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Kosovo

rose to ask Her Majesty’s Government what proposals they have for the future status of Kosovo. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to open this short debate on Kosovo. It is timely because the status problem is likely to be resolved shortly, and it is important that your Lordships should be able to express views beforethat decision is published. Perhaps the Ministerwill confirm the expected timetable. We know that Martti Ahtisaari, the UN special envoy, has delayed his report until after the elections in Serbia on21 January. His proposals are then likely to be passed to Pristina and to Belgrade in February, and to be published in March. The EU Commission has already given its views on the importance of the decision in its annual report, which was published on 8 November. In addition, the text of the Council’s joint action on the establishment of the EU preparatory team has declared that the EU has a vital interest in a positive result of this process and stands ready to enhance its role in Kosovo following the status settlement. Technically, of course, Kosovo is now part of Serbia and therefore regularised by UN Security Council Resolution 1244, but it is in legal limbo and, in practice, a UN protectorate, which leads to intense frustration among the Albanian majority. The EU report states that the status issue has dominated Kosovo politics and has deflected Kosovo from necessary internal reforms. It points out some areas of improvement, such as strengthening the Assembly’s role and establishing new institutions, but its overall tone is very negative. In particular, it highlights alack of, or inadequate, progress in key political and economic fields, and points out that unemployment remains high and that more needs to be done in fields such as organised crime, the trafficking of human beings, and drugs. Otherwise, as optimists might say, it is a highly favourable report. It is sad to reflect that the imminence of the decision on status has been known for some time but that it did not stimulate greater effort to make progress in Kosovo. It might be helpful to look at Kosovo in its regional and historical context. The prospect of EU membership is a major positive factor for the west Balkans as a whole. The EU correctly recognises that much of the solution lies in boosting regional co-operation and integration and in reducing the existing barriers to intra-regional trade. Yet we know that we face enlargement fatigue and that the question of absorption capacity lies like a cloud over the whole region, even over Croatia. There is also some evidence of recent backsliding in the region. There is strain in Macedonia, for example, following the July elections, which some see as a threat to the Ohrid Framework Agreement. And a year after candidate status was accorded to Macedonia last December under the UK presidency, the EU has still not decided to begin accession negotiations. Then there was the October election of Silajdzic for the Bosniak presidential seat in Sarajevo, mounting extremism in Bosnia, and the Serbian referendum on 30 October, which included a clause declaring Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia. What of Kosovo itself? Obviously we need to place Kosovo in the context of the negative legacy of the former Yugoslavia. It was the poorest province of former Yugoslavia, and much neglected. The UNDP states that the per capita income is now just over $1,000 per annum. It does have some natural resources, particularly lignite. It has enough lignite to power the country for 200 years, but it is located in areas of tension and there is low investment in it, due partly to low energy-bill collection and to land title problems. All this might, of course, improve when the status question has been resolved. On my several visits to Kosovo I have noted a lack of community spirit which includes lack of indigenous NGOs, crime, violence, and alas a dependency culture. Of the population of 2.473 million, 60 per cent are unemployed and 55 per cent are under the age of 30. The average age of the Albanians is 28 and of the Serbs 54. A recent study by two formers members of UNMIK argued that the UN had been insufficiently robust in tackling what they call the ““thugocracy””. They state that, ““most Albanians who took up arms to challenge Serbian oppression did not object to one ethnic group bullying all the others; they simply wanted their ethnic group to be the one on top””. However, the inventiveness and enterprise of the Kosovars from 1989 to 1999—the university is an example—shows that they are capable of enterprise even if they have shown little capacity for it since the war. It is small wonder that Martti Ahtisaari appears to have concluded on the basis of his experiences since February that an internal consensus is not available and that an imposed solution is inevitable. Commentators fear riots by one side or the other when the proposals are published. There is of course much combustible material from the past, but we cannot ignore the reality that 90 per cent plus of the population have a fixed determination for independence. Equally, they cannot be given a blank cheque. The result is likely to be a unique formula—independence, but with strong conditionalities, including protection of minority rights and substantial decentralisation to Serbian municipalities. It has been a bad year for Serbia, which has lost Montenegro and is about to lose Kosovo. It has a victim complex, conveniently forgetting the responsibility of Milosevic for its troubles and simply refusing to recognise current realities, as the referendum showed. But the international community should be sensitive to the legitimate concerns of a proud country and should do nothing to humiliate it. There is recent evidence that the international community has recognised this, including the decision on 20 November at the Riga summit of NATO. I also think of the European Union opening visa facilitation negotiations on30 November, which it hopes to conclude by the end of next year. It is all part of what has been called an EU charm offensive. There must have been strong international guarantees of minority rights with sanctions for any infringement. Again, Javier Solana has undertaken to review, after the Serb elections in January, the reopening of SAA negotiations, which were suspended in May. Clearly, the European Union hopes that this will encourage a moderate outcome of those elections. There is also a major challenge to Kosovo to act responsibly. It is fair to say that Prime Minister Ceku has taken a limited number of initiatives on national reconciliation, but the immediate prospect is difficult. Even if there is conditional independence, as recommended, this could well not be accepted by the Security Council and any status change depends on an amendment of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Russia is now in a more assertive mood and may well see independence as a negative precedent for Chechnya and could well seek to make trouble in the frozen conflicts in Georgia—in Abkhazia and South Ossetia—and in Moldova in relation to Transnistria. China’s response may be influenced by Taiwan and Tibet. Even though the West argues that Kosovo is unique, Russia and China may demand a price if they do not veto. Even if the Security Council, as expected, issues a mandate for the European Union, over time more countries will recognise Kosovo’s independence, whatever the Russian and Chinese position. I end with a series of questions to my noble friend. What are the current assumptions by his department to the response of Russia and China at the Security Council? What safeguards does he expect, apart from minority rights? Does he anticipate a continuing role from NATO even if there is an ESDP mission? I am of course aware that the GAERC at its meeting today and tomorrow will consider a proposed council joint action to extend the mandate of the EU planning team. Is my noble friend confident, however, that the European Union has fully recognised the scale of the task that awaits it in Kosovo and is making the necessary budget amendments? The International Organisation for Migration, IOM, has stated that trafficking in women and girls is now the third source of income, after arms and drugs, for the Albanian mafia network. Will he undertake to ensure that the problem of human trafficking is given high priority in any negotiations? What steps are proposed to tackle the problem of the 300,000 illegally held small arms in Kosovo that Saferworld reports are held there? Finally, and perhaps most importantly of these questions, what specific contribution will the UK make in terms of finance and technical assistance? I have one final reflection. I posed the question of what is our interest and that of our European Union partners. The answer is surely a Kosovo that is as stable as can be managed during and after the transition period, with a clear perspective of eventual membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions. Bluntly, if we do not go to them and help them manage the transition, they will come to us in the shape of refugees, illegal immigrants, organised crime, drug barons and human traffickers. Kosovo will ultimately be independent politically, with no conditions, if—and, given all its problems, perhaps this is a big ““if””—it meets the relevant EU criteria. Then, and only then, it should be welcomed as a full member of our European family.