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Kosovo

My Lords, the international community is facing a critical moment in what could—and, one hopes, will—be the final chapter in the cascade of events, many of them tragic and many of them not too brilliantly handled, that followed the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. The long-awaited report on the future of Kosovo by the UN Secretary-General’s special representative, Martti Ahtisaari, to which the noble Lords who preceded me referred, has in my view—and in this I differ from the noble Lord, Lord Ashdown—wisely been postponed until after the Serbian elections in January, although I firmly agree with the noble Lord that it should not be postponed further after that. The challenge remains how to ensure that this final chapter in the break-up of Yugoslavia is completed in a way that ensures a peaceful transition to a future that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Kosovars while guaranteeing the human rights of all the inhabitants of Kosovo and ensuring peace and stability throughout the Balkan region. That is easy to say but difficult to do. The Question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, could not, therefore, be more timely. Perhaps the easiest part of the question to answer is what the legitimate aspirations of the Kosovars are. With roughly 90 per cent of the population of ethnic Albanian origin and their absolute determination to have an independent state of their own, it is hard to see how any outcome could be accepted and respected that does not in one way or another and in some predictable timescale secure their independence. But answering that question is only the beginning of any solution. It raises the need to protect, not only on paper but in everyday life, the human rights of the minority populations in Kosovo, most obviously but by no means exclusively the Serbs. It raises also the spectre of a greater Albania, which has the potential to be intensely destabilising right across a region which contains several states with substantial ethnic Albanian minorities. It raises also the question of the prospects for EU membership of Kosovo and its neighbour, Serbia. Finding answers to all those questions, not just the simple one about Kosovo’s independence, is likely to determine whether any outcome can be sustainable and achieved peacefully. From time to time, it has been suggested that a possible solution to the problem of minorities would be to detach from Kosovo as it is presently defined those geographical areas which are principally inhabited by ethnic Serbs and to incorporate them in Serbia. However, such a solution would surely cause more problems than it would resolve and create destabilising pressure for further territorial adjustments in the region, including in Serbia. It would be to enter the logic of ethnic cleansing, which we should now aim to put behind us, not to legitimate. But if that solution is to be rejected, it is all the more essential that the personal and political rights of minorities should be permanently entrenched in whatever constitution an independent Kosovo adopts, and that the practical implementation of such rights should be ensured for at least an initial period by some degree of international supervision. As to the spectre of a greater Albania, it would probably be best if that were to be quite explicitly ruled out in any settlement which is reached over Kosovo. In the longer term, by far the most important of the questions which I have posed, and which has to be answered, is that relating to Kosovo and its neighbours’ future prospects of one day joining the European Union. There, I firmly join both noble Lords who have preceded me in saying that that is crucial to getting this situation right. It is that prospect which offers the best hope that political institutions, the rule of law and free economies will evolve steadily in a positive direction, and that nationalist pressures and rivalries will be kept firmly under control. Without that prospect, or if that prospect becomes shrouded in doubt and dispute, the chances of a successful evolution will be sharply reduced, and the risk of developments which could drag the Balkans back towards back to the nightmare conditions of the 1990s would be increased. Thatis why the European Union’s current bout of enlargement fatigue is potentially so extraordinarily damaging, to itself as much as to anyone else, and why it is so important that the European Council meeting in a few days’ time moves decisively to confirm the commitments earlier entered into with respect to all the countries of the west Balkans. I hope that the Minister will say something on that point. Even if all these questions can be satisfactorily answered, shadows remain over the prospects for Kosovo, most notably the attitude of Serbia and the manoeuvring of the Russian Federation, which has recently begun to hint at some obscure and unacceptable linkage with problems in a quite different geographical region, the Caucasus, presumably in connection with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. By using its veto, Russia can prevent the Security Council’s endorsement of any proposals put forward by Ahtisaari, even if they are backed by an overwhelming majority of the other members, but it cannot prevent Kosovo’s independence being accepted by that same overwhelming majority, thus becoming an inescapable fact of international life. Moreover, it cannot hope to impose an outcome parallel with that in Abkhazia and North Ossetia, given the Security Council’s frequently reiterated confirmation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It would surely be far better, therefore, for Russia not to brandish the threat of such linkages, but to negotiate in good faith in the Security Council on the basis of whatever proposals with which Ahtisaari comes forward and which will then be endorsed by the new Secretary-General of the United Nations. One thread that runs through all these analyses of the Kosovo problem is the absolutely central role of the European Union. In some parts of our media, even in some parts of your Lordships’ House, it is customary to mock the European Union’s common foreign and security policy as if were some kind of will-o’-the-wisp or fantasy. But in the Balkans it has been a key element for years. It is keeping the peace in Bosnia. It is helping Macedonia avoid civil strife. It has acted as a midwife to Montenegro’s peaceful detachment from Serbia. In Kosovo, too, it is a key player. Its role in the months ahead could make all the difference between success and failure. I hope that the Minister will be able to tell the House how Her Majesty’s Government intend to ensure that the EU remains united and effective in its policy towards Kosovo in the period ahead.