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Counter-Terrorism Bill

I regret taking that intervention. The Government have doubled resources for the security services and a record amount of resources are going into counter-terrorism work. However, the hon. Gentleman brings me to my point on the complexity of the challenge facing SO15, the Metropolitan police counter-terrorism unit. He himself as a member of the Committee, if he has read his papers, will have seen the SO15 statistics. In 2004, some 19,000 exhibits were retrieved and registered in terrorist investigations. They rose to 51,000 in 2005 and to 68,000 in 2006. Statements, messages and documents created rose from 33,000 to 62,000 to 83,000 to 91,000 last year. Action and lines of inquiries created rose from 16,000 to 28,000 to 40,000 to 42,000. Total records for legal consideration and disclosure rose from 69,000 right up to 197,000 in 2007. There is absolutely no doubt that terrorist networks have become more sophisticated and adept at using information technology and the latest techniques available, first to avoid surveillance, secondly to communicate with each other and thirdly to commit atrocities. We have to be cognisant of that fact. It is a matter of public record that in 1997 the UK security services seized just 19 mobile phones, one computer and seven computer discs in their terrorist investigations. Ten years later those figures had risen to 16,000 mobile phones, 353 computers and 2,541 computer discs. Yes, we can increase resources, no, we should not deny the fact that terrorist technology is on the march. The Home Affairs Committee has been party to private briefings from the security services. We know that there have been a substantial number of plots. We know that about 200 groups and 2,000 individuals give the security services cause for concern. Those numbers are going up, not down. I find it ironic that the shadow Home Secretary is happy to praise the professionalism of the police and the security services in foiling those plots, and we join across the Floor of the House in praising them for that, but when it comes to questioning their professional judgment, somehow we are not so keen to praise their professionalism and to take their advice. That led the Home Affairs Committee, in two separate reports, to a series of conclusions. In June 2006, before I and the hon. Gentleman who just intervened joined the Committee, it, under the excellent chairmanship—it is excellently chaired now—of my right hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham), now the Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills, came to the following conclusion. Looking at the Government's case for 90-day detention, which was not particularly strong in my view, the Committee concluded:"““None of the evidence we have reviewed of current and recent investigations would have justified a maximum detention period longer than 28 days.””" The Committee went on to conclude, however:"““We believe…that the 28 day limit may well prove inadequate in future.””" That was in June 2006. It was the starting point for the extensive Home Affairs Committee inquiry that has just concluded. Both Front-Bench teams have, in exchanges across the Dispatch Box, referred to the acceptance of a case for exceptional circumstances. I am not praying in aid the motives of my Conservative colleagues on the Committee; I do not believe for one moment that they saw their names being attached to that recommendation as praying in aid a case for extension to 42 days. I am very happy to put that on the record, but the Committee accepted that there was a case for exceptional circumstances, as did Liberty and, I have to say, the Conservative Front-Bench team when it suggested that amending the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 could deal with exceptional circumstances. Let us read into the public record what was agreed by all parties:"““If, in these exceptional circumstances, a temporary extension of the pre-charge detention period is deemed essential to secure successful prosecutions of terrorist suspects, the Government should consider building support for proposals that effectively reform the powers of the CCA, secure Parliamentary scrutiny and judicial oversight, but stop short of the requirement to declare a full-scale state of emergency.””" One reason why the Committee rejected the use of the 2004 Act was that it would be, frankly, ludicrous—this was the advice that we got from the police—for us to endorse an approach that declared a full-scale state of emergency in order to give the security services the powers that they might need to apprehend people who were the cause of that full-scale emergency. We were right to reject the CCA and we were right to listen to people such as Peter Clarke. I shall quote people who have supported my argument and people who have contradicted it. Peter Clarke, the former national co-ordinator of terrorist investigations, said on 3 June that"““critics claim that the proposal is a draconian extension of police powers. It is not. Detention would be a judicial discretion, to be exercised following an adversarial hearing with both sides legally represented. This would be no rubber stamp.””" Justifying the point about a precautionary principle, he went on to say that"““we should legislate now, and not in panic in an emergency.””" Sir Ken MacDonald has been oft-quoted in the debate. He was very honest: he made it clear that he did not see the case for going beyond 28 days at this point. But he said that the proposed legislation"““would be compatible with the European convention on human rights and I think that it would be Strasbourg-compliant.””" That is significant. He indicated a willingness to use the legislation because, he said, it was his job not to see the Bill into law but to use the tools available to him. He said:"““I am quite satisfied that this provision would be lawful. As I have said, if it was in law, we would use it if we ever found it necessary to do so.””––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism Public Bill Committee, 22 April 2008; c. 57, Q149.]"