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Strategic Defence and Security Review

The debate has been excellent, but I do not believe that it has addressed the aircraft carriers issue in as much detail as it deserves, and I hope to remedy that. When the Secretary of State and others discuss the nuclear