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Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report for 2008–09 (Cm 7807)

My Lords, this debate is always welcome; indeed I would say it is a necessary opportunity to acknowledge the important role of and work done by the intelligence and security agencies, the staff of which work tirelessly, day and night, often in pressing circumstances, to safeguard our way of life. In a very illuminating comment, the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, said recently that they are, ""men and women of different backgrounds, beliefs and ethnicity who wish to work, without any chance of personal fame, or recognised success, because they believe in the UK, its rights and freedoms and because they wish to protect it, as far as they are able against threats"." I think that that tells us something about the motivation of those who are engaged in the tasks we are looking at today. I thank the noble Lord for his substantial and illuminating report. I also acknowledge the work done by the members of the Intelligence and Security Committee. As the noble Lord rightly said, they do a great deal of work that is largely unseen and pretty unheralded—partly because of the nature precisely of what they do—but that, in a sense, is all the more valuable for that. A number of them are stepping down at this election, so thanks are very much in order. The committee does important and solid work. As I said last year, I rather regret that more of it does not enter the public domain and help to increase our understanding of the agencies and the work they do. It is not so much this Committee or the Houses of Parliament: I think that a wider understanding in the country as a whole is important. As we have to take measures that impinge on our liberties in society, it is extraordinarily important that the general public should have insight into the security threat that this country faces so that they actually understand what we are up against. Our ability to get that message across is at the moment somewhat deficient. I would like to see that improved, and I am quite certain that the committee has an important role to play in that. I want to say something about finances to begin with and then a little bit about policy issues that have arisen. I would also like to comment on the question of the role and status of the committee. First, on money, and as with all other departments, the agencies are operating within an increasingly constrained resource environment. The single intelligence account has increased year on year and will do so again next year, but there are three particularly important points to note. First, there is no funding in the short and medium term for a fully resilient data centre for GCHQ. The question is whether in a sensible economy we can really afford to be without resilience in the data centre. The problem we face in trying to answer that question is that we do not have information about costs and therefore are not able to conduct an intelligent discussion on whether this is a correct thing to be doing. I would be grateful if the Minister will write to me with more information on that if he cannot reply at the end of the debate. Secondly, funding across the board for the ever-growing cyber threat is a third below the planned level, which itself is quite modest. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, rightly referred to that. He was also right to point out that the committee’s remit has of necessity expanded beyond its original domain because we are faced with a whole series of issues that are closely related to our security and cannot now be separated from each other. The role of CSG is a perfect example. It is part of the cybersecurity machinery operating within one of the intelligence agencies. That is the third thing that I want to say. There are problems with the operating model of CSG. I have no doubt that it performs an invaluable information-assurance function across government, but GCHQ, perhaps not surprisingly, as a result of that, wants to see it funded centrally. I do not want to comment on that point but I do want to say that I think that the information-assurance and cybersecurity agendas need to be brought together more closely than they are at the moment. Perhaps the Minister can say why the Government seem to think it advantageous to keep the two separate. In our view, CSG ought to have more of a front face in Whitehall to be effective in the role it is being called on to play. Just because the agencies operate in a difficult and challenging environment does not mean that there are no legitimate questions to be asked about their work and the value for money they offer. This is not easy to do from outside because relatively little information, either financial or on tasking the agencies, is provided, which means, as I say, that it is quite difficult to know how to conduct any value-for-money assessment from outside. I believe that this assessment is necessary. The ISC’s report last year on the 7/7 attacks made clear that the issue is not simply one of the volume of the resources available but also their best use. I underline "their best use". So the question of how the agencies use their money, particularly as they now have very sizeable budgets, is a real issue of public interest. I know that a cross-agency spending review working group is in existence to facilitate discussion with the Treasury and to produce a co-ordinated single bid for the next spending round. It would be helpful if the Minister could comment on the extent to which this will cover the scope for shared support services and for joint if not integrated teams and strategies. Most of those who follow these issues will be aware of the fact that there are moves in this direction between the agencies. They are separate bodies and have separate remits but I think that it is fairly clear that there are services which could be brought together and operated more in common, reducing underlying costs. We believe that there should be determined progress in this direction. I do not think that I am saying anything which is not accepted by the agencies themselves, but it does require the effort to be put into making this a reality. It is not only the resource environment that poses a challenge to the intelligence community; some policy problems also have arisen. I should like first to comment on the Butler inquiry—and I see that the noble Lord, Lord Butler, is with us. I think it is