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Armed Forces

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Inge, and congratulate him on opening this debate so well. I shall concentrate on a major topical procurement issue, following the interesting contributions of the noble Lords, Lord Trefgarne and Lord Dykes. Last week, the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer commented about the future of the nuclear deterrent. During Prime Minister’s Questions, the Prime Minister said,"““the decision will have to be taken in this Parliament””.—[Official Report, Commons, 21/6/06; col. 1315.]." The Chancellor spoke of his support that same evening in his Mansion House speech. At yesterday’s Prime Minister’s Questions, the Prime Minister went further, saying that,"““we will of course consult the House fully. The method of doing so will be announced at the time when we publish the White Paper””.—[Official Report, Commons, 28/6/06; col. 253.]" So both of them have reaffirmed their support for continuing our nuclear capability. Inevitably, our present system will, with the passage of time, reach a stage when its reliability can no longer be guaranteed. Although that is by no means imminent, long lead times mean that some decisions must be made quite soon if there is to be no break in capability. There are many aspects to consider before reaching such decisions. I can touch on only some of them. The first—it is obviously the key issue—is whether this country needs such a capability in future. Looking 30, 40 or more years ahead, it is impossible to forecast any set of circumstances in which the government of the day would find such a potent capability vital. Trident was adopted in the early 1980s when our defence policy was concentrated on NATO and Europe. We did not foresee the end of the Cold War less than a decade away or our subsequent involvement in large-scale expeditionary warfare thousands of miles from these shores. The deterrent posture of the Cold War has little relevance today because changes in deployment and operation have been necessary. I cannot contemplate using nuclear weapons against a terrorist or largely asymmetric threat. If they could not be used, their deterrent effect is non-existent. Their use, or threat of use, must be for situations where national security is mortally threatened. I recall discussions from as long ago as 1989 with my then opposite number in the United States, Admiral Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which his firmly stated position was that any decision to use US nuclear weapons would be confined to dealing with a major threat to the security of the United States itself. Whatever the NATO rubric of an attack on one being deemed an attack on all, that would not, he said, guarantee the US using nuclear weapons on behalf of others in NATO, even the UK. Only if the threat was to the United States itself would their use be contemplated. Post Cold War, it is highly unlikely that the Crowe position on the use of US nuclear weapons will have changed. To rely on another nuclear-capable country, no matter how friendly, to come to our rescue by threatening, let alone using, nuclear force on our behalf is not realistic.  If the threat we faced were seen as mortal to our security and way of life, only a national deterrent capability would be credible, and then only if underwritten by a realistic determination to be prepared to use it. It would also lack credibility to rely solely on a nuclear capability not backed by other military resources. Conventional military strength is an important part of a deterrent or counterforce posture, as are other non-military threats or actions in achieving a desired outcome. Conventional forces must therefore be maintained and, indeed, strengthened from today’s levels that have been cut too far. Our conventional strength is now tied to a defence planning assumption that we would not become involved in major confrontation or conflict without strong allies. This dichotomy between major action only with allies and unilateral nuclear action if we face mortal danger nationally needs some explanation or elaboration that I hope Her Majesty’s Government will provide. Another consideration about retaining a national nuclear capability is the degree to which it is seen and recognised to be independent. At the use or threat of use end, given the right security of communication, capability and national control is there. Reliance on others and their facilities beyond our shores for supply, maintenance, modification or repair has been cited as reasons for denying that Her Majesty’s Government have true independence. But it is not credible to argue that no operational capability will be available, even when relying on offshore support, if Her Majesty’s Government were ever to have to consider its use. The present combination of nationally provided warheads on US missiles does not deny Her Majesty’s Government the possibility of independent use. Nevertheless, we must revisit the arguments that led to the adoption of the current procurement and support arrangements for Trident. Will the United States’ view about this country retaining a nuclear capability with major assistance from it mesh with its revised global stance and ambitions? I believe that it will, although our recent experience over access to technology in the joint strike fighter that we are building with the Americans has not been a happy one. A further consideration is the invulnerability of the nuclear capability to pre-emptive attack and destruction. Until there is a breakthrough in underwater detection, the submarine and missile combination provides a high degree of protection and a high assurance that the capability would be available for use if necessary even if a surprise attack on it were ever attempted or contemplated. Less well protected would be land-based weapons or weapons relying on launch from aircraft platforms. There is potential scope for trading security from sabotage or attack with the relative lower cost of less and invulnerable systems. This too must be examined. While a nuclear weapon has an awesome capability, it is in truth even more a political rather than a military weapon. So the politics of possession must also be weighed in the balance. The position of the United Kingdom in the United Nations and on the Security Council may in future depend on this country remaining in the nuclear nations’ club. I leave it to others to weigh this argument, but it should not be overlooked in the process of the decision taking. No Act of Parliament is required for the Government to proceed to a replacement system. But, as Mr Straw said last Thursday in another place:"““Decisions on Trident’s replacement have yet to be taken. When they have been taken, they will be put to Parliament in a White Paper. I cannot anticipate at this stage the most appropriate form of debate, but it will be in a form that shows proper respect for the House””.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/6/06; col. 1468.]" I am certain that your Lordships would also insist on a debate in this House. I believe that the Government are right in principle to maintain an independent nuclear capability as insurance for the unforeseens and for the leverage it can provide. But it should be backed by a better level of conventional capability that we can deploy today. What form our nuclear capability should take needs much further knowledge-based discussion than has so for been possible in public. Noble Lords will have noted from Mr Straw’s statement that the Government intend to reach decisions first, ahead of informed debate; that is to announce and defend, in the classic way adopted by all past governments on this issue. Perhaps the Minister would like to confirm this for the House.