Proceeding contribution from Austin Mitchell (Labour) in the House of Commons on Thursday, 23 October 2008. It occurred during Debate on Public Accounts.
Public Accounts
That is good to hear, and it is right that we should do it. However, it is a little late. It is closing the stable door after several big horses have bolted—and they are now wandering around the countryside, putting money into contracting firms and kicking people. Until now, the role of the OGC has been that of a marriage bureau, lining up Departments with IT firms and consultancies, rather than looking at the projects themselves and asking, ““Are they too big? Are they trying to do too much?”” That is the usual tendency, but we should ask whether those projects are going to produce a palpable gain, and what the position of the heritage system is while the new system is installed. That is never thought through, and I do not know why. I do not know whether Ministers are pushing the virtues of big computer contracts on the civil service, hoping that once everything is mobilised in such a fashion, government will be more efficient and cheaper to run and they can fire all the civil servants. I do not know whether it is a question of fashion in the Departments. I do not know whether every Department must have such a contract and the bigger it is the better, or whether there has been zealous salesmanship on the part of the companies. Who is to tell? Certainly, the projects are oversold, and the civil servants do not seem competent at cutting down to reasonable dimensions the brochures and vision that they are given by the salesmen and asking, ““Is this really going to work?”” There is a problem, and I am delighted to hear that something is being done about it, but at such a stage it is too late in our experience. We are left with several big projects that will be very difficult and very draining financially before they are working. There should be a degree of pre-testing, which does not seem to have occurred. Yesterday we were looking at the information system in the Ministry of Defence. When the computers were to be installed, it was found that they could not work in the existing buildings without serious modifications. They were never pre-tested. Again, some general review should require that and should require Departments to justify these big projects before they are authorised. Some means of central authorisation is necessary, and some degree of sanction against the firms that oversell the projects in the first place. On the tax credits issue, EDS had to pay compensation because of the inadequacy of the systems that it had installed, but that compensation was geared to EDS getting more Government contracts from which it could pay the compensation for the mess that it had made on the first Government contract. What an insane situation. If a firm screws up one contract, it gets other contracts to help it pay for the compensation on the contract that it screwed up. I have never heard anything like it. I do not know much about banking, but I can say that there is insufficient disciplining, control and sanctioning of companies if they fail. I should like to see the same procedure as for Gershon-style economies—the grinding Gershon wheel that is supposed to squeeze fat out of the Departments all the time, as they go along. That goes on remorselessly, even at a time when Departments are trying to carry on some major function. The Rural Payments Agency is a classic example. Because of the Gershon economies, people are being fired at the same time as the agency is embarking on one of the biggest tests of its efficiency and payments system that it is possible to imagine. The result is that it is understaffed, the people who know the work have gone, and the agency must hire them back again to make up deficiencies. Such economies must be co-ordinated. There is another example coming along in the Department for Work and Pensions, which is proposing to fire a large number of civil servants just as we all know that the coming recession will increase the number of unemployed, create more work for the Department and make its life more difficult. Nevertheless, it is proposing substantial reductions in personnel. The functions, personnel and computer systems of a Department need to be co-ordinated. I turn from such general preoccupations to a few specific points about some of the reports that we are discussing today. I was somewhat worried by the tax credit system, which we dealt with a week ago. It was implemented in too inflexible a form, which has resulted in large sums of money having to be clawed back from the poorest sections of society. Mainly because of the inflexibilities of the system, the people whom it was meant to help must repay large sums that they cannot afford and which, in fact, will never be recovered. The suspicion crosses my mind that Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs, which does not want that burden—it is used to taking money from people, not giving it to them—is embarrassed by the situation and has therefore implemented the giving back or credit system in such a ham-handed fashion that the system is discredited. That is too malign a thought for our civil servants, but things have been cumbersome and the HMRC has been far too slow in bringing them into line. The testing has been inadequate. The system itself is good, but its implementation has been clumsy. The treatment of those who are being and have been asked to pay back large sums—they are particularly so for them—is in total contrast to what we saw in another of our reports on HMRC, about the management of large business corporation tax. According to Private Eye and evidence given to us, the businesses that pay large sums in corporation tax are wined and dined by HMRC. Their representatives are taken out to expensive restaurants and asked how HMRC can be nicer to them, what would oil the wheels, and how the companies can be made to cough up voluntarily—a proposition that must be extraordinary to the large corporations. All that is in great contrast to the treatment of the poor, whose faces are ground in the debt and who are pursued in the most cruel fashion. They are taken to