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Kosovo

My Lords, we adhere to that agreement, and we will press others to adhere to it as well. That is the straightforward answer. May I set out the context of the debate with a brief update on where the UN-led status process has reached? The process was launched a year ago following a report to the UN Security Council by the Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide—I hope I have pronounced his name reasonably competently—which concluded that the status quo was unsustainable. There would never be a good time to resolve this difficult and complex problem, and therefore the international community should meet its responsibilities by gripping it now. The Foreign Affairs Committee in another place reached a similar conclusion in its report last year, judging that deferring a decision on Kosovo’s status would serve only to make it increasingly unstable and hostile towards the international community. Last month, the UN special envoy and former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari, announced his decision to adjust his envisaged end-of-2006 timetable and to present his proposal for a status settlement to Belgrade and Pristina without delay following parliamentary elections in Serbia on 21 January. I have mentioned our adherence to that timeline, and Her Majesty’s Government fully support that decision. We recognise the case for deconflicting the final stages of a difficult status process from the elections in Serbia. Equally, we believe that any delay to the process should be strictly limited, and we therefore also support former President Ahtisaari’s intention not to delay further to allow time for a new Government to be formed or for presidential elections to be held. We expect that, having engaged with the parties over his proposals, the special envoy will present his recommendations to the Security Council. We recognise that this is a sensitive matter. The special envoy’s proposals will no doubt be the subject of detailed discussion in the UN Security Council. However, we believe that the international community should back his recommendations. As has been said in this debate, Ahtisaari brings great experience and judgment to his work. We have every confidence in him to deliver a series of recommendations that provide for the most viable way forward for Kosovo and for the stability of the Balkan region as a whole. As a member of the Contact Group and a permanent member of the Security Council, the United Kingdom has a key role in supporting the special envoy throughout the process and in encouraging the international community to be decisive about following up on Ahtisaari’s recommendations. I am well aware, as is the House—noble Lords have mentioned it—of Chinese and Russian concerns. We have noted recent statements from Moscow indicating opposition to an imposed settlement, but we have also been working with Russia in the Contact Group throughout the process. As part of that group, Russia has accepted that any settlement should be acceptable to the people of Kosovo and that striving for a negotiated settlement should not obscure the fact that no party should be allowed unilaterally to block progress. We will strive to maintain close co-operation throughout the end-game, although, given the way in which the Russians have described these matters, I do not imagine that it will be easy. However, the Russians need to understand, as I believe the House has understood—my noble friend Lord Anderson and the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, made this point—that every post-conflict situation is different. There is no universal blueprint for dealing with frozen conflicts exactly along the lines of Kosovo; they are all different. Kosovo is unique because of Milosevic’s unconstitutional abolition of its autonomy in 1989, his regime’s brutal oppression of the Kosovo Albanians throughout the 1990s, the systematic ethnic cleansing of 1999, the NATO campaign of that year, and UNSCR 1244, giving the UN Security Council the central role. In my judgment, it would be far better for Russia to look at the situation in that way—as being distinct for those distinct reasons—without trying to produce an artificial conflation with a series of wholly unrelated issues. It is for President Ahtisaari to make his recommendations on the possible outcomes of the status process, and, as I said, he will have our full and unequivocal support. Our firm hope is that we can achieve all this through a negotiated agreement. But, if the UN special envoy’s view is that an agreed settlement is not possible, the international community must be prepared to draw the necessary conclusions and face its responsibilities. The Contact Group has set out the conditions for the negotiating process and the outcome in a set of guiding principles endorsed by the Security Council and in a ministerial statement following a meeting in London in January. Those texts make it clear that Kosovo cannot return to the situation before 1999; it cannot be partitioned; it cannot, as I said earlier, join in union with any or part of any other country; and the settlement must be acceptable to the people of Kosovo. The texts also stipulate that, having started, the process cannot be blocked. We would ideally like to see an agreed settlement, but we need to be realistic about the prospects for that in view of the limited flexibility displayed by both parties, particularly by Belgrade, during Ahtisaari’s negotiations. In our view, there is nothing to be gained by protracting the process because one or both parties refuse to engage constructively, but there is a considerable risk of instability and unrest if the negotiations become bogged down or open-ended. In the interests of Kosovo, and of the region as a whole, it is important that the status process concludes as soon as possible and in a way which achieves a sustainable, democratic, multi-ethnic Kosovo. It is of course not for me to pre-judge what the UN special envoy’s recommendations will be. I say to the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Wallace, that the costs that the EU may bear will largely turn on the detail of those recommendations. The EU will assess those matters in some detail when we are a little more certain of the totality of the recommendations. However, there is growing consensus on the part of many observers that any settlement is likely to be based on some form of independence for Kosovo, supervised by a robust international civilian and military presence and with cast-iron guarantees protecting the rights and security of the Kosovo Serbs and other minorities, as the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, and other noble Lords have stated. Such an outcome would be consistent with the guiding principles and ministerial statement agreed by the Contact Group. It is difficult to identify alternative options providing a better basis for Kosovo’s democratic future and for wider regional stability. I accept the description of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, of the pattern of weaker states in the area and what may be needed. I believe, as I think he says, that they will be weaker and continue to be weaker if outside the EU in the long run and potentially stronger if they are inside it and within this family, although