---

Road Safety [HL]

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do not insist on its disagreement to Commons Amendment No. 6, on which the Commons have insisted for their reason 6B. We return once again to the offence of causing death by careless driving. The question before us today is whether a custodial penalty should be available on summary conviction for the offence, and I shall concentrate on that. A number of issues need to be addressed before I can move on to discussing why the Government are insisting on this amendment, and I recognise the strength of feeling in several parts of the House on this matter. I am therefore obliged to repeat, but not at great length, some of the points I made on the previous occasion when we debated this. This legislation has been considered carefully and was the subject of extensive consultation. The consultation itself was preceded by a review in which a wide range of stakeholders was consulted, including judges, the police and road safety campaigners. The policy is not being rushed. I realise that there is some concern that these offences were not included in the Bill from its introduction, but that was because they were still the subject of the consultation exercise we were carrying out and we did not want to pre-empt the outcome of that process. We made changes as a result of that consultation, and included the offences in the Bill as soon as we were able to do so. The maximum penalties provided for this offence will be 12 months on summary conviction or five years on conviction on indictment. I emphasise that those penalties are the maximum that would be available to the court. If the court did not consider a custodial penalty to be appropriate, it would use other methods of disposal; for example, by imposing a fine or a community penalty. I did not respond directly last time when the noble Baroness, Lady Gardner, asked what would happen if a mother reversed out of her driveway and caused an accident to her child. I cannot conceive of any court prosecuting and passing a sentence against a mother in such circumstances, but in any case that would be for the court to make its judgment. Here we are merely seeking to establish maximum penalties where careless driving has clearly resulted in death, and is therefore serious. Some noble Lords may be concerned that sentencing will be inconsistent or unfair, but we are seeking to ensure that guidance from the Sentencing Guidelines Council will be available to inform sentencing decisions. The only obligatory elements of the penalty would be disqualification and endorsement, as is the case with other bad driving offences where death is caused. This issue is not one to which we can return, as both Houses have now agreed. I realise that certain noble Lords are concerned about it, however, and I believe a mistake was made at Third Reading. I cannot say whether a mistake was made, only which amendment was voted upon. That is the only judgment I can make. We voted on whether this offence should have a custodial penalty attached to it on summary conviction. The Government lost that vote at Third Reading in this House by the very narrow majority of 159 to 153. I cannot assume that everyone who voted on that amendment did so in the mistaken belief that they were voting on the penalty for the offence as a whole. I wish to concentrate on the effect that our vote would have on the operation of this offence. On the previous occasion that we debated this matter, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lyell, stressed that in his view a mistake had been made in the way the amendments had been dealt with, although he recognised that it was not a mistake on the Government’s part. I reiterate what I said to the noble and learned Lord on that occasion. The Government can deal only with the Bill as it is before us. If a mistake has been made, we are not in a position to correct it, nor dare we presume the basis on which noble Lords voted. The other place has insisted on its amendment that a custodial penalty should be available on summary conviction to avoid what I think the House will recognise as the perverse consequences of providing that a Crown Court only can impose a custodial penalty for this offence. It is those perverse consequences which I urge noble Lords to concentrate on and recognise today. The failure to provide for a custodial penalty on summary conviction would mean that any case that might conceivably warrant a custodial sentence would be referred to the Crown Court for trial. This would increase costs and anxiety for the defendant. This runs contrary to views expressed during the consultation exercise. The Magistrates’ Association is clear that in its view if it is to have the power to try this offence, it should have a full range of penalties at its disposal. In addition, under changes made to magistrates’ powers under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which are awaiting implementation, if a magistrates’ court accepts jurisdiction in a contested case but finds,on trying it, that a custodial sentence was after all justified, it will cease to be able to commit it to the Crown Court for sentence, even if it considers its sentencing powers to be insufficient. I assure the House that the Sentencing Guidelines Council, which is charged with publishing definitive sentencing guidelines for all criminal offences in England and Wales, has asked the Sentencing Advisory Panel for advice on sentencing for the new bad driving offences that would be created by this Bill. It will also review the existing guidelines for the offences of causing death by dangerous driving and causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs. This will ensure that courts are aware of how these offences work together and what factors to consider in relation to sentencing. It will also ensure that sentencing for this new offence is consistent and fair. The factors to be taken into consideration would be subject to consultation, to which noble Lords will have the opportunity to contribute. I encourage the House to do so. I believe that this is the most appropriate way forward. I noted the letter of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lyell, in today’s Times. I am forced to recognise that throughout these long debates I have fallen short of persuading him of the Government’s case. That is not for want of trying; we have expressed our opinions clearly on several occasions. I pay great tribute to the way in which the noble and learned Lord presented his case. He and the Government fundamentally disagree on this matter. Nevertheless, the Government have gone as far as they can to implement a manifesto commitment and to see through that commitment by votes in the other place—votes which fully considered the careful scrutiny which this House gave to the issues, including not just scrutiny on the detail but the principled case which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lyell, made supported by his Front Bench. Therefore, I hope that noble Lords will recognise that the Government have reached this position after the fullest possible consideration of the matter. The Government have a majority in another place. That majority has spoken. Therefore, I hope that the noble and learned Lord recognises that even if he again expresses his reservations about our position, it would not be appropriate for a further vote to be taken on the matter. Moved, That the House do not insist on its disagreement to Commons Amendment No. 6, on which the Commons have insisted for their reason 6B.—(Lord Davies of Oldham.)