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Counter-Terrorism Bill

I need to make some progress, as many Members want to speak. Alternative No. 3 is post-charge questioning, which we debated yesterday. Alternative No. 4 is my new clause 3, which proposes police bail with conditions similar to control orders for people on the fringe of plots, such as the inciters and funders—the sort of people we were talking about earlier. They could be closed down entirely while their computers were analysed. They could be prevented from communicating and from going where they want to go. That option was suggested at Paddington Green during our visit there. Alternative No. 5 relates to intercept evidence and the Chilcot review. Alternative No. 6 is more specialisation in the CPS, as is already happening. Alternative No. 7 would be more active case management by judges. Why are judges not tougher on some of the unjustified delaying tactics and obstruction deployed by defence teams? Alternative No. 8 involves a suggestion put to us by the Director of Public Prosecutions and relates to incentives for those on the periphery to give evidence—for example, lower sentences and witness protection, although obviously with appropriate safeguards. The Government response to that package is that they do not look at it as a package. They accept that such proposals would reduce pressure to go beyond 28 days, but say that they would not entirely eliminate the risk of running out of time. However, for that matter, 42 days or 90 days would not entirely eliminate that risk. As the DPP said to the Public Bill Committee, it is always possible to posit hypothetical scenarios; the question is whether they are ““remotely likely””. When the Joint Committee made its recommendation about putting threshold charging on a statutory basis, the Government response, in terms of the impact on affected communities, was:"““Communities most likely to be affected may react adversely if they perceive that terrorist cases are uniquely charged on a lower evidential threshold.””" The inference of the Government's position must be that such communities would not react adversely if they perceived that people in such cases would uniquely be detained for 42 days. What a non sequitur. If the threshold charge created an adverse reaction, surely a 42-day period would, too. We have only to look at the briefing issued by the Equality and Human Rights Commission to see what Muslim people really think. The Government say that Muslim communities are no different from any others—they want to be protected from terrorism. Of course they do. They want to be protected from the backlash. Of course they do. However, it is appropriate to note that in London everybody came together after 7 July and there was the opposite of a backlash. People were concerned to ensure that the Muslim community was protected and reassured. Finally, would the proposal make us safer? It is not a deterrent to terrorism, but an investigation tool. It could make things worse if the consequences are alienation, less co-operation, less information and less intelligence. There are risks in lesser cases—not in extreme doomsday cases, because derogation deals with those—that someone who should be charged is released after 28 days with no control order. What if they are released after 42 days? The offence of acts preparatory to terrorism and the other examples I gave offer an alternative package for such cases. The risks need to be balanced against the effect of releasing an innocent person, even with compensation, after six weeks. I regret to say that the Government have not made a case for the need for 42 days. Even if they had, derogation is available. We have experience of 28 days. Alternatives are available. The safeguards are inadequate. The proposal will not make us safer and I hope the House will not accept it.