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Planning-gain Supplement (Preparations) Bill

Of course, such matters depend on how such a very big system of taxation is introduced. That is why it is important that local authority-wide pilots are run and that work is done, as is happening in a couple of local authority areas. For example, there is collaboration between the right hon. Gentleman’s party and mine in the vale of Oxford. How this might work is being looked into. Clearly, a lot of exploratory work needs to be done and, if the legislation had been broadened in that regard, it would have been much more attractive to me. What is being proposed is also a bad idea because it does not give us sufficient detail to talk about the planning gain supplement properly. I understand the Minister’s difficulty in setting the rate, but the rate issue is fundamental to how we debate the matter. Its history has been partially rehearsed. It is one of Governments experimenting with very different levels of development taxation. The first experiment was the proposals of Lloyd George and Winston Churchill almost exactly 100 years ago: there was a development tax of 20 per cent. but the proposals were not introduced because of difficulties with another place on a wider subject. The Attlee Government had the confiscatory 100 per cent. There was then Wilson mark 1 and Wilson mark 2, which had rates of 40 per cent. and 80 per cent. respectively, and the Thatcher Government initially experimented with 60 per cent. There has, therefore, been a very wide range, and where we position ourselves on that range is crucial to the feasibility and attractiveness of the scheme. If we position ourselves at the top end, there will be many major disincentive effects on development; if we position ourselves at the bottom end, the issue arises as to whether it is worth introducing this measure, particularly as I believe that the Government are proposing to allow tax offsets against other taxes such as capital gains tax. I want to develop the argument in three stages. First, as the Financial Secretary encouraged us to do, I want to look at the basic principle, his approach to which I support. Secondly, I want to look at the relative merits of adapting section 106 agreements, as opposed to introducing the new tax. Finally, I want to offer some alternatives, which the hon. Member for Rayleigh (Mr. Francois) was coy about doing. On the basic principle, most of us will agree that the Financial Secretary is right in saying that there is a very powerful philosophical case for taxing betterment and the windfall that accrues through no greater effort than achieving a change in planning status. The right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal (Mr. Gummer) wrote an article some time ago in which he mounted a spirited case against that principle, based on his experiences as Secretary of State for the Environment, but as he is not here it is probably unfair to drag him into the debate. I think that there is a general acceptance among those present that the principle of taxing betterment development value is right, but the problem is that there are already other ways of doing that. Section 106 and adaptations of it have been discussed at length, but what has not been mentioned is that capital gains tax does the same thing—it taxes windfall capital gains. The objection to relying on CGT is made in the Government’s consultation paper, which says that its effect is severely undermined by the various allowances and reliefs. The logical response to that is to tighten up on the allowances and reliefs, which I would suggest doing for wider tax reasons. At present, there is not just one but two ways of taxing betterment: section 106 and CGT. That brings us to what is essentially a practical argument: whether section 106, as adapted—the right hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich suggested how that might be done—compares with the planning gain supplement concept. The arguments against section 106 have been well made and the Financial Secretary repeated some of them. In its worst expressions, it is arbitrary and inconsistent and can be long-winded. Examples from across the country—particularly from the early 1990s, when section 106 was first experimented with—show that all those arguments are true, but it has two enormous attractions: it is purely local and it is reformable. This situation strikes me as odd, particularly as the Minister for Housing and Planning is sitting alongside the Financial Secretary today. The former Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, and now the Department for Communities and Local Government, expended a lot of effort on trying to persuade local authorities that good practice could be built on. Circular 1/97 was an example, and another circular, in December 2003, also explained how good practice could be built on. It is not at all clear that the Treasury and the DCLG are entirely at one on this issue. The former ODPM was very clear that the system was capable of being improved considerably, and some of us are disappointed that that effort has not been carried through. I could understand why the Government want to argue that that system should be superseded if there were a simple, clear and easy way of extracting development value for the taxpayer that does not happen at the moment, but it is clear that the planning gain supplement does not do that. I do not want to speak at length on this issue, as some of the points have already been made, but there are several specific ways in which it fails. First, it fails in terms of valuation issues, as the hon. Member for Watford has already pointed out several times. In part, the problem is how it is possible in practice to crystallise a transaction in such a way that the planning gain supplement can apply in a simple way. A big development will have lots of different and related planning applications. As we know from the work of our local authorities, in practice, big and complex projects often involve a necessarily long planning process, during which there is discussion of planning conditions. It is not at all clear how a single point and a single owner can be identified for tax purposes. The underlying measure that the Government propose is self-assessment, which, although it is counter-intuitive, is in fact right and a good idea. Clearly, people will not underestimate the value of their own land if at some point the Government can compulsorily acquire it at the volunteered value. What the Government have never clarified is how the system of self-assessment would be backed up by the compulsory purchase powers that would be necessary to make it effective. Valuation is possible, and self-assessment is a possible mechanism, but there is much more to it than simply saying that people should declare the value of their own development.