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Afghanistan and Yemen

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. I think the Pakistani forces are being reconfigured to take care of what the Pakistani Government would call twin threats, but he is right to say that the sort of effort, training and structures that are needed for a counter-insurgency are quite different from those for traditional warfare. The evidence from Pakistan shows the folly of pursuing a political strategy on its own—a deal-making strategy will not work, and it has not worked in the federally administered tribal areas over the past two decades—but equally, a military strategy on its own will not work either. The absence of any sort of political process in the FATAs is as dangerous to their stability as the absence of any kind of security and order. The Pakistani experience shows the importance of combining military and civilian effort in the service of a durable political settlement. The fact that for, I think, the first time ever, that is happening on both sides of the Durand line in a complementary fashion, is a significant change in the past year.