---

Middle East and Afghanistan

My Lords, one of the disturbing aspects about our military involvements in Iraq, and now Afghanistan, is the degree to which Her Majesty’s Government, maybe unwittingly, have surrendered some control and authority over our Armed Forces. Let me make clear at the outset that nothing I say detracts from the high regard that I have for the way in which all three services, from top to bottom, have been performing to support the Government’s wishes. I share the widespread admiration for their efforts. My particular criticism is focused on the slipshod way in which Her Majesty’s Government have been prepared to deploy and commit our forces. The timing of our initial military involvement in Iraq in 2003 was preceded by political restrictions on overt preparations which compressed timescales. It was not the best way to embark on a large-scale expeditionary operation. Moreover, we were committed to operations by the timing of the United States’ decision to invade Iraq and its declared and clear intention of achieving regime change. Our professed reason for participating was the removal of a threat from weapons of mass destruction, although it was not denied by the Government that if Saddam fell it would be most welcome. So from the start there was some confusion about the strategic political aim of the coalition, and that could have affected the way in which the forces carried out their tasks. Fortunately, the Iraqi initial resistance was very poor and the divergence in aims did not cause the operational difficulties that could have arisen if the resistance had been stronger or more prolonged. It was also disturbing to learn that confirmation of the legality of our involvement had to be sought by the Chief of the Defence Staff of the day, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce. Both the US and UK Governments saw and characterised the invasion of Iraq as the actions of ““liberators””. However, it was only a matter of months before we ““liberators”” were being recast as occupation forces, not least in the eyes of many Iraqis and some of their neighbours. The label ““occupation”” is now very widely used. The Prime Minister and other Ministers have repeatedly said that our continuing deployment in Iraq would be governed by the wishes of the Iraqi Government: we would stay or go at their request. The initiative on when to reduce or withdraw our forces is left not clearly with Her Majesty’s Government but with the Iraq Government. As the weeks, months and even years have gone by, and with our additional involvement in Afghanistan, our forces have become over-committed on these two fronts. By ““over-committed”” I mean that our forces are operating way beyond defence planning assumptions, as the noble Baroness, Lady Park, has just mentioned, for which the defence budget had not been adequately funded, and for a protracted period of time. The situation has now developed to the state that difficulties with key enablers such as air transport and helicopters and a drawdown on essential operational training have become more and more critical. One cannot properly go to war, or take part in operations that may involve fighting or difficult peacekeeping, without adequate backing and preparation of additional or replacement units. The actual or likely reduction in junior and middle rank officers and senior NCOs by resignation or early retirement can only cause further problems with bringing on and training new recruits. The worse this difficult situation becomes—and time is not on our side—the more important it is to be absolutely clear that the decisions about our deployments lie in the hands of our own Government and not that of another, no matter how friendly. A further complication is that if the Americans are to continue to operate in the Baghdad area, the security of their lines of communication from Kuwait and the Gulf through the British zone around Basra will be of great importance to the US forces. In other words, the timing and scale of withdrawal of our forces might be decided not in our own national interest or to correct and relieve overstretch in our own forces, but on the wishes of the Americans and/or of an Iraqi Government whose writ does not seem to run widely in their own country. That, again, is not to criticise the forces. Our participation was an inevitable consequence of the protracted high level of commitment in Iraq and because some NATO countries were reluctant to take part. In short, there was not enough to go round the two theatres at the more prudent levels of effort that would reflect and cater for uncertainties about the strength and determination of the opposition. Ministers admit that the scale of Taliban attacks was greater than had been anticipated—certainly a great deal more than Dr Reid’s forlorn hope, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Blaker, that our forces in Afghanistan might be there for three years without ever having to fire a shot. Thanks to the superlative efforts of our forces, the Canadians and a few others, we have so far managed to dominate the battlefield in southern Afghanistan, sadly not without casualties. But is it realistic to believe that this can be done into the next year and beyond without deploying much greater strength in theatre than is there at present? The Government acknowledge now that this is necessary. Why otherwise have the Prime Minister and Defence Secretary made so much effort to get other NATO nations to step up to the plate? Until those few that do so are trained for the intensity of operations—and are then deployed—the situation is not going to be eased. A rise in the casualty rate cannot be ruled out when faced with such determined and suicidal opponents. Redeploying forces following a drawdown in Iraq may be a help, but Her Majesty’s Government should make it very much clearer that this is their intention and that they are not going to be overruled by one or more of our allies in Iraq. In his Chatham House speech last week, there were indications that the Defence Secretary’s thinking was starting to move in that way. That is welcome as far as it goes. But my criticism is that the Government have for too long let it be understood that our deployments and even strengths in the two theatres were to be at the behest of the host nations or the US Government. Staying ““until the job is done”” or ““staying the course”” as our American allies have expressed it, is not a proper strategic posture when the levels of commitments are as high as they have been—well above defence planning assumptions—and so beyond by a considerable margin what ground forces in the front line and all three services in the key enabler areas of support are resourced, trained and able to sustain. I believe that the time has come to be far more robust and honest in our statement of future intentions. The service men and women who are out in theatre—and those who are going to be committed in the coming months—deserve a clearer understanding of what it will involve for them. Even this line of approach may be overtaken by events. It is alarming that an individual as eminent as the former US Secretary of State Colin Powell, as was widely reported last week, said that the war in Iraq could be considered a civil war. Kofi Annan was even more depressing, saying the situation was worse than civil war. If faced with open civil war in Iraq and the total loss of control by the Iraqi Government that that would imply, it might be necessary for us, the Americans and other coalition forces in Iraq to withdraw very rapidly—even at the expense of having to leave behind valuable equipment and stores. And whatever the future holds for us in Iraq, it is all too clear that far more effort is going to be necessary in Afghanistan—and over a period of years—if the Taliban is not to re-establish control in the southern areas of Afghanistan. The Foreign Minister in Pakistan was reported as saying the Taliban was going to win in Afghanistan and NATO was bound to fail. The Pakistan Foreign Ministry later said that their Minister’s remarks had been misrepresented. Apparently he did not say that the Taliban was winning the war in Afghanistan and NATO was bound to fail. However he did emphasise that the military approach alone would not resolve the problems of Afghanistan. It must be combined with a political and economic approach. We and the local Afghan people need to see much more of that in the weeks and months ahead. The Government, if they are minded to stay in Afghanistan, must speed the drawdown in Iraq and provide the increased resources that protracted expeditionary commitments require. Is it possible to continue to hold at the current level of forces in Afghanistan and not have to increase them? I doubt it. Even at present levels more is urgently required to support operations. Promises expressed by the Prime Minister last month on his visit to Afghanistan must be honoured. So far it is not clear that they are. Without a much more full-blown commitment of resources, we may indeed lose out to the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. There will be no chance then for the political and economic levers of a co-ordinated strategy to work, to set Afghanistan on a stable footing. Whatever new direction we take, let the Government remember their responsibility not to over-commit the Armed Forces as has happened in pursuit of their objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan thus far.