---

Armed Forces

rose to call attention to the level of operational commitments on the Armed Forces and the issues of recruitment, retention and funding, including the procurement programme; and to move for Papers. The noble and gallant Lord said: My Lords, I asked to initiate this debate because Britain’s Armed Forces have to face not only in Iraq and Afghanistan probably the most demanding, dangerous and complex operational challenges that they have faced for many years, but major funding problems and concerns about the shortcomings of equipment currently in service on operations and, in particular, the vulnerability of the old Northern Ireland Snatch Land Rovers, which was starkly illustrated in last week’s Sunday Times. This is not a new problem which has suddenly arisen. In addition, the future equipment programme is in a muddle and is significantly under-funded. I know that at least one noble Lord will address that very important issue in some detail. The Defence Logistics Organisation, set up under the Strategic Defence Review, needs sorting out to make it, to use modern jargon, fit for purpose. I am told that in the Financial Times today there is a suggestion to combine the Defence Procurement Agency and the Defence Logistics Organisation into one large organisation. I hope that Ministers will think very carefully before they move along that path. These major structural problems are taking place when the Armed Forces are heavily committed on operations. At the same time, it would be a mistake to underestimate the negative impact of high profile courts martial, such as those of Trooper Williams and others. Frankly, there are parts of the Army that feel battered by the lawyers. All of this is happening at a time when our troops are heavily engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Army is already breaking the operational guidelines about the gaps in operational tours, which were announced with a flourish at the unveiling of the Strategic Defence Review. The earliest that these guidelines could be met would be late 2007. All this has led to a slowly growing demand for a federation or a union. What I hope for from this debate is that it will at least make some people more aware of the huge demands on our fantastic Armed Forces and why they need greater support. I shall focus mainly on the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, procurement, and why there appears to be a growing demand for a military federation or union. Before I talk about Iraq, it is important to remember the other operational deployments in places like Bosnia, where we have been for some 16 years, and Kosovo. Currently, they are not such demanding operations as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, although Kosovo may well become increasingly difficult. Noble Lords will realise that the political and security situation in Iraq has become increasingly challenging and dangerous. Our Armed Forces, both Regular and Reservist, are doing a magnificent job and I pay a warm tribute to the Reserve Forces and what their contribution has been. Something like 14,500 Reservists have served in Iraq. While I am certainly not suggesting that we should pack our bags and come home with our tail between our legs, it does not help that the war has become increasingly unpopular and no longer commands the support which it did. I am sure I do not need to remind the Minister how important support is for the Regular and Reserve servicemen and women fighting in Iraq and how vital it is also for their families. In all I say, we should never forget the pressure on our service families and what they have to cope with. I would add that getting the Army’s message across has been impacted, I believe, by the decision to cut the three single service directors of public relations. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, will say something more about that because he has firsthand knowledge. As a start, it would be helpful if the Government as a whole—I stress, as a whole—put their full support behind the war. I personally am not clear what the coalition’s strategic security objectives are in Iraq or how it plans to achieve them. I realise that you cannot look at security in isolation and have to consider the political and economic objectives as well. I also recognise that it is not an easy question to answer in the time available and that the Minister may prefer to give a more detailed written reply. But it would be a great help if he were to outline at least the key political and economic objectives of our strategy, and I say that because I have a real sense of drift and confusion about where we are going in Iraq. I am not sure that commentators and policymakers really understand what General Sir Rupert Smith was talking about when he described the difficulties of fighting a war among the people, and how difficult it is to conduct complex military operations in a nation you are trying to help when at one minute our soldiers are acting as peacekeepers, but then suddenly and very dramatically the situation changes and they are fully engaged in a major fire fight with an enemy dressed the same as many of the innocent bystanders—and they have an enemy trying to kill them in the most bloody way possible. At the same time, soldiers sometimes have to try to make arrests in vehicles that they know do not provide adequate protection. I shall move on to Afghanistan, a country which exports a very high proportion of the heroin on the streets of this country, and I accept that it is a noble objective to want to greatly reduce the Afghan heroin crop. But I wonder if we have thought through the implications of our policy. I believe that it is a huge long-term challenge and I have very serious reservations about the size and fighting capability of our deployment, and about our operational objectives in Afghanistan. I am not arguing that we should not be there; we are where we are, but we need to recognise that the situation on the ground could well deteriorate seriously and quickly. We therefore need to consider the implications of this on the need for increased force levels and additional equipment; and more widely, the implications for NATO, Pakistan, and the allies serving with us in Afghanistan—who incidentally are already on very different and much more restrictive rules of engagement. One has only to take a brief look at the history of Afghanistan to put this deployment into perspective. Here I am not just thinking about our own nation’s previous disasters there. More recently, there has been the defeat of the Red Army, albeit with significant CIA and other support, but that strategic failure in Afghanistan played a significant part in the collapse of the Soviet Union. I happen to believe it is na&-uml;ve to think that the destruction and removal of the poppy crop can be achieved without a major fight. I hope I am wrong but, like most soldiers, I have been educated to plan on the worst case. I would like a clearer understanding of the Government’s plan for the removal of the poppy crop and what the replacement economy will be. I would also like a clearer understanding about the role of other government departments and other nations, and what part they will play in the nation-building of Afghanistan. I would particularly like to know about Pakistan, which clearly has a major role to play. If I am right in thinking that things will get worse before they get better, from a military perspective we need to recognise that even from a cursory glance at our force levels in Helmand province, we do not have an adequate reserve in theatre ready and available. Helmand province, as has been said in many newspapers, is a very dangerous area, and very exposed. In addition, it is exposed to the turbulent tribal areas of Pakistan and to infiltrators from Iran. It does not make military sense, to me, for a reserve to be in the United Kingdom or, say, Cyprus. It needs to be readily