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Planning-gain Supplement (Preparations) Bill

I declare my interest as an honorary fellow of the Royal Town Planning Institute, vice-president of the Town and Country Planning Association, a non-executive director of Hometrack and chairman of the National Centre for Excellence in Housing. As my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury made clear in introducing the Bill, this is a paving measure that allows the Government—specifically, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Department for Communities and Local Government—to undertake preparatory work on a potential planning gain supplement. I fully understand that this is not, therefore, an occasion for a full debate on the PGS proposals, not least because they have not yet been fully defined. However, it is not adequate to nod through the Bill on the basis that we shall, if the Government decide to proceed with the PGS, have a full opportunity to debate the pros and cons of the proposals in the substantive Bill. A great deal of work will have been undertaken by then that will both contribute to the architecture of the PGS proposal and provide the momentum to take it forward. Many of us can already hear the arguments being advanced—namely, that with all the expenditure of working the scheme out having been incurred, it would be wasteful to abandon or radically revise it at that later stage. It is therefore right that we should attend today to exactly what a PGS scheme might achieve, how it might work and what impact it might have on development activity. We also need to consider how the PGS might affect the funding of any infrastructure, environmental and social works that are necessary to complement or mitigate development, and how that might compare with alternative mechanisms for achieving those goals. I am a sceptic. I have serious doubts about the wisdom of what my right hon. and hon. Friends are embarking on and even greater doubts about the likelihood of PGS delivering the benefits that they describe. That is not because I disagree with the objective; on the contrary, I wholly favour effective mechanisms for capturing a proportion of the gain that accrues from the development process for the benefit of the wider community and to finance necessary infrastructure, social provision or environmental mitigation. However, we must recognise that that is easier said than done. The history of post-war Britain is littered with the wrecks of abortive attempts to achieve that objective, first in the 1940s, then in the 1960s and again in the 1970s. On each occasion, the measure designed to capture for the community some of the gain accruing from the development process was repealed after experiences that could not remotely be described as successful. Against such a background, one would at the very least urge extreme caution before venturing again into such territory. I am not sure whether my right hon. and hon. Friends have been complimented by their civil servants on their bravery in introducing the measure, but they will recognise the double-edged meaning implicit in that. Why did the previous attempts not succeed? Essentially, there were three reasons. First, the legislation was of necessity complex, as were the processes for defining the uplift in value and hence the tax liability, which were therefore not difficult for sophisticated developers to evade. Secondly, the measures were seen as being anti-development, so developers’ natural instinct was to postpone schemes until the threat of the tax had passed. That was possible because, thirdly, the Opposition of the day had pledged to repeal such measures if they got back into power, and they did so in each case. I am not suggesting that all those scenarios apply now; the last certainly does not. However, enough of them apply to sound alarm bells. The inherent complexity of the proposal means that evasion will not be an unattainable objective. On the contrary, most informed commentators suggest that, if PGS is implemented, a small army of consultants will emerge, advising developers and landowners on how best to minimise or avoid their liability. The view of the development industry is generally hostile to PGS, so there will be all sorts of incentives to structure schemes to minimise liability. There are two key issues. First, as was implied by my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary in moving Second Reading, setting PGS relatively low will reduce the disincentive effect that undoubtedly applied to the earlier measures, in which a very high—indeed, penal—rate of taxation was involved. I fully understand that the Government have not reached their view on a figure, but I happily acknowledge that a PGS of, say, 20 per cent. would be less likely to deter development than a tax at 100 per cent. However, I am not sure that developers will decline to explore the scope to reduce or even eliminate their liability. There is huge scope for that, not just in the inherently complex nature of the scheme, but in the varied circumstances affecting the valuation of different sites. That takes me to the second key issue: the point at which the tax will bite. The PGS is predicated on the assumption that the main enhancement in value comes when planning permission is given. That is true in some cases, but in others the picture is much more complex. I leave aside all sorts of issues of hope value and other such factors and focus on two circumstances. There is sometimes a need for substantial land remediation costs before a site can be developed, or for infrastructure investment to give access to the site before the true value can be derived. Without the Jubilee line extension, the Greenwich peninsula in my constituency would not have been developable because, essentially, it was not accessible. Putting in the infrastructure of the Jubilee line was far more important to uplifting the value of the land than any grant of planning permission, irrespective of the infrastructure investment. That is where there is enormous scope for developers, with their advisers, to examine, explore and exploit opportunities to argue that it is not the granting of planning permission that explains the uplift in value, but the process of development, the enhancement of access, the remediation of the land, the opportunities to develop and the process. In