clear from all of the committee’s annual reports since the noble Lord, Lord Butler, reported that not all of the recommendations have yet been taken fully on board. Last year I said that this could negatively affect the functioning of the central intelligence machinery and the UK’s analytical capability, and I think that that point still stands. The 2008-09 annual report—which, as the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, pointed out, we are also debating—raises concerns about the role of the professional head of intelligence analysis and the location and place of the "challenge team" and the Defence Intelligence Staff. Can the Minister tell us what has actually been achieved by the professional head of intelligence analysis and, in particular, what work has been undertaken to develop a professional career stream for analysis? I think that this is a road down which the UK does need to go. It is certainly one that the Americans have travelled. There is no point in having the capacity to collect without that being matched by the capacity to analyse—otherwise you do not know what the material means and, frankly, it is a waste of effort. It is just as important, if not more so, to put effort into understanding what the material one has collected means as it is to put it into collecting material. It would be very helpful to receive illumination on how far this has developed. In the case of the professional head, it would be helpful to know how much time is spent on career development and developing the analytical capability of the intelligence community as opposed to chairing the Joint Intelligence Committee. Secondly, the Government have to some extent allowed a climate of uncertainty to develop. There are a number of outstanding issues on which Parliament, the public and indeed the intelligence community itself await answers from government, and the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, alluded to some of these. The Government undertook to report on the work of the National Security Forum this month, although the noble Lord did not mention that point. Given that the intelligence machinery these days is an absolutely central and integral part of our whole national security framework, that the Government have set up the National Security Forum and promised us a report, and that I will not have many other opportunities to ask the Government this question, it would be helpful to be given an answer to it—namely, will the National Security Forum report come forward this month? The Government also undertook to report before Easter on the use of intercept as evidence. I should be grateful to know whether this will happen. Unlike the ISC—I am afraid that I disagree with the committee on this point—I do not believe that a negative report should close the option of using intercept as evidence. Frankly, the issue is too important. Given the pace of technological change, the use of intercept as evidence should be kept under review on a regular basis. We do not know what the outcome of the latest work is and any information that the Minister can give us regarding progress on that front, and whether we are likely to receive a report before Easter, would be very helpful. Thirdly—I have mentioned this already—there is confusion about the Government’s approach to cybersecurity. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, talked about the structures. There is overlap and a lack of clarity about what the structures do and how they work together and inadequate information about the operating capabilities of the Office of Cyber Security, or the Cyber Security Operations Centre, and what their functions should be. It is very clear that the security of our communications is nothing short of vital. Indeed, it affects government, national resilience and the critical national infrastructure of the private sector. It also has international implications. Therefore, certainty and a strong sense of direction on cybersecurity are very important. Uncertainty is not a good quality in this area of our national business. Meeting an undoubtedly uncertain strategic context by muddling along is not a posture that this country needs. Last year I said that there was a lack of strategic direction from the centre. By that I mean government; I do not mean another committee. The ISC’s annual report for 2008-09 says that the updated national security strategy, which should be the governing vehicle, has had little impact on the focus or nature of the work of the agencies. Given what the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, said when he described in detail the relationship between the work done by the agencies and the conduct of major government policies, including, for instance, that on nuclear proliferation, it is curious to say the least that the national security strategy does not relate to the role of the agencies, as they are central to the way in which we implement our national security strategy. It would therefore be helpful to know what the Government think should be the right relationship between the national security strategy document and the agencies. There also remains an issue which, if not closed, could become one of serious morale within the intelligence community. There are now, sadly, multiple allegations of complicity in torture and of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. I absolutely take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, about not taking at face value the allegations and comments of one individual. A serious situation is clearly developing and the Government have failed to draw a line under it. The wider issues thrown up in the course of these events include the irreplaceable intelligence relationship with the United States and the balancing of the needs of national security with the requirements of accountability. These go to the heart of the protection of the security of our nation. We need to focus on how to keep those things in balance. Despite the very good efforts of the committee so far, there is still a lack on the accountability side of the balance. I shall say something about that in a moment. The release of redacted paragraphs as part of the Court of Appeal judgment in the case of Binyam Mohamed drew a strong response from the US Director of National Intelligence. We on these Benches argued that the control principle could have been upheld while seeking an exception from the United States in this specific case. That was not a course that the Government