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Armed Forces Bill

This issue goes to the heart of the Bill. There are two key principles underpinning the Bill with which I hope no one in this place disagrees. The first is that our Armed Forces require a separate system of military justice. The second is that the system of justice must underpin service discipline at all times, wherever, geographically, an offence may have taken place and whether it has been in an operational or non-operational environment. The noble Lord has described his concerns at length and I have responded in a letter to him, setting out our arguments in some detail. I will not go through those arguments in detail this afternoon in the interests of brevity. However, I stress that the fundamental principle that we are aiming to achieve in the Bill is to ensure that we have a separate system of military justice which can be recognised by our Armed Forces as fair, effective and appropriate. We believe that this aspect is important. Perhaps I can give some background to why the current service discipline Acts restrict the powers of courts martial to try certain criminal offences. My understanding is that the reasons for these exclusions are historical and go back to the 17th and 18th centuries. Those reasons in the modern context have gone. It would be seen as strange for a member of the Armed Forces to be able to elect not to be tried by his peers within a court martial and to go through a civilian system. Nowadays, protocols exist between the civilian and service police and the prosecuting authorities. Our aim is to have the same flexible approach apply to murder or manslaughter as already applies to offences such as grievous bodily harm and the most serious sexual offences. The amendment, like the existing restriction, would cause practical difficulties. I shall give one example of where the restriction would lead to unfairness. If a soldier were suspected of raping another soldier twice, once in the United Kingdom and once in Germany, the services could deal with the offence in Germany, but not in the United Kingdom—they would have to be tried separately. Other examples could be given, and I would be happy to provide further details to your Lordships, but this is a fundamental principle of the Bill. It ensures that the Bill provides a separate system of military justice for our Armed Forces. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, raised numerous ECHR judgments. Apart from the case of Findlay, which he mentioned, the essentials of the court martial process have been consistently upheld. The decision in Morris was overturned in Cooper by Strasbourg, and no legislative change followed Morris. The only change since Findlay has been the decision in Greaves against naval uniformed judge advocates. We have carried out a careful examination of ECHR compliance and I have described it in some detail in the letters that I have sent to noble Lords.