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Counter-Terrorism Bill

I agree entirely that, if there is a long-term solution, it has to be though winning hearts and minds—but, in the mean time, we have to defend our people. Of course, we should not surrender more than the minimum necessary of liberty and we should at all times be vigilant on behalf of our liberty, but the balance between liberty and security has always been recalibrated in time of conflict. I respect the professional experience and judgment of noble Lords who have been very senior police officers, headed the Security Service, chaired the Joint Intelligence Committee or served in government as Attorney-General or Lord Chancellor. However, I am puzzled as to how they can be confident that, as technology and other complexities develop and we find ourselves in uncharted circumstances, it will never be necessary, in the interest of the safety of the public, to hold anyone in pre-charge detention for more than 28 days. What if, as my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey asked at Second Reading, the police cannot start to question a seriously injured suicide bomber for some time, or it takes some time to make safe for investigators premises where biological or radioactive materials have been kept? When an early arrest is needed in the interest of public protection or when there is more than one plot requiring simultaneous investigation, it may be necessary to hold suspects for longer before charging. The call by the Opposition Front Bench and the Joint Committee on Human Rights for evidence of the need to extend pre-charge detention seems unreasonable. You cannot have evidence about what has not yet happened. There can be pointers, however; if we extrapolate past trends, we are assuredly led to conclude that longer periods of investigation before charges are preferred in terrorist cases may be needed. We were asked by some noble Lords at Second Reading, and by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer again today, to accept that the threshold test for charging removes the need to extend pre-charge detention, and to draw comfort from the new provision for post-charge questioning. I am not a lawyer and I may misunderstand them, but I find both those arguments less than satisfactory. I am encouraged to raise these questions by the important speech of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. If investigators do not yet have the admissible evidence to prefer a charge convincingly, how content should we be that a charge is none the less slapped on the suspect to legitimise continuing detention during the search for more evidence? The noble Lord, Lord Dear, suggested that it would be satisfactory to use what he termed ““second division”” or holding charges. As my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer reminded us, the threshold test requires that there be no more than reasonable suspicion. It may be there and may already be provided for, but that does not make it a good thing. The suspect, after being charged on the basis of a threshold test, can then be detained for months longer—far beyond 42 days. Why is that preferable to the continuation of pre-charge detention up to a maximum of 42 days, authorised by a senior judge who is persuaded that there is sufficient prospect of the fuller evidence needed for a charge being found?