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Iraq and the wider Middle East

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s question, but I do not think that it is up to the Opposition to apologise for believing the Prime Minister’s assurances to the House. I take a different view, in any case. I believe that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein was right, but that the failure to plan for the aftermath of that has been a tragic mistake and that we are now living with the consequences. I believe, and I think that the hon. Gentleman would agree with me about this, that if we did support the war, we must recognise that in many respects it has gone wrong—[Interruption]—as we did; and we must have the humility and thoughtfulness to learn from that. That is one of the tragedies of the Prime Minister not coming to a debate like this. I want to concentrate my remarks on what should happen next, but it is important to point out that there is something of a consensus across the House on where matters have gone wrong. It was the majority feeling in the House in March 2003, as the right hon. Member for Neath (Mr. Hain)—now Secretary of State for Northern Ireland—put it, that:"““in the end we as a government feel we cannot walk away from this situation, leaving Saddam Hussein unchecked, able in the future to attack the world””." But I suspect it is now also the majority view of the House that, as the Secretary of State for International Development told the Fabian Society recently:"““The current situation in Iraq is… grim, so let us be clear about that truth.””" The right hon. Gentleman said:"““the intelligence was wrong, the de-Ba'athification went too far, the disbanding of the army was wrong and, of course, we should have the humility to acknowledge those things, and to learn””." That is the voice of a member of the Cabinet, and that is precisely my view. These errors do indeed appear to have been fundamental, and without them we need not have had the parlous situation that we have today. We also know, from documents published in recent months, that much military advice to send a vastly larger number of troops to Iraq from the United States to help control the country after the invasion was ignored, and that those in the US State Department who attempted to plan for the administration of the country after the invasion were sidelined. That is a lesson to us all for the future that embarking on military action alongside another power requires confidence in our own Government that our allies have a satisfactory plan. Indeed, there are so many lessons to be learned, not only about the conduct of war and of occupations, but about the management of our relationship with the United States, that the case for a high-level Privy Council inquiry into the conduct of the war in Iraq is overwhelming.