court and forced to repay. The report on the taxation of large corporations was very worrying. The position taken towards such corporations was, on the whole, one of trust—““We trust the chaps to fulfil their obligations.”” But we all know that a culture of tax avoidance, and in some cases tax evasion, permeates the whole of business. Companies, particularly big companies, are not paying the social rent that they owe this society for profits generated in this country. News Corporation Ltd is the classic example: it has very profitable investments in this country, but its tax affairs are fiddled through a whole plethora of tax havens and it does not make anything like the contribution that it should to this country, given the revenues and profits that it generates here. That is the culture, yet those are the chaps whom we are asked to trust to pay their tax obligations. The TUC has estimated that tax avoidance by companies and the wealthy costs everyone at work £1,000 a year. In other words, a total of £13 billion is lost through tax avoidance. We try to get to grips with the issue, but our effectiveness is nothing like that of the American committees. They have been dealing with the same culture as ours: big firms sell tax avoidance—and tax evasion—schemes to the companies in the knowledge that it will be profitable to implement them until the Internal Revenue Service catches up with them, as it eventually does. Interestingly, following a US Senate committee inquiry into the design, marketing and implementation of abusive tax avoidance schemes, KPMG, a firm of which I have heard, admitted criminal wrongdoing and was fined $456 million. That involved shuffling money around the world. The Committee found that major banks such as Deutsche Bank, HVB Bank, UBS and NatWest provided purported loans and credit lines for the purposes of tax avoidance. Those schemes were sold by KPMG and there is the same system here; it is just less publicised and more covert, because we never get to hear of the details. The US Senate report showed that from 2000 to 2007 Morgan Stanley helped clients to dodge payments of US dividend taxes of more than $300 million. The late lamented Lehman Brothers indulged in the same scheme. When e-mails from within Lehman Brothers were produced before the Senate committee, they showed one executive telling another that"““the cash register is opening!!!!””" and another saying:"““Outstanding…Let's drain every last penny out of this””" market opportunity. Those were the American investigations. We do not have the power and effectiveness of those committees—I wish that we did. We need to go into this area because it directly affects this country's finances on a massive scale, shifting the burden of taxation on to individual taxpayers in favour of a big industry of tax avoidance and evasion in which companies are not paying their way. Our recommendations were very good, but we encountered the disadvantage of their not being publicised enough and not becoming part of a major debate. We pointed out that whereas the Americans have an estimate of the tax gap—in other words, the tax that corporations should be paying as compared to what they do pay—we found that HMRC had no measure of that tax gap and appeared reluctant to develop such a measure. Unless we have a knowledge of the sums at issue and how the matter is being dealt with, we cannot possibly deal with it. An outstanding recommendation of ours was that it should develop such a measure and it should be publicised. We need to know what the tax gap is, how much has been avoided and how much has been evaded. We found that as HMRC has reduced the use of generic avoidance schemes, tax advisers have developed bespoke schemes that are now flogged to help business. We found, too, that HMRC would find difficulty as regards its staffing in coping with the clever, highly paid boys who devote their whole lives to devising schemes that can be sold on to the banks and other businesses to avoid taxation. There is clearly a problem in terms of the amount that HMRC can pay its staff compared with the amount paid by the institutions—the big accountancy houses and others—in developing these schemes. The two areas are totally unmatched. HMRC's large business service faces a loss of skills and industry knowledge as more experienced staff are due to retire. It will have to recruit people with the skills and ability and at the pay level necessary to cope with this issue. This is an excellent report on our part, but it has fallen with a dull thud and without the public reaction that it should have generated and deserves. We are dealing with a major political issue—one of a whole series that we come across in our work. We need to be able to promote it further, push into the political forum and get it discussed instead of seeing it falling mutely like a feather on the waters; I was about to say a tomb of silence, but I am mixing my metaphors too much. We are doing important and valuable work—frightening work in the sense that there is so little sanction and so little discussion at the end of the day. Apart from that, more power to our elbow.
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
- Reference
- 481 c513-7
- Session
- 2007-08
- Chamber / Committee
- House of Commons chamber
- Subjects
- Cost effectiveness Costs Banks Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Budgets Finance Investment Government departments Financial markets Government shareholding Privatisation Public sector Public expenditure Private finance initiative Nationalisation National Audit Office Public private partnerships Ministry of Defence Taxation Committee of Public Accounts Risk assessment QinetiQ Office of Government Commerce Capital markets Olympic Games 2012
- Link
- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
Librarians' tools
- Timestamp
- 2023-12-16 01:32:10 +0000
- URI
- http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_502926
- In Indexing
- http://indexing.parliament.uk/Content/Edit/1?uri=http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_502926
- In Solr
- https://search.parliament.uk/claw/solr/?id=http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_502926