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Nimrod Review

My Lords, I first enjoin these Benches in the earlier tribute to those who lost their lives yesterday in Afghanistan. To allow less than one hour for this House to respond to a major Statement does scant justice to the importance and complexity of the Haddon-Cave review. More particularly, it is totally inadequate given the tragic loss of 14 dedicated personnel aboard the Nimrod that was lost over Afghanistan in September 2006. I suggest that we really need—indeed, that we owe it to the relatives of the deceased—a much more thorough debate on the report and on the Government’s response. The establishment of a military aviation authority, which we surely welcome, needs to be probed. Would it not be preferable for it to be chaired by a truly independent senior non-service person rather than a serving officer? Indeed, will there be any outside non-executive involvement or similar in that authority? On the Haddon-Cave review itself, I pay tribute to that near 600-page tome as a remarkably comprehensive and detailed document, but I do have a number of questions. I echo very much the probing of the noble Lord, Lord Astor, in this regard, but given that Ministers have overall responsibility for their departments—certainly, for the financial resources allocated to them and for overall policy—why were no Ministers questioned by Haddon-Cave? Similarly, there was no questioning of either the Permanent Secretary or the second PUS despite, if I understand it correctly, the latter having overall responsibility for health and safety. Additionally, why were no non-executive members of the Defence Logistics Organisation board interviewed? I believe that we will be hearing from the noble Baroness, Lady Cohen, shortly. Haddon-Cave found against both BAE Systems and QinetiQ. On page 301, his report says: ""If BAE Systems had carried out the NSC task properly, the accident"," would not have happened. In a press release dated 29 October 2009, BAE says: ""We accept full responsibility for these failings and apologise unreservedly for them"." QinetiQ, as has been said, has appointed a former judge to oversee that company’s formal investigation. However, the review also comes out heavily against two senior figures: General Sir Sam Cowan and Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger, both former Chiefs of Defence Logistics. Paragraph 17 on page 353 says: ""Two very senior figures bear particular responsibility for the episode of cuts, change dilution and distraction and its consequences"." From my reading of the report, there appears little evidence to support these conclusions. It could be suggested that these former officers were only doing their jobs as instructed by Ministers and more senior officials. That is why I question the non-interviewing of Ministers. In terms of process, given the obvious distress to General Cowan, Sir Malcolm and their families that the besmirching of their reputations inevitably brings about, should they not at the very least be told of the review’s conclusions in so far as they concern them, providing an opportunity to challenge or refute before final publication? The Minister’s Statement mysteriously tell us that: ""An RAF Police investigation is now under way"." Can the Minister perhaps elucidate just a little? How extensive is the investigation? Does it just involve current serving officers? Indeed, who does it involve? Paragraph 23 of the executive summary on page 12 says: ""But for the delays in the Nimrod MRA4 replacement programme, XV230 would probably have no longer been flying in September 2006, because it would have reached its Out-of-Service Date and already been scrapped or stripped for conversion. The general history of procurement in the MoD has been one of years of major delays and cost overruns. This has had a baleful effect on in-Service Support and safety and airworthiness generally"." None of us who specialises in defence in this House need reminding of all this. My point is that, given the financial pressures on the defence budget, there is an increasingly obvious danger in running on and patching up across all three services. Today’s Statement hints at other changes that may be needed across the safety domain in defence. All who have responsibility for our Armed Forces need to place the highest priority on safety, obviously commensurate with operational risk, if we are to avoid tragedies like the Nimrod ever happening again.