---

Terrorism Bill

I had not understood that aspect of the speech of the noble Baroness. I am sure that it is my fault in comprehension rather than the fault of the noble Baroness in elucidation. As I understand it, if the noble Baroness is right, lifting the ban on intercept evidence would make very little difference because my understanding of what the noble Baroness said was that most of it would not be useful to the prosecution anyway. Perhaps if I develop my argument—and I promise to do it crisply—the noble Baroness will not be as unsympathetic to what I am saying as she has been so far. My difficulty with the ban is that there will be certain circumstances in which intercept evidence will be cogent evidence for the purposes of prosecuting an alleged terrorist. The problem with not using it is that our constitution has to resort to extremely unconstitutional measures; such as, for example, a system of control orders under which we have to detain people without being able to prosecute them. In the debate that we have had this afternoon on 28 days versus 90 days, one of the reasons why the police are insisting that 90 days is the appropriate term between arrest and charge is because of the ban on intercept evidence. There are very strong constitutional reasons to lift that ban. Having said that, I am acutely aware of the dangers to the security system that the noble Baroness, and other noble Lords who support her, identify: to individuals, to the systems of security and to the technologies used. It is crucial that they are all protected. Therefore, the answer to this problem is surely the one given by the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, who, in effect, said that the prosecution should have the discretion to use intercept evidence in appropriate cases. Of course the prosecution will not use intercept evidence where there is any threat to the security services or to the advanced technology that enabled them to achieve the ends that they sought. I think that that is accepted by all noble Lords. But there will be circumstances in which intercept evidence can be deployed in court against an alleged terrorist without in any way compromising the sources of that evidence. As I understand it, all that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, is seeking to do is to introduce into the law an opportunity for the prosecution to deploy intercept evidence where there is no danger that those who delivered it will be compromised. I entirely concur with the intervention made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochbroom, who said that we should trust the prosecutor. After all, we trust the security services, so why should we not, equally, trust the prosecutor? The prosecutor will be aware of all the concerns of the security services before he or she brings the prosecution; and all those concerns will have to be brought into balance with the legitimate constitutional concerns that have been expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and other noble Lords in this House. The correct approach is to leave it to the DPP and, in certain extremely difficult cases, the Attorney-General, to balance legitimately protecting our security, on the one hand, against the constitutional desirability of prosecuting people on the other—rather than subjecting them to control orders or to very long periods of detention without charge, which are repugnant to our constitutional traditions.