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Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Bill

The noble Lord, Lord Trimble, went out of his way to say that he would concentrate on Amendments Nos. 6, 7 and 8, and did not touch Amendments Nos. 3, 4, and 5. The noble Baroness did Amendment No. 5. Amendment No. 3 was moved, but if no one has spoken to Amendments Nos. 3 and 4 I could save the Committee a bit of time by not dealing with them, although I am happy to. I shall kick off with Amendment No. 5 and go through Amendments Nos. 6, 7, and 8, because those are the ones that we have actually debated. Amendment No. 5 is in many ways similar to the model envisaged by the UK and Republic Governments in the proposals for a comprehensive agreement, which were published in December 2004. Those proposals were, as the Committee will be aware, the Governments' best call at that time of arrangements that would be likely to command sufficient support among the parties to enable there to be an agreement to go back into devolved government. Since then, my right honourable friends the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State have been engaged, along with colleagues from the Irish Government, in a series of discussions withthe parties about the best way to move forward. The arrangement set out in paragraph 9 of annexe A to the St Andrews agreement, and provided for in Clause 8, represents our assessment in the light of those discussions about the best model to introduce. I acknowledge that this does not provide an opportunity for Assembly Members to endorse the Executive's composition. However, it will in effect already have been endorsed by the electorate, since it is the people of Northern Ireland who determine through their voting the party strengths in the Assembly and therefore entitlement to sit on the Executive. That is of course an issue that the Bill envisages the Assembly, through the committee to be established under Clause 11, taking a closer look at in the years ahead. Our minds are not closed to the prospect of change; I want to make that absolutely clear. It is just that we do not feel that it is possible to go further now. There is one change to the proposals made in annexe A of the St Andrews agreement which Amendment No. 6 seeks to nullify. The reason for the change is that, without it, on the current demographics, it would be impossible for there ever to be a nationalist First Minister. That is why the new Section 16C(6) provides that in circumstances in which the largest party in the largest designation is not in fact the largest party in the Assembly it should be the overall largest party that nominates to the office of First Minister. Without that we would signal that on the basis of current demographics we could never see a nationalist First Minister. I do not believe that that is what the Belfast agreement envisaged—far from it. I do not believe that it is what any right-thinking person would envisage either—that the system has that automatic check. It would deny the community the hope of ever having the opportunity to nominate a First Minister. It is very hard to defend a situation in which the largest party in the Assembly is prevented from doing so by a quirk of the arrangements. This should not be portrayed as allowing a minority to dominate a majority or to receive preferential treatment. The offices of the First and Deputy First Ministers are equal offices, jointly held. Like the noble Lord, Lord Glentoran, I do not want to go down the road of what parties will say at the election; that is for the parties in Northern Ireland, which are best placed to make their arguments and present their manifesto at election time. We believe that Clause 8 is an appropriate means of delivering the commitment made in the St Andrews agreement and we cannot support the amendment. I shall deal with Amendment No. 8 before discussing Amendment No. 7. It deals with a related issue of how Ministers, once approved, may be removed from office. The amendments in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Trimble and Lord Glentoran, would amend the 1998 Act to provide a discretionary power for the Crown to exclude a Minister or a junior Minister from office if the Prime Minister were to advise that it was in the national interest. I am aware of the concerns that noble Lords might have. Should there be adequate mechanisms to exclude Ministers from office where appropriate? Those concerns were voiced eloquently and at length yesterday, when the Bill was debated in the other place. We recognise that noble Lords remain apprehensive about what provisions may be made in relation to, among other things, a potential return to violence by the Provisional IRA. Those are heart-felt fears and we respect them, but we believe wholeheartedly that Northern Ireland has undergone a complete transformation. We remain convinced that the amendment is unnecessary and that it goes too far. Ultimately, it is procedurally beyond the scope of the Bill and outwith the gift of this House. I hope that noble Lords will allow me to offer some reassurance on the safety mechanisms already in place on ministerial conduct, because that goes to the heart of the amendment’s concerns. The pledge of office that all Ministers must make before taking up office requires a number of commitments that are clearly intended to protect the national interest and that of the Assembly and the electorate, including a commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and non-violent means. This Bill strengthens the pledge, adding four further commitments which Ministers are obliged to make, including the commitment to uphold the rule of law based on the principles of fairness, impartiality and democratic accountability, including support for policing and the courts. While the pledge of office sets out the standards for ministerial conduct, Sections 30, 30A and 30B of the 1998 Act ensure that wide-ranging powers are already available for the Assembly or the Secretary of State to exclude Ministers from office when those standards set out in the pledge have been breached. Comprehensive mechanisms already exist to exclude a Minister from office where appropriate, so the amendment is unnecessary. However, there is a quirky, technical issue that the noble Lord may not have been aware of when he drafted the amendment. The conventions and process that must be followed when the Queen’s consent is sought is that the Palace should naturally be given as much time as possible for consideration, and the guidance states that that should never be fewer than 14 days. So procedurally it would not be appropriate for such a measure to be brought forward by emergency legislation and the amendment is therefore beyond the scope of the Bill. That is a hell of a good argument. I could have used it to start with, but I wanted to save it, because the House deserved and needed the other explanation. It was no good my trying to kill it with a technical issue because we are not here to debate technicalities; there are important political issues behind the amendment. The amendment would make provisions superfluous to the needs of the smooth functioning of the Assembly. I turn to Amendment No. 7. In Northern Ireland, as the noble Lord has said, although the position is not quite as he explained it, most statutory functions are vested in departments rather than in their Ministers. That arrangement dates back to the establishment of Northern Ireland itself, which was not put together in the last few years. Originally there were six departments, which for devolution were divided up into 11. They were created as corporate bodies in law, on which statutory functions were conferred. However, that does not subordinate ministerial authority in any way. The Departments (Northern Ireland) Order 1999 makes it clear that the functions of a department shall at all times be exercised under the direction and control of the Minister. The departments are not acting independently of the Minister. Consequently the noble Lord’s amendment is unnecessary, as it would not have any practical effect. The situation has been different with direct rule over the past 30-odd years, with Ministers coming and going, and sharing three or, as in my case, four departments. We are described as the commuting, part-time direct rule Ministers. It is not the same as Whitehall. You leave an awful lot of the day-to-day work to others, but you, as the Minister, are responsible. The issue that the noble Lord raised about Northern Ireland departments possibly refusing to follow a Minister’s direction is not unique to Northern Ireland. In the United Kingdom civil servants operate under the Civil Service code, and if they believe they have been asked to act improperly they can seek a direction from the Minister. At that point such a direction can be given, and that is normally the case. It is set out in writing; copies are sent to the Treasury, and I believe they are also sent to the Public Accounts Committee, so the direction is placed clearly on the record. The difference in Northern Ireland is that the departments were created as corporate bodies back in 1922, but there is no surprise about that.