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Afghanistan Conference and Yemen Meeting

My Lords, it is good that we support the Afghan army, but there is a danger that we in the West rather overemphasise its operational capabilities and its leadership. To this extent, also, to hold the hand of friendship and parley with the aggressor, the Taliban, before we have it on one knee—or, preferably, two—is rather dangerous. We are dealing with a very proud people. Some will be attracted by land, money and jobs, but the talk in the coffee and tea shops of Quetta in Pakistan and elsewhere is very much that the Taliban is not losing but is in the ascendancy; that it is winning, and that the fact that we want to talk to it shows a weakness on our part. I ask the Government, then, to beware. We are dealing with people who admire and respect power and strength, and we have to show that we have both. As a nation, we are actually fairly weak in some of those departments. I would be rather careful about meeting the Taliban and thinking it a friendly gesture when, at the time, it thinks that it is because we are weak. The reason that the President of Afghanistan asks for, and suggests that he will require, help for 10 to 15 years is entirely because of his weak government, and the fact that he does not get out among the tribes and realise that it is a tribal situation. With the greatest respect to the noble Baroness, I believe that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office does not, in many ways, have the experience or the capability to know what the Taliban is really up to. We will find that it is like all guerrilla armies; it will go when it wants, leave when it wants and come when it wants, strengthened in purpose. It is a difficult situation and I do not mean to be depressed by it, but there is great work to be done and still a lot of fighting to get over.