many developments, a period of relatively discounted low-value rents is necessary to attract people to the site. The true values are achieved only several years down the line, when the site is seen to be working. However, PGS is predicated on the assumption that it bites when the planning consent is granted, not on the ultimate development value of the site. There are serious questions about whether this measure is the most effective way to capture development value and real risks that canny developers will find easy opportunities to evade liability. That brings me to the nub of the problem: past development taxes have generally failed because developers have seen no advantage in making the required contribution. On the contrary, they have sought to evade liability—and look set to do just the same with PGS. By contrast, section 106 contributions, despite the problems associated with them, to which I shall return in a moment, are often paid willingly by developers when they see the money being used to create a better environment for their development. That has very much been my experience in Greenwich, where my local authority raised substantial sums under section 106 from developer contributions to major local schemes such as the Greenwich peninsula or the Woolwich arsenal. The developers have been willing to agree such contributions because they can see direct benefits: better transport arrangements to serve the site, new schools, parks or health facilities that will make the development more attractive to potential investors. In short, the section 106 framework has worked for us because it has offered a win-win outcome as a result of which both parties have seen clear advantages, so there has been no incentive to try to evade the contribution. I recognise that that does not apply in all cases. The experience of section 106 is patchy: the mechanism has worked in some areas but not in others. Developers have been critical of many local authorities for making unrealistic demands or allowing the process to drag on, so delaying much-needed development. Equally, some critics have demonstrated that local authority enthusiasm and indeed capacity for negotiating section 106 agreements has been variable and that some authorities have failed to secure appropriate contributions The conclusion that I draw, as was implied by my question to my hon. Friend the Minister, is that the section 106 process can and should be improved. The sharing of good practice and the development of appropriate support and advisory services to help local authorities negotiate section 106 agreements is obviously one way in which to improve outputs. Irrespective of the Government’s decision on PGS, that will be necessary, because—as my hon. Friend conceded—a continuing, albeit reduced, remit for section 106 is envisaged under the Government’s proposals. If such improvements can be achieved—and in my view there is no reason why the poorer-performing local authorities cannot be helped to up their game to reach the level of the best—an obvious question is raised about why the Government are proposing to introduce a complex, unproven and potentially risky new task that may well end up raising contributions that are less than those that could be achieved under a properly functioning section 106 arrangement. A study undertaken by Knight Frank that was reported in Regeneration and Renewal last September suggested exactly that scenario—a lower yield for PGS than for a properly working section 106 system. The traditional section 106 route is, of course, not the only option for securing developer contributions to infrastructure or social and environmental investment. There have been some very interesting developments involving tariff systems, sometimes described as ““roof tax””. Perhaps the best-known example is the Milton Keynes system. Under those arrangements, developers are required to pay a fixed sum per home or per square metre of commercial space to finance additional community needs such as transport, health, education, environmental improvement and social housing. The evidence to date suggests that developers are generally willing to enter into such agreements when they are certain of the benefits that will flow from the use of the funds that are necessary to complement and ensure the success of their development. I am aware that such an arrangement may not work everywhere. The special circumstances in Milton Keynes, which is in a defined growth area with a clear pipeline of future expansion and where land prices are generally pretty comparable throughout, make it especially suitable for such an approach. However, there is growing interest in different means of securing appropriate developer contributions within the existing legal framework. Evidence suggests that the sums being raised are growing. It seems curious that, just when there appear to be good prospects of securing the objectives that lie behind the Government’s proposal by existing means, attention may be diverted by the introduction of a radical and controversial new tax. Given the uncertainties and risks implicit in the route on which they are embarking, I urge caution on my right hon. and hon. Friends. Whatever gloss their officials may try to put on the outcome of the earlier consultation, the reality is that the majority of informed opinion is not in favour of PGS. Nor is it a case of vested interests. The local authorities that may have the most experience of negotiating successful section 106 agreements with developers are as wary of the PGS proposals as the development industry. The Royal Town Planning Institute, of which I am proud to be an honorary fellow, described the proposals in somewhat stark terms in a press release headed ““Government ‘sleep-walking’ into unworkable new tax””. Although this is only a paving Bill, it begins a process that is inherently complex and risky and that could end badly. I urge my right hon. and hon. Friends to take stock and give careful thought to all the issues involved, as well as the considered views of the people and organisations who best know the minefield that they are approaching. If they do so, they may well conclude that the alternatives available can generate better outcomes and save them from repeating the mistakes of the past. When history has such good lessons to teach us, it is unwise—to say the least—to ignore them.