chose to pursue, and we would not know whether it would have succeeded. We cannot know because it was not tried, but it remains our view that it could have been a preferable course of action rather than having the matter dragged through the courts, as has happened, which has had the effect of fuelling the accusation that the Government were withholding evidence. That in turn has had the effect of exposing our relationship with the US to particular strain. It is important now to try to draw a line under what has happened. I hope that the Minister will comment on whether the Government see any need to take further action to reassure the House and the United States about upholding the principle of control. Does the Minister agree that the UK should now be in a stronger position as the control principle and public interest immunity are both contained in a legal judgment? That is a strength in itself, but I want to know what further action the Government intend to take. In another place, the former Foreign Secretary Sir Malcolm Rifkind pointed out that when we are dealing with issues raised by allegations of torture and mistreatment we need to look not only at the detail of individual cases but at the processes within the agencies. We have to assure ourselves through the ISC—or possibly, as my right honourable friend the shadow Foreign Secretary suggested in another place, through a judge-led inquiry—that we have been able to draw a line under previous allegations and that we have systems in place to ensure that we are true to the values and standards which we champion in the world and to which we expect others to adhere. In respect of the allegations of complicity and torture, in March of last year the Prime Minister said that he would work, ""to protect the reputation of our security and intelligence services and to reassure ourselves that everything has been done to ensure that our practices are in line with the United Kingdom and international law"." He said that we would, ""put beyond doubt the terms under which our agencies and service personnel operate".—[Official Report, Commons, 18/3/09; col. WS18.]" It is urgent that that happens. So far, the procedure has not been reassuring. The Prime Minister committed the Government to publishing the guidance given to agencies about the standards to which they should adhere during detention and interviewing of detainees overseas. He said that the guidance would need to be consolidated and reviewed by the committee, as the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, pointed out, before publication. The noble Lord also said that it took another eight months before the committee saw this guidance, despite repeated requests to the Cabinet Office. He also said, rightly, that it arrived only on 18 November, well after the date on which the committee could scrutinise it as part of its annual report. Ministers have not even attempted to explain why the delay was so long, except to say that the whole matter has been very difficult. On 11 March, the Prime Minister assured the committee that the guidance would be made public in the 2009-10 annual report, which would be published in good time for the debate in another place on 17 March. This still has not happened. I understand that this is because there has been a difference of opinion about something that the committee wrote in its report. Perhaps the noble Lord can enlighten us on this. Will the Minister give an absolute assurance that the Government are not trying either to block the report or influence its conclusions? The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, referred to this. I hope that he is right in his confidence that in the end we will have the report with the committee's comments. Will the Government commit to publishing the report before the election? It is because the Government have failed even to begin the process of drawing a line that there have been calls for further investigation. This issue will not go away by itself, so it is important that the Government do something about it. Finally, I will say a few words about the relationship between the ISC and the Government. The noble Lord pointed out that it is not acceptable for the Government to delay publication of ISC reports, which is why we have ended up debating two together. Certainly it is not acceptable to fail to assist the committee properly and in a timely way. The noble Lord talked extensively about this, and I will not go over all the ground. However, it is fair to say that because the committee's work is done in the way that it is, with much of it not reaching the public domain, it gets less credit than it should for the quality of the work that it does. Now we face a situation where there appears to have been a breakdown in confidence and trust between the committee and those parts of the government apparatus that have contact with it. It is very important that the committee is seen to have the independence that its statute should give it. Last year I criticised the Government—as the committee did this year—for giving only cursory responses to the committee’s conclusions and recommendations. These should be taken seriously, and I hope that the Minister will take this observation away and look to see how the Government can better respond in future—if they have the privilege—to the committee’s reports. We have heard about the worrying issue of independence potentially being compromised, as it appears to have been over the past 12 to 18 months. The chairman said in another place that, ""life for the ISC secretariat has been distinctly uncomfortable and, at times, very unpleasant and threatening"." That is strong language. He also said that, ""there are some within the Whitehall bureaucracy who, for reasons of their own, have not understood or have refused to accept that the independence of the ISC is sacrosanct"—" the word used by the noble Lord. The chairman went on to say: ""Some of them have given the impression that they regard the ISC as an irritation—a problem that they could well do without".—[Official Report, Commons, 18/3/10; col. 996.]" The ISC is not an irritation, but a very important part of our public accountability machinery. The noble Lord warned about the bureaucracy interfering with the committee's secretariat in the intervening period before a new committee is appointed. I note what he said about not being able to continue to work during the election period. I do not know exactly what aspect of work he was referring to.