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Armed Forces: Future Defence Policy

My Lords, helicopters have been a recurring theme throughout this morning, and I apologise for them being also my principal subject. However, I would like to come at it from a rather different point of view to that put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock. I would not dispute his comments concerning the growth of the availability of the fleets, but I would take great issue with the extent to which, at present, MoD action has inhibited or curtailed the continuing operational availability of sufficient numbers of those fleets for our purposes. My points are therefore couched in terms of questions to the Minister, and I start with the Chinooks. Will the noble Lord please give us further and better particulars about what is now happening with the mark 3 fleet? There is reportedly a programme of MoD reversion, which I suspect is a euphemism for withdrawal or suspension of the fleet, for a period of engineering. However, the nature of that engineering is strange; it is described as reverse engineering. Now, in the days when I was with the Ford Motor Company, reverse engineering was taken to describe the opposite of product enhancement. It was, effectively, a back step, and that is what we understand might be happening with the mark 3s, which are now being reverted to analogue control technology compared to the highly desirable digital technology that ought to have been their proper right. There are several reasons why that might be happening at present. One might be that there is a surplus of analogue-trained pilots as opposed to digital-trained pilots; that would be a good reason. A very bad reason would be if the cost of the change to digital was so extreme, and if Boeing would not do some deal on it, that we could not now afford it. We would be stepping back on technological capability to meet a cost factor there. It would be even worse if the other story in circulation is true; that as soon as the present mark 3 upgrade programme is complete, the entire Chinook fleet will be withdrawn in order to allow its conversion to digital. In that case, why are we wasting the time and money in losing operational capability at this time for a temporary move, before we incur the huge cost of conversion to digital in the near future? May we please understand more of the background to that, and under the present programme will we have the Chinooks back in availability by the end of this year, which was the original programme? In the case of the Puma fleet, which is equally vital, could the Minister please confirm that the present contract placing the upgrading of that fleet with businesses in Romania and France was put out without tender for competitive pricing? If it was, is there any truth in the rumour that that was because there was virtually nowhere else that the upgrading programme could go, other than to those factories in France and Romania? Was it because there had been a failure by the MoD to secure access to the intellectual property required for the engine upgrades, because the manufacturer would not allow us the necessary jigs to maintain those engines? A recurring theme runs through that and the question of the Chinooks, of whether the MoD has a blind spot in acquiring the necessary intellectual property to do that sort of renovation. Is it fully participating in what ought to be the advantages flowing from the ITAR code of practice—the International Trade in Arms Regulation code—established by the USA, which ought to be ensuring access to all the intellectual property that we need? If not, that seems to be becoming an extremely expensive omission. Work on the Pumas is rumoured to be going on at a cost of some £400 million. Would it not have been very attractive, in our present recessionary condition, if that work could have been retained in the UK? Going back to the earlier comment of my noble friend Lord King, would having done so not have enabled us to arrange for 24-hour-a-day, seven-days-a-week work on this contract, which would have overcome the present fears that we will have a late delivery of the fleet into service? A similar point to that on intellectual property arises on the question of the Lynx. It would be helpful to have the Minister’s update on where the Lynx is. That was said to be a question of intellectual property on electronics. It would be good if the MoD could understand that intellectual property applies to mechanical engineering and not just to advanced electronics. As I have a minute to go, I will use it to talk about the Type 45; I endorse entirely what my noble friend Lord Lyell said about that. The Type 45s are essential as defence for the carriers. We currently have some confusion as to whether the carriers are to be split as one aircraft carrier and one amphibious attack vessel. Either way, they will be flat-tops. Noble Lords will be aware of the huge vulnerability of flat-tops. America lost 16 of 23 in the Second World War in the Pacific, and it was on the winning side. Japan lost 11 out of 12; it would have lost the 12th if it had had enough aircraft to go to sea to make it worth while. We lost five out of 10, which does not sound too bad until you work out that they did far fewer average nautical miles per ship. We can only provide defence for our new flat-top carriers with absolutely massive, competent technological defence. The Type 45 is undoubtedly that vessel, but we need many more. If there is any attempt to curtail the two-carrier fleet, we must still have the maximum number of 45s for the protection of what we have. It is a great vessel, probably the best vessel ever delivered to any navy anywhere in the world. We need the maximum number.