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Nimrod Review

Statement. Seven weeks ago, I addressed the House about Mr. Charles Haddon-Cave's report on the events leading to the loss of 14 service personnel aboard Nimrod XV230 on 2 September 2006. As I said then, it was a tough read. It spelt out in detail the many failings both in the MOD and in industry that led to the tragedy. I wish again to express my sorrow for what happened that day, and to reiterate my sincere apologies to the families of those who died. I know that nothing I can say will bring those 14 men back. What we must do now is learn all the lessons, and take all the actions that are necessary to implement them. Mr. Haddon-Cave's investigations were wide-ranging. His report was thorough and detailed. I want to thank him again for his efforts, and for helping us to identify the changes that we need to make. Today I shall explain to the House how we are implementing his recommendations. Some of them are complex, and I am therefore placing in the Library of the House a more detailed written response to the 84 recommendations. This afternoon I want to focus on three areas: the creation of a military aviation authority, the changes that we are making to the management of airworthiness, and our relationship with industry. The Nimrod XV230 was lost as a result of a number of failings in the MOD and industry over a period of some three decades. Opportunities to discover and avoid the dangers, particularly during the development of the safety case, were missed. That was due in part to specific errors, but it was also due to the fact that the MOD'S aviation safety processes had become too cumbersome and complex, and lacked transparency and accountability. Despite the efforts of many hard-working men and women in the MOD and the private sector to deliver safe aircraft, the result was simply not good enough. The report recognised—and indeed welcomed—the many improvements we had made since the loss of the XV230, but it also made it clear that we needed to go much further. I agree, and I am today announcing the most radical reform of the MOD's airworthiness procedures since military aviation began. First, we are creating a new independent military aviation authority that will regulate, audit and assure all military aviation activity. It will be led by a senior—three-star—military officer, supported by a staff of about 250 personnel. He will provide the leadership on airworthiness, and also the independent assurance that we and our industry partners are all operating to the highest safety standards. He will have been identified and appointed by February, and the new authority will begin its work from April next year. The MAA will be independent of those who fly and maintain our aircraft day to day, ensuring that they operate fully within the regulations and are properly equipped, trained and resourced to deliver safe aircraft to the services. In proposing this new organisation for the management of airworthiness, Mr. Haddon-Cave wanted to ensure that there would be responsiveness in the face of changing operational circumstances, and that a safe approach would be adopted at all times. I agree, but in order to make his recommendations effective in the military environment, some adjustments are necessary. The single service assistant chiefs of staff must retain responsibility for determining that our aircraft can be safely released into service. The MAA will provide full assurance, but it will not carry out this release-to-service role directly. For operational emergency clearances, I have decided to opt for a tighter regime than Mr. Haddon-Cave proposed, under which the assistant chiefs—not those who fly the aircraft at the front line—will be responsible for any clearances. The MAA will play an assurance role in this area, too. This refinement of the Haddon-Cave model will deliver his intention while retaining operational agility, and improve on both our current and his proposed governance arrangements. Mr. Haddon-Cave also recommended a new approach to aviation safety cases. He was critical of our current approach, saying that it was bureaucratic and, frankly, missed the point. I agree. We need to make it simpler and more relevant. The MAA will rewrite our instructions to include the improvements that the report recommends. I have instructed that we examine how to apply this best practice appropriately across the whole of Defence. We are also auditing the standard of our current aviation safety cases to check that they are fit for purpose. Most of this work has been completed, and it will be finalised in the next couple of weeks. I now turn to the criticisms of our relationships with industry. The Department has been working with BAE Systems and QinetiQ to address their failings identified in the report. BAE Systems has announced the appointment of Dr. Chris Elliott to provide independent support to the group managing director in undertaking a review of the company's approach to product safety. QinetiQ has appointed Sir Robert Nelson QC to oversee the company's formal investigation, which will include a review of processes, structure and reporting. All their findings will be shared with us. Partnership with industry has always been part of ensuring that our troops are provided with the best possible equipment and support. We recognise that partnership does not mean that we can just transfer work to industry; we still have a role to play. That is why we are improving the skills of our people to ensure that we manage industry's activities on our behalf more effectively. A review of the contract conditions that we put in place with industry is also being conducted. We will institute improved checks and audits by the MAA on industry compliance. However, I acknowledge that we need to do more, so I have asked my noble Friend the Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, Lord Drayson, as part of the work that he is doing on defence acquisition reform, to establish a much clearer understanding of the different roles and interests of industry and of the MOD, and to be sure that industry's efforts meet our needs. In the course of his report, Mr. Haddon-Cave also criticised the personal conduct of a small number of civilians and service people who held positions in the MOD and in industry in the period leading up to 2006. A number of those individuals work for BAE Systems or for QinetiQ, both of which are conducting their own investigations, and a number of others are now retired. Neither of the two serving RAF officers who were named currently holds a position related in any way to safety. An RAF police investigation is being conducted into the issues raised by Mr. Haddon-Cave. I hope that hon. Members will understand that I am unable to comment further on these matters at present. There is an expectation that in some such situations, investigations are accompanied by blameless suspensions of the individuals under investigation. We will re-examine this area to develop a common practice for all MOD personnel—military and civilian. Mr. Haddon-Cave's analysis and conclusions on safety management in aviation have wider relevance, and we are looking to see what changes we may need to make across other domains in defence. He made a number of broader observations on areas that were not the main focus of his report. Mr. Haddon-Cave did not take evidence on the Department's approach to change management. However, I will ensure that his observations on these important issues are reflected in our planned work on the organisation and culture of the MOD, as part of the preparations for the future defence review. Every effort is being made by the Department to ensure that our armed forces are the best trained and the best equipped, but we must recognise that the work of defence is inherently dangerous. We ask our armed forces to place themselves in harm's way, and that entails risk. At the same time, any organisation that wants to learn and improve must change and develop; our armed forces cannot stand still in the face of developing threats and the need to work in hostile environments. It is also vital that we do everything possible to use public money effectively and efficiently. However, I am clear that change and development and the management of risk cannot be incompatible with a clear commitment and approach to safety. My hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces and I have been clear throughout that the Ministry of Defence will be open and honest about our shortcomings, and we will respond vigorously and face the challenge to improve performance. I regret enormously the deaths of those on the XV230, and apologise for the part the Department played in failing to prevent them. The measures that I have announced today reflect a personal commitment to improving safety in military aviation and the safety of our armed forces.