available, in theatre, acclimatised and aware of local conditions, and not some hundreds of miles away. Even more worrying is the fact that there is no adequate reserve at the theatre level available for General Richards, who commands the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, and for whom I have great respect. We are breaking the basic rules of military tactical and operational level planning. The coalition failed to think through the possible consequences of the war in Iraq, and I have a nasty feeling we may be doing the same in Afghanistan. The Minister should be quite clear: I will of course support our and NATO’s forces in Afghanistan, but I want the Government to recognise the challenges which our Armed Forces are facing and that significant reinforcements of people and equipment may be necessary. In addition, it will be critical for other government ministries to play a major role and to work closely with the Ministry of Defence and with the forces on the ground in what is likely to be a dangerous environment. In thinking about Iraq and Afghanistan, I wonder where the political and military schwerpunkt is. I have to use that word, because it is a wonderful, Clausewitzian word. It means: where is the point of main effort? Is it Iraq or is it Afghanistan? I put this thought on the table because I sense there is a lack of European political will and European military capability to support both theatres of operation adequately. This was a strategic dilemma, on a much greater scale, which faced Churchill and Alanbrooke during the Second World War. I hope we are not making the mistake of trying to be strong everywhere and ending up being strong nowhere. Before I leave operational issues, I should like to add that I recognise why it is necessary to break the operational guidelines on the gap between operational tours for our very small Army. But like many other planning assumptions made by the previous and present Governments, they have been shown to be very optimistic.  Indeed, some of the Armed Forces’ problems today are a hangover from the previous Government and when I was on my watch as Chief of the Defence Staff. But there has been the time, even if there has not been the money, to rectify some of those mistakes. Frankly, I get a real sense that the Army, in particular, is too small. Given the current pressure and intensity of operational service which is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, I wonder whether the tour intervals planned between operational tours, not only for the teeth arms, but for the signals and the logistical and medical services, are realistic and whether they need to be longer. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, will say more about that. When the planning guidelines were issued, I do not believe that the planners really contemplated this intensity and this tempo of operational service. As I have said, I believe that the fundamental problem is that the Army is too small for the many tasks being laid upon it. I urge the Minister to consider this point very carefully. I have no doubt that any such study would cause all sorts of problems in the Budget, and certainly with the Treasury, but it needs to be properly addressed and thought through. As I have confessed, some of the problems go back to my time as Chief of the General Staff and Chief of the Defence Staff when the operational guidelines given for such studies as Front Line First and the defence cost studies led to hasty decisions which had significant consequences on the effectiveness of our Armed Forces. The cuts were made before the assumptions could be properly tested. I now turn to procurement and the forward equipment programme which is, of course, of the greatest importance to the fighting effectiveness of our Armed Forces. I know that at least one noble Lord will discuss that in some detail. I would also like to thank the Minister for what I know he is doing to grip the procurement programme. It is a hugely complex issue and I wish him well. Certainly, it is under-funded and in a muddle. I have a few random points or questions. I hope that the Minister will tell us today what is being done about improving as a matter of the utmost urgency the replacements for some of the vulnerable vehicles that our soldiers have to use in Iraq. In addition, what steps are being taken to improve the security of our helicopters and the air transport fleet? Moving on from urgent operational requirements, will the Minister give us a progress report on the future rapid effect system vehicle, which was given a very high profile as a vehicle, was critically important to the re-organised, more mobile Army, and was a key element of the Strategic Defence Review in 1998? I could be wrong, but I understand that no prototype has been designed, yet this vehicle is due in service in five years’ time—in 2012. In the same year, the Lynx and Puma helicopters are due to come out of service. Both are critical for the Army’s and the Royal Air Force’s operational effectiveness. What progress is being made on the selection of their replacements? In addition, what are the Minister’s views on the Defence Procurement Agency? Is it on top of its job? Is it properly structured? Is there a strong and powerful enough single service voice, really able to influence the programme at key stages in the design and procurement process? Surely, there can be no doubt in anyone’s mind that, given the operational pressure on our Armed Forces, they need a future equipment programme that is effective, credible and delivered on time. That would send an important signal that the Government understand the operational pressure on our Armed Forces and why they need to be given the best possible equipment available. I should make it clear, as I have said before, that some of the problems started before the present Government took over. Again, I thank the Minister for what I know he is doing to grip this huge, complex and difficult area. My final point concerns the mood and morale of our Armed Forces. They are a very special group of people, for whom I have a great affection. I am beginning to see for different reasons early signs of the sort of mood of unhappiness that developed in the Armed Forces in the late 1970s when, due to a number of reasons but mainly because of very poor pay and what became known as the ““Irishman’s pay rise””, morale was very low. That was when Northern Ireland was going through a particularly difficult stage. I was responsible for running a course which all the captains in the Army attended. There was very serious talk about federations and unions. We are beginning to hear similar talk now. Before people say that it is a good idea to have a federation or union, we need to analyse why they are saying that. My view is that if you produce a federation or union you will undermine the ethos of our Armed Forces and the chain of command and, very importantly, you will totally distort the relationship that should exist throughout that chain of command. That chain of command includes not just the military but Ministers and civil servants. The latter have a very real duty not only to serve Ministers, but to make sure that they are looking after the interests of our servicemen and servicewomen, Regular and Reservist, and their families. Before any hasty decisions are made, we really need to think through why there is a growing demand for some form of federation or union. I say, solve the problem and the need disappears, as it did in 1980. In conclusion, I hope that the Minister will understand that I am not trying to score cheap political points. The issues that I am trying to articulate are ones that give me great cause for concern because I believe that our Armed Forces are not being given the assets or budget that they need. I am convinced that the Army are too small and that the Armed Forces overall are significantly under-funded. I beg to move for Papers.