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Foreign Affairs and Defence

The operation in Basra was certainly very different. History has demonstrated that there has been a different result there. On whether there should be an inquiry, I want to make some points about our commitment in relation to our resources. We must decide to cut on our commitments or increase our resources; doing nothing is not an option. In my view, the wise choice would be to cut our commitments and increase our resources at the same time. Although in recent years we have certainly increased defence spending in real terms, we have done so at a time when the opportunities for new and improved defence technology have grown enormously. It is absolutely right to spend on new and exciting resources—new aircraft carriers, submarines, Snatch vehicles and fighter planes. We must stay at the forefront of defence technology. However, those new and effective assets must not come at the expense of our people on the ground. There is much to do if we are to house and reward our people at a level that will recruit and retain them. Like any others, defence resources are scarce and expensive, so they must be used to our best advantage. In consequence, regardless of the history, we have a responsibility to review our strategic position continuously. We should constantly ask this question: are we helping the situation or contributing to the problem? Although it makes no sense to name a firm date for withdrawal, it is sensible for us progressively to reduce our forces with the firm intention of leaving things to the Iraqis. If we do not make it clear to the Iraqi Government that they must soon deal with their own security, they will never be ready to run their own affairs. Afghanistan is a completely different kettle of fish. The fear is that the two operations are frequently seen as the same in the public eye. After 11 September, the Americans were justified in demanding from the Taliban the cessation of support for al-Qaeda, and they were right to invade Afghanistan. Appropriately, we supported them and we should continue to do so because the democratic world would be foolish in the extreme to allow the Taliban back to control a nation state and run the affairs of the people of Afghanistan. The NATO Council was justified when for the first time in its history it invoked article 5 of the treaty in defence of the USA. Let me remind the House of how article 5 begins:"““The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all””." Those are fine words, but NATO membership and the responsibilities that go with it will require the delivery of more than fine words in Afghanistan. There can be no place for a two-tier NATO, with some nations prepared to do the trouble-free bits while others, such as the British and the north Americans, are expected to bring home dead soldiers. In the light of the current support of some of our European neighbours, we have to wonder what would have happened if, during the cold war years of the Soviet Union, the Russians had invaded mainland Europe. Would some of our so-called NATO allies have hesitated until the tanks ranged at their own borders before they were prepared to put their forces in harm's way? Who knows? We will never answer that question. However, another question arises: if NATO cannot deliver significant military force from countries such as France and Germany on the back of an article 5 declaration, what is the purpose of NATO at all? After all, Afghanistan is a relatively small task when compared to the threat formerly from the Soviet Union. If nothing else, NATO's performance in Afghanistan is already convincing me that we cannot rely on a European defence force for anything but peacekeeping and parades. We must remain masters of our own destiny in military matters. I am afraid that the defence of our liberty will never come cheap; however, the failure to be ready, willing and able could be very expensive indeed.