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Armed Forces: Nuclear Deterrent

My Lords, I welcome the Government’s decision to maintain our independent nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future. Many good points have been made this afternoon in support of that decision. I will endeavour not to tread too much on already well trodden ground, but I would particularly like to endorse the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, about how the attitudes of Iran and North Korea would change were we unilaterally to give up our own nuclear capability. It is a nuclear capability that has served us well, especially the submarine-borne strategic asset that has provided continuous, ultimate assurance of our national security since it was first deployed in 1968. Let me also take the opportunity—as did the Minister—to pay tribute to the submariners and their support staff who have maintained the Polaris and the Trident deterrent, submerged for every second of every minute of every hour of every day, without break, and undetected for nigh on 40 years. It is a remarkable human and technological achievement that, by and large, receives little or no acknowledgment. As I say, the deterrent has served us well and, given our frequently proven inability to predict events which have strategic impact, such as the Falklands, the invasion of Kuwait, or 9/11, it would certainly be unwise to abandon the security it provides at a time of huge global uncertainty and nuclear proliferation—especially by some states whose long-term stability and sense of responsibility are at best questionable. I do not need to elaborate on that given the perceptive comments of a number of noble Lords who have spoken on this before me. I also welcome the decision to stay with the submarine platform for our nuclear delivery. Apart from its cost-effectiveness, no other system can get close to its covertness and thus relative invulnerability to pre-emptive strike. Under the opaque high seas, the submarine on quick-reaction alert faces none of the threats of disruption—such as terrorism or public disorder—that can assail any system operating from the land. It is also sensible to continue with the ballistic missile which, apart from the huge range difference that allows the SSBN to lose itself in the middle of the world’s oceans, does not suffer the same vulnerability to survivability of the cruise missile. These are significant capability gaps that will not close over the timescale of the deployment of a replacement deterrent. Much talk is bandied about as to why this decision cannot be deferred, especially by extending the lives of the Trident submarines beyond the five-year extension being mooted for the class—in other words, to allow them to run on after 2024. I am afraid that those who suggest such a course of action, including the transatlantic commentators mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, expose their understandable but dangerous ignorance of operating at first hand British nuclear submarines nearing the end of their design lives, at which time they have shown themselves to be increasingly hard, and hugely expensive, to maintain, and the hurdles imposed by nuclear safety authorities become more and more costly to surmount. All our experience of dealing with ageing nuclear submarines that has been garnered over the past couple of decades can lead only to the conclusion that it would be absolutely irresponsible to push the current Trident class beyond the five-year extension to its designed lifespan. I share the fears of my noble friend Lord Powell on that point. I think that they are quite justified. Given that this means that the force will deplete to a level in 2024 when continuous at-sea deterrence cannot be guaranteed, and given the 17 years it will take to design, build and make ready a new class of submarine, it is quite clear why a decision must be made now if there is to be no break in our capability. It should be self-evident that any such planned break to one of the fundamental keystones of our deterrence posture that is represented by continuous at-sea deterrence would completely undermine the credibility of the deterrent—not to mention what it would do to the effectiveness and motivation of the submarine crews. While on the subject of continuous at-sea deterrence, I agree that it would be sensible to explore what our latest technologies can offer in terms of increased reliability, sustainability and availability, and what they might allow us to do to reduce the size of the strategic submarine force to three boats without undue risk to the maintenance of unbroken continuity of a submarine on patrol. Finally, I also welcome the Prime Minister’s comment that the investment required to maintain the deterrent will not come at the expense of the conventional capabilities of our Armed Forces and what they need. Nonetheless, it is with some trepidation that I allow in this case for hope to triumph over experience. The scepticism expressed by my noble friend Lord Owen on this is, I fear, well placed. However much the Minister may protest otherwise, the fact is that currently our Armed Forces are totally inadequately and irresponsibly under-funded for their current level of commitments and the defence planning assumptions they are supposed to meet. Now is not the time to roll out a litany of examples to bear this out—I have mentioned many of them on the Floor of the House before, particularly the deprivations of the Royal Navy—but the point I wish to register is that I fear we will see the Treasury conducting some underhand activity in the current spending round to shave the defence budget in order to allow headroom for the new strategic force. This will have a disastrous effect on our conventional military capability where already we are seeing running rife rumours that to meet savings targets, dramatic cuts are to be made. If only half of what is being leaked comes to pass, our forces will be emasculated—a very poor reward for what they have done for this Government during their time in office. We will have to examine the outcome of the Comprehensive Spending Review with great care to see whether the Prime Minister has kept his word.