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Armed Forces Bill

I do not know whether these provisions have been lifted entirely out of the Army Act 1955 or are a new construct, but it is interesting to look at the way in which Clause 6 is framed. Not only does it not mention mutiny, but the first two offences are that the person, "““agrees with at least one other person subject to service law to overthrow or resist authority””," or, "““he agrees … to disobey authority””." Essentially, those are conspiracy charges. They relate to an agreement between two people to commit an offence, and the offence that they are contemplating is straightforwardly mutiny. When one looks at subsection (2), one sees that a person subject to service law commits an offence if, "““in concert with at least one other person subject to service law, he … acts with the intention of overthrowing or resisting authority; or … disobeys authority””." Those are actions. Subsection (1) is about agreement—that is, a conspiracy to do something in the future—whereas subsection (2) is about actually doing it. A proper way of approaching this might be to follow the amendment tabled by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley. We could say what mutiny is—and how a person can be guilty of it—by incorporating paragraphs (c) and (d) of his amendment and then, by adding a subsection (3), we could deal with the question of conspiracy to mutiny. That is not actually required, because conspiracy to do an unlawful act is an offence anyway, but it might make it clear if that were included. If one looks at Clause 7, one can see how inconsistent it is. It uses the word ““mutiny””. It states: "““A person subject to service law commits an offence if … he knows that a mutiny is occurring””—" something that is active— "““or is intended””—" something that goes to the future— "““and … he fails to take such steps as he could reasonably be expected to take to prevent or suppress it””." Of course, the failure to suppress a mutiny is confined to the acting and not to the conspiracy, whereas one would have thought that it is as important to quash a conspiracy as it is to quash the act of mutiny when it is occurring. These are very serious offences punishable by life. I suggest to Members of the Committee that those drafting the two clauses should look again at them very carefully, bearing in mind everything that the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, has said. Central to the drafting of those clauses should be a firm definition of mutiny. There should be no confusion between an agreement to do something in the future and actually doing it. If the Government desire to draw a distinction between the two in suppressing mutiny, they should make that very clear. I do not suppose that that is their intention, which brings me back to where I started—I suspect that this provision may have been lifted wholesale from the current legislation.