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Terrorism Bill

That is why I say that there might be an increase in convictions but that that would be modest. Experience from other countries shows that the resources required to ensure that intercept material can be used evidentially would limit the number of evidential cases that law enforcement could handle. Let me explain why. Intercept as evidence will not transform results against the most serious criminals or against terrorists, who tend to be the most security-conscious in their use of communications. I know that it is the serious criminals and the serious terrorists about whom the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, is most anxious. Let us consider them. This is not just the UK’s conclusions, which were based on the examination of real cases. For example, there has been recent media reporting of unsuccessful use of intercept product in terrorist trials in Spain and Italy. Australia’s latest published figures on interception under the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 report for the year ending 2004 shows that there were no convictions in the five terrorism trials that used intercept evidence in 2003–04. The Canadian 2004 annual report on the use of electronic surveillance shows that there were 683 interception authorisations that year, but that none ended with a conviction. In the United States in 2004, 1,710 intercept authorisations— that is, evidential interceptions—were used, which is fewer than in the United Kingdom; that resulted in 634 convictions. That is a lower proportion of authorisations resulting in convictions then in the United Kingdom where, using intercept for intelligence only, rather than evidentially, we estimate that we have a better rate of converting arrests into convictions. A further important consideration that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary mentioned in his Written Statement is that it does not make sense to change our system just as technology is changing and before we know what that means for how interception is regulated and deployed in future. My noble friends Lady Ramsay, Lady Symons and the noble Baroness, Lady Park, say that we cannot do it now but we may be able to do it in future, in which case we will want to, because of the obvious benefits; they are absolutely right. Technology is moving—and moving faster by the second. Over the next few years, the world of communications technology is likely to change very significantly in lots of ways. Terms such as ““wiretap evidence”” will soon be as redundant as talk of telephone operators and switchboards is today. They will be replaced by technologies such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), where the human voice is broken up into many signals transmitted across a variety of different routes before being brought together again on delivery, rather than being carried over a single line. The noble Lord’s amendments provide no guarantee of the safeguards necessary to protect the relationship between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. That would lead to a reduction in co-operation, in the options available to criminal investigation and in its effectiveness as an intelligence tool and ultimately as an evidential tool. Increased reliance on PII only could not provide the degree of assurance sought. Crucially, the amendments take no account of that technological change. The Government are working with the communications industry to understand and respond effectively to technological change and to examine any evidential opportunities that that brings. However, one thing is certain: in just a few years’ time the communications and interception world will be radically different from the one that we are looking at now, let alone the position when the noble Lord was more actively engaged in his previous role as Interception of Communications Commissioner. That is true for the rest of the world, not just the UK. Indeed, the early signs are that the UK is ahead of the rest of the world in meeting the challenges. The additional work commissioned on the subject will be completed by the end of the year. It would be premature to try to pre-empt the conclusions. But it is clear that the introduction of new technologies will raise by several notches the required protection of techniques and capabilities.