Proceeding contribution from Lord Robertson of Port Ellen (Labour) in the House of Lords on Tuesday, 13 December 2005. It occurred during Committee of the Whole House (HL) and Debate on bill on Terrorism Bill.
Terrorism Bill
On the grounds that I do not have the same amount of déjà vu on the subject as everyone else, I will speak first in the debate initiated by the noble and learned Lord. First, again I declare what might be an interest. I am deputy chairman of Cable and Wireless, the second largest telecommunications company in the country. But I repeat that I talk today from my experience as a former Secretary of State for Defence and as a former Secretary-General of NATO, which is why I am strongly and passionately opposed to what sounds on the face of it to be the attractive proposition that the noble and learned Lord puts forward. If I thought we could protect all the sources and techniques and still make intercept evidence available, I too would be attracted. But I know that we cannot do so, which would make it a serious liability, counter-productive and, indeed, dangerous to those involved in these activities. We were told recently by the authorities that both before and after 7 July major operations of a terrorist nature in this country have been frustrated by information that was gained. It may not be sufficient to put anyone on trial, but it has prevented atrocities taking place. I believe that all in this country agree that deterrence is better than simple conviction. If, by convicting a couple of people, we declare our hand and expose our techniques for gathering information on a wide range of things, we would have a bad bargain and we might rue the day we went down that route. Most of these arguments have been rehearsed in previous debates. Not only did I participate in the debate on the Private Member’s Bill brought forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, but I have also read some of the other debates that have taken place. The ground is well and truly trodden, but sometimes in politics certain key things need to be repeated in order that they can be appreciated fully. The fact is that communications of all sorts are becoming ever more sophisticated, complex, concealed and surmountable. The criminal classes present a constant challenge in their efforts to stay ahead of those who stand for an ordered rather than a disordered society. If we were to expose the methods by which information is gathered, as inevitably we would have to do if the law was changed in the form being suggested, we would suffer more and be in much greater danger. I shall go over some of the evidence put forward in the last debate, but before I do so I should like to pray in aid someone who takes a view similar to that of the noble and learned Lord; sometimes, it has to be said, with the same persistence. I refer to Mr Anthony Arlidge, QC, who appears to be doing the rounds of the legal conferences arguing in favour of the admissibility of intercept evidence. I do not know him personally or anything of his provenance, and I do not know how mighty he is in terms of the legal profession. However, he certainly pops up at conference after conference arguing strongly that intercepted information should be put into evidence. He has a somewhat na&-uml;ve view of telecommunications since he seems to think that the only evidence we are talking about is telephone evidence. Much of the information gained is not strictly telephone evidence at all, but for the moment we shall leave that to one side. I shall quote from a press release issued by Mr Arlidge’s chambers after he attended a Sweet and Maxwell conference held on 28 June this year:"““However, Anthony Arlidge QC cautions that allowing intercept evidence to be used in court would not be without risk. The defence might seek to argue, he claims, that it is relevant for them to know if, for example, there has been a participating informant and then try to force the argument to the point that the prosecution have to drop their case””." That is exactly the point I made in the last debate. Indeed, it was at the suggestion of the noble and learned Lord that, in extremis, that is what the Government could do, but nothing would be more likely to undermine the authority of the court system and the strength of argument against terrorists than dropping cases in the middle of proceedings. However, Mr Arlidge goes on to make a quite devastating point:"““Once taps are admissible, the opportunities to play this game will be greatly extended””." So we are not talking here about some layman who was the subject of criticism in the last debate when I made the assertion that clever lawyers can always be outwitted by even cleverer lawyers. We now have a very clever lawyer making the argument that we are opening a door here. If he says there is a risk, it is right and proper to examine that risk to see whether it is worth taking. Let me refer to some of the other views that have been expressed. The noble and learned Lord mentioned a few of the authorities which argue in favour of intercept evidence being used in court. In his 2004 report, the Intelligence Services Commissioner was very frank indeed: he said it would assist the operation of those hostile to the state if they were able to estimate, even approximately, the extent of the work of the Security Service, SIS and GCHQ in fulfilling their functions. That is a very clear and explicit point. The commissioner was quoted by the noble Baroness, Lady Park, in the previous debate, in a speech which is well worthy of Members of this House reading again. But, of course, as we found in the previous debate, the most devastating evidence against the proposition put forward this evening comes from Sir Swinton Thomas, the Intercept of Communications Commissioner. There was a remarkable exchange between the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Ackner, in the previous debate. I am sorry the noble and learned Lord, Lord Ackner, is not part of the tableau today. It was quite memorable. It was certainly worth spending a Friday afternoon in the House of Lords simply to enjoy it. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Ackner, chose to read out the letter from Sir Swinton Thomas, which the Intercept of Communications Commissioner had sent to both of these mighty former Law Lords. Sir Swinton Thomas was absolutely clear in what he was saying. He said categorically in his 2004 report that he was left in no doubt that the balance falls firmly against any change in the present law and that any amendment would overall be damaging to the work of the security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies. We are bound to listen to the considered view of this eminent lawyer—who was given the task by the country of looking specifically at this issue—and to bear in mind very carefully what he has said. But, of course, he went beyond what he himself called the bland words in his report. I think they are pretty devastating words—they do not sound bland to me—but in the letter that he sent to the two noble and learned Lords, Lord Lloyd of Berwick and Lord Ackner, he went beyond that. The noble Lord, Lord Ackner, said that Sir Swinton Thomas added that his view is that the disclosure that is now sought would do untold damage, especially to law enforcement and intelligence, and substantially increase the risk to us all. I do not believe that this House and this Parliament can afford to ignore such an explicit warning given by the man charged with that responsibility. If we are to do anything in this regard before we take that step, the words in the letter sent to both the noble and learned Lords, Lord Ackner and Lord Lloyd of Berwick, should be held very much in mind. I suggest that the argument still remains, very clearly and positively, against making any change in the existing law.
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
- Reference
- 676 c1218-20
- Session
- 2005-06
- Chamber / Committee
- House of Lords chamber
- Subjects
- Disclosure of information Civil liberties Admissibility of evidence Criminal proceedings Codes of practice Appeals Administration of justice Detainees Crimes against property Communication Electronic surveillance Evidence Intelligence services Judges Police Prosecutions Proscribed organisations Police custody Politics and government Scotland Terrorism Remand in custody Time limits Telephone tapping Cryptography Sunset clauses
- Legislation
- Terrorism Bill 2005-06
- Link
- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
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