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Foreign Affairs and Defence

The hon. Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) made a thoughtful contribution. He knows that we share much common ground on the issue of Iraq and, from what he said today, on the situation in Iran. I am grateful for the chance to speak in the debate and I intend to confine my remarks to one of the most significant challenges facing British foreign policy today—Iran. I am concerned that the US's approach is an impediment to a peaceful solution. By opting for confrontation and the rhetoric of regime change, President Bush is playing into the hands of President Ahmadinejad and the hardliners in Tehran. That can only make matters worse. I urge the Government to use their influence to get the US to change tack or at least soften its tone. We understand that President Bush is seriously considering a military strike. If he is even coming close to doing so, we risk sleepwalking into yet another foreign policy disaster, the scale of which might surpass even the shambles of Iraq. For one thing, it is not even certain that Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons, a view shared by Sir John Thomson, a former UK ambassador to the United Nations. It may be true that Iran is pressing ahead with uranium enrichment, and that that uranium could be used to build a bomb, but I suggest that Tehran's nuclear programme has always been as much about status as it has been about security. There is a possibility that Iran, like Japan, wants the prestige of having nuclear know-how without actually wanting to develop a bomb. Indeed, if we look at the region from Iran's point of view, it is surrounded by nuclear powers, be they China, Russia, Israel, Pakistan or, to the south, the US navy, so status is important. Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy Agency has been unable to uncover any concrete evidence of a nuclear weapons programme and Tehran has consistently denied any intention of building one. We saw in Iraq what problems can follow when evidence is not properly scrutinised by this place. The situation requires subtlety of understanding and action. That is where President Bush's rhetoric becomes very important. Talk of an ““axis of evil”” or regime change is not helpful. Iran can have no meaningful incentive to co-operate on nuclear power if it believes that the US ultimately wants regime change. In fact, it makes the nuclear option more attractive. Regime change is unlikely to happen anyway, as Iranians are already broadly supportive of the political system, even if many are not in favour of President Ahmadinejad. Indeed, the current confrontational approach, through rhetoric and the implied threat of military action, plays into Ahmadinejad's hands. It gives him the enemy he needs to unite Iran and harness anti-American feeling across the middle east. It helps the hardliners to secure their position at a time when economic difficulties are getting worse. The subtlety of our approach should recognise the election timetable in Iran. Parliamentary elections are due next March and presidential elections in 2009. Both Iranian elections will affect the course that that country eventually takes. One could argue that confrontation is not working anyway. Iran is still enriching uranium and does not feel especially vulnerable, believing the US to be weak and essentially bogged down in Iraq. The risk is that we underestimate how seriously President Bush is contemplating a military strike. For him, the timetable of dealing with Iran is shortened by his own imminent departure from office. He does not want to leave a nuclear Iran as his legacy and he seems prepared to sacrifice the long game for his short-term needs. However, a military strike by the US or Israel would be wholly unwise. The one thing guaranteed to push Iran into continuing uranium enrichment and developing a nuclear weapon would be a unilateral military strike. National pride, as well as strategic wisdom, would require that. Iran would probably also drop out of the non-proliferation treaty and end all co-operation with the IAEA, as the hon. Member for Islington, North suggested. Support for the current hardliners in Iran would probably increase as a result of a strike, just as the Iran-Iraq war boosted patriotic support for the regime and helped to cement the revolution. In the same way, Iranians responded to Bush's talk of an axis of evil in 2002 by going on to remove the reformist President Khatami. Air strikes would not do much damage to the nuclear programme anyway. We do not know for sure where the sites are; some are deeply embedded in mountains. Air strikes would, however, further inflame western and Islamic viewpoints. Instead of confrontation, there should be more constructive dialogue from the US and the west in general. We need a cessation of US calls for regime change, and an end of talk about an axis of evil. I suggest that we need to offer implicit recognition of Iran's new status as a major power in the region—a status that we created through the removal of Iran's rivals in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is a precedent for recognising new status: in the 1960s, when the US presence in Asia was waning and China was beginning to flex her muscles, Nixon did not respond by denying the reality of Chinese power. We need a gradual normalisation of diplomatic relations. Without that, discussions on Iraq, the nuclear issue and the middle east peace process will become more difficult. There is no doubt about it: some diplomatic efforts have already been made by the E3 plus 3, but more could be done. The west underestimates the opportunity to influence Iran and to steer the country towards a more moderate and reformist future by appealing over the head of President Ahmadinejad to the country's population and its middle classes. Iran is a state in transition, with multiple centres of authority and constant power struggles. The challenge for the west is to influence those struggles. Crude appeals for regime change undermine local proponents of reform by making them look like imperialist lackeys. Offering Iran a new relationship with the US could strengthen the pragmatists at the expense of the hard-liners. The pragmatists believe that Iran has a better chance of achieving regional prestige through negotiation. We must not forget the opportunities that engagement presents. Like Washington, Tehran is eager to avoid civil war in Iraq, with the instability and refugee movements that that could involve, and is eager to maintain Iraq's unity, albeit with Shi'ite predominance. Instead of bemoaning Iran's influence in Iraq, President Bush should seek to embrace that power and try to use it constructively, difficult though that may be. Tehran and the west also have a shared interest in tackling poppy production in Afghanistan—a point that was raised earlier. Iran has a real problem with heroin addiction, and co-operation with Britain might hold the key to reducing supply. Situations of great complexity are often played out at different levels, and Iran is no exception. For example, Germany, one of Iran's biggest business partners, is under US pressure for its companies to cut exports, and for export credit guarantees to be reduced. The German Chancellor has responded by saying that any sanctions must be negotiated in the UN. Berlin has evidence of US companies doing undisclosed business with Iran via shadow companies in the middle east. We know that the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, recently made a surprise visit to Tehran to put pressure on the regime to meet the IAEA deadline regarding uranium enrichment. Apparently the key reason is that the Kremlin sees an Iranian climb-down as the perfect way to prevent the US from setting up its planned missile radar intercept sites in eastern Europe. As President Bush insists that the stations are targeted at Iran, not Russia, he would not need them if the Iranian threat disappeared. Whichever level holds sway, and whatever argument wins through, politicians of all types need to remember that military action should always be the action of last resort; Remembrance weekend was a poignant reminder of that. Once military action is sanctioned by politicians, the way is laid open for uncertainty and unforeseen consequences. Those unwelcome visitors always come knocking at the door of even the best laid plans. That is why military action should be taken only when all other avenues have been exhausted. I believe that we can and should go that extra mile for peace. The US needs a subtlety of approach that recognises the complexities of the issue, and Britain should use her influence in the US to get President Bush to acknowledge that. We need a policy of genuine engagement to undermine President Ahmadinejad and reassure Iran that her interests need not be threatened by working with the west. While keeping all other options on the table, we need to renounce the option of a military strike in the short term. The nuclear issue is yet to be decided. A peaceful solution is possible if we can succeed in getting the US to change its policy, but time is becoming short, if only because of the presidential election timetable.