on this occasion I will not be drawn on the European constitution. In our view, a key part of this negotiation ought to be about how a settlement can ensure that the Kosovo Serbs and other minorities can have a secure future in a multi-ethnic Kosovo. The UN special envoy, with our full support, has been devoting continuous energy to negotiating a set of provisions which, taken together, should provide solid guarantees for the Serbs and other minority communities in Kosovo, and which would provide them with a generous measure of local self-government. As others have said, that is very important. These provisions could include continued transparent links with Belgrade; horizontal links between Serb majority municipalities; and special arrangements in the areas of law enforcement, education, health, and protection of religious heritage sites. We believe that such guarantees, combined with the international presence to ensure the implementation of these provisions of the settlement, could lay the foundations for a multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo capable, over time, of entering the European family. Noble Lords, particularly the noble Lord,Lord Anderson, have asked about what the United Kingdom will do to help. We are focusing on Kosovo in the context of the joint Foreign Office/Ministryof Defence/DfID programme budgets. Kosovo has been allocated £2.1 million from the Global Conflict Prevention Pool for the financial year 2006-07.In addition, the FCO’s Global OpportunitiesFund Reuniting Europe programme has allocated £0.5 million to Serbia. It also has access to the Balkans civil democracy fund worth £700,000. With international partners and Kosovo authorities, we play a prominent role in mentoring and in monitoring the issues of combating human trafficking and other aspects of organised crime in Kosovo and the region. We have recently provided a sophisticated witness protection system and equipment, which I understand is now widely used in Kosovo and elsewhere to bring criminals to justice. The British office in Pristina has bid to the Global Conflict Prevention Pool for a contribution for a joint project with the Swedish Government and the UNDP on small arms—another issue that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, raised. The project’s objective is to collect and destroy small arms, light weapons, ammunition and explosives that have been seized in Kosovo. The project will also train and equip a team from the Kosovo police service to carry out properly audited, accountable destruction of such material in the future. Provided that approval is given for the final stage, the project will begin before the end of the year. Unfortunately, the course of negotiations so far clearly indicates that Belgrade remains fixated on the retention of sovereignty over Kosovo. Of course, anyone familiar with the history of the region—the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, took us back to a decisive battle; I have the precise date in my briefing notes, but I will not trouble the House with it—understands the special place that Kosovo has in the history, culture and religion of the Serb people. There must be an understanding of that. No one in the international community wants to humiliate Serbia. For the first time, Serbia is being offered the prosperity and security that would come with membership of the EU and NATO. NATO took the decision at the Riga summit to invite Serbia to join the Partnership for Peace. I expect this week’s European Council to send a warm signal to Serbia of the EU’s continued commitment to Serbia’s EU perspective. It is time for Serbia to look to the future, not—as the noble Lord, Lord Ashdown, rightly said—to be so fixated on the past. To accept that regional stability requires a settlement acceptable to the people of Kosovo must be in Serbian minds. Events since 1989 have created political realities and shaped public attitudes in such a way that Kosovo could never realistically be ruled from Belgrade again. For its own sake, and that of the Serbian community in Kosovo, Belgrade needs to rethink its approach. The international community did not fully grasp this in 1999. Let us grasp it now. The British military has been in Kosovo since 1999, and we remain, playing a key role in KFOR. We also maintain a substantial civilian presence there, with a significant diplomatic representation, as well as contributing to economic development and policing and providing advice and assistance to political and community leaders. Our engagement is not simply political, although that is important. We are intensively involved in both civilian and military work on the ground in Kosovo, aimed at delivering security, stability and progress on standards. It is a demanding challenge. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that NATO is bound to continue to deploy KFOR for the foreseeable future. KFOR, UNMIK and the Kosovan authorities are preparing in a co-ordinated way for what is bound to be a tense period following the settlement. In a more general sense, that is true not only of NATO but of the EU presence, which the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, rightly says must be there, helping to structure the future. In conclusion, I doubt that anybody in the House—particularly given the history and the wasted and missed opportunities of 1999—pretends that there is a perfect solution. Equally, we must be clear that resting on the status quo—in effect, a UN protectorate under the terms of UNSCR 1244—is not the right option. We therefore need to give our full support to the UN status process led by Ahtisaari. Once he delivers his recommendations, we must be completely resolute in taking them forward. It will, for sure, be difficult. It will be easy to point to the problems that could take the process away from a conclusion, but we must be aware that there will never be an easy time to do this. It is much better to make the move now, rather than camping on the fragile status quo, which would be the worst option for the area’s security. Our vision for the future of the western Balkans is to see steady progress towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, asked specifically about the European Union andthe European Council meeting. Enlargement is on the agenda this week, and the UK will press forward. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, asked whether we were really committed to it. I promise that there is no end to the trouble that my colleagues and I have gone to. My right honourable friends Douglas Alexander and Geoff Hoon have been deeply involved in precisely this issue, and Geoff Hoon was most recently in the region on7 November. We are working hard with EU partners to ensure that the EU’s response to this major UN process in Europe will be neither hesitant nor divided. To achieve that, we need a complete resolution of the legacy issues from the break-up of former Yugoslavia. I suspect that Kosovo is the major outstanding issue. It is in the interest of Europe as a whole that we resolve it in a way that enhances democracy, stability, prosperity and multi-ethnicity in Kosovo, Serbia and the region as a whole. We shall carry on pressing for those objectives because they are the objectives of the Parliament of the United Kingdom and they are right for the countries involved.