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Counter-Terrorism Bill

I agree with the noble Lord that it is. I would have to take advice on what can be said about it. We have diverted slightly from this amendment, but I will take the matter away to see whether anything can be done. We will be discussing asset freezing at a later date, so there will be an opportunity then. The amendments would unintentionally suggest that the provisions would apply to all samples and fingerprints held by the police. As Members of the Committee will be aware, Part V of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides for the taking and retention of samples and fingerprints. The Act also clearly stipulates the purposes for which such samples may be used. The Committee may also be aware that an individual can request that samples or fingerprints held by the police should be destroyed. Such an application is made to the chief officer of the police area concerned and, while destruction is a matter for the chief officer, such a decision is subject to guidance issued by the Association of Chief Police Officers. The guidance, Retention Guidelines for Nominal Records on the Police National Computer, is available on the ACPO website. I acknowledge the noble Baronesses’ sentiment in putting down these amendments but it is our view that the existing structure under PACE provides sufficient safeguards and protections for the individual. As Members of the Committee may be aware, the position on retention of fingerprints and samples is subject to consideration in a case, S and Marper, before the European Court of Human Rights. The Government have provided a robust defence in that case, and we await that decision from the Court. However, in this amendment they unfortunately fail to take into account the key element that fingerprints and samples held on the counterterrorism databases are often obtained without the knowledge of the individual. That is the nature of investigating terrorism. It would be wholly inappropriate to compromise or indeed negate an investigation by giving any person a statutory power to require the police to disclose what information is or may be held by them. I will strongly resist these amendments as they will fundamentally change the system for the retention and use of fingerprints and samples, to the detriment of terrorist operations protecting our national security, as set out in this Bill. The primary purpose of Clauses 10 to 18 is to make sure that retained samples can be used as effectively as possible. Clauses 10 to 13 provide equivalent powers, procedures and safeguards for the collection and use of fingerprints and non-intimate samples collected from those on control orders with those collected after arrest under the relevant legislation for the jurisdiction involved, such as the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Clauses 14 to 18 have three specific aims: putting a counterterrorism DNA database on a firmer legal footing; allowing fingerprints or samples taken under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 to be used for national security; and making it easier to allow fingerprints or samples taken under the Terrorism Act 2000 to be placed on the national DNA database. In Clauses 14 to 18, we are not creating any new powers to take fingerprints and samples. Amendment No. 13 sets out the contents for the proposed report on fingerprints and samples. I do not believe that it is necessary to require the Secretary of State to issue such a report as the issues raised in the amendment are already dealt with. First, the report would require the Secretary of State to set out the circumstances in which fingerprints and samples can be taken without consent. That is unnecessary, as the situations where this can arise are already clearly stated in primary legislation, or will be with the passing of this Bill regarding control orders. Subsections (1) and (2) of Clause 10 insert provisions into the relevant sections of PACE setting out clearly when fingerprints and samples can be taken from individuals without their consent. Equivalent procedures and safeguards that would apply in those circumstances will apply in relation to fingerprints and non-intimate samples taken from controlled individuals. In Clause 18, it is clearly set out how the police can obtain fingerprints and samples during covert operations under Part III of the Police Act 1997 and under Part 2 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Given the clear presentation of the situations where fingerprints and samples can be taken without consent, I see the first requirement of this report as completely surplus to requirements. Secondly, the amendment proposes that the report contain the circumstances in which and purposes for which fingerprints and samples taken with or without consent may be retained. As with the first proposal, this is unnecessary, as the Bill and other primary legislation set out the purposes for which samples can be used. We are using this Bill to standardise the purposes for which fingerprints and samples can be used so that they may be used in the most efficient way possible. These purposes are: in the interests of national security; for purposes related to the prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or the conduct of a prosecution, or for the purposes related to the identification of a deceased person or of the person from whom the material came. So a report explaining the purposes for which fingerprints and samples may be retained is completely superfluous. Thirdly, the amendment would require the report to cover the circumstances in which fingerprints and samples may be shared with bodies other than the agency collecting them. The terrorist threat requires both national and trans-national multi-agency co-operation. It is important that we are able to share our data with national and international partners so that we can properly protect our national security. For example, where we have an unidentified sample obtained covertly in this country from a person whom we believe to have attended terrorist training overseas, we must be able to cross check that sample with those held by the country where the training is thought to have taken place. Noble Lords should be reassured to know that, where any sample is disclosed, it can only be done for the purposes I gave earlier. There are other safeguards against the abuse of samples held subject to Clause 18. In line with his existing powers, the Information Commissioner will provide independent oversight of the database with regard to data protection issues. Additionally, the MPS will liaise with the newly appointed Forensic Science Regulator to establish standards for DNA analysis, validation of the CT DNA database and protocols for international exchange of DNA data. Working with the custodian of the national DNA database, the MPS will ensure compliance to standards it has set, which are accepted and adhered to by forensic laboratories. Additionally, it will work with the custodian to develop new protocols for cross-searching between the national and CT databases, ensuring that public confidence, counter-terrorist investigations and national security are not compromised. Finally, the report would have to include the circumstances in which information relating to fingerprints and samples is destroyed. As I have already stated, I accept absolutely that there is a need for a wider debate outside this one to discuss DNA and I have no doubt that this will be included in that debate. We do not intend to destroy the samples covered in this Bill. The retention of DNA is not an indication of innocence or guilt; it is an important investigative tool which enables the matching of samples from crime scenes with those held on the database. At the same time, it allows for the elimination of people where samples do not match. For example, an estimated 200,000 profiles on the national DNA database would have been removed prior to a legislative change in 2001 to allow samples to be retained indefinitely. From these, about 8,500 individuals have been matched with DNA taken from crime scenes, involving some 14,000 offences. They include 114 murders, 55 attempted murders, 116 rapes and 68 other sexual offences, and a number of other serious crimes. In conclusion, I believe that the report requested in Amendment No. 13 is unnecessary. We have set out clearly in primary legislation the situations in which fingerprints and samples can be taken and how they may be used, including safeguards. What is more, we have established a robust framework for the oversight of the retention and use of fingerprints and samples to ensure that the legislation is followed. For these reasons, I must resist the amendment and I hope that it can be withdrawn.