are evidential warrants for use in court and warrants which are solely for intelligence purposes. In this country, we call that the two-tier system. It was discussed as long as five years ago. I remember attending a Home Office conference on this very subject where it was top of the agenda. I have to ask yet again: if it can be done in Australia, why can it not be done here? I know that there is fear among all those who have worked in intelligence services that once evidence is admitted in a single case, Pandora’s box will be opened and defence lawyers will have a field day. I suggest that that fear is misplaced. It will always be for the prosecution to decide in any case whether to use intercept evidence. If the prosecution decides not to use the evidence, there will be no way in which the defence can get hold of it. Section 17 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act will provide a complete bar. No one suggests that this evidence will be useful in all cases or even in a majority of cases, but it will be very useful in at least some cases. What is difficult to justify is a blanket ban on the use of intercept evidence. Because that is so difficult in my view to justify, and that being all that I seek to achieve, I beg to move.