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Proceeding contribution from Lord Cameron of Lochbroom (Crossbench) in the House of Lords on Tuesday, 13 December 2005. It occurred during Committee of the Whole House (HL) and Debate on bill on Terrorism Bill.


Terrorism Bill

In holding the scales, justice may be blind but there is no reason why prosecution should be. Speaking as a former Lord Advocate, I would have expected to be aware of all the material which led the police force to suggest that there should be a prosecution of an individual for a terrorism offence. I remind noble Lords that in Clause 19, the Attorney-General, though not apparently the Lord Advocate, is given the discretion whether prosecution should proceed in certain matters relating to,"““the affairs of a country other than the United Kingdom””." It is perfectly reasonable for the Lord Advocate in Scotland—although I hesitate to think who it would be south of the Border; it may well be the Attorney-General in a case so important as to involve intercept evidence—to consider whether it would be advisable that such evidence should be produced in court. There might be many reasons why it should not be, but that is a matter of discretion which the Attorney-General or the Lord Advocate can consider and discuss with those who would be most effective. I must say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, that perhaps it would easier to stop the use of the evidence at first blush than have it produced by the prosecution and have the Secretary of State intervene by coming into court and saying that it should not be used. The first place to consider whether it would be appropriate in all the circumstances to lead it as evidence is at the point when the prosecution is marshalling its evidence. I have a great deal of sympathy with what the noble and learned Lord is endeavouring to do in this case. Frankly, the fears that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, has ventilated—and I have read the Second Reading debate on the Bill proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd—may perhaps be overstated. If we cannot trust the prosecutor in deciding where these matters lie, who can we trust? If we trust the Attorney-General in Clause 19, why cannot we trust him and the Lord Advocate in deciding whether these matters should be led in evidence against the background of all the concerns that have been expressed, both today and in earlier debates? For that reason, though with a certain caution about the one part of it that I mentioned, I generally support the thrust of the clause.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
676 c1222 
Session
2005-06
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
Subjects
Disclosure of information Civil liberties Admissibility of evidence Criminal proceedings Codes of practice Appeals Administration of justice Detainees Crimes against property Communication Electronic surveillance Evidence Intelligence services Judges Police Prosecutions Proscribed organisations Police custody Politics and government Scotland Terrorism Remand in custody Time limits Telephone tapping Cryptography Sunset clauses
Legislation
Terrorism Bill 2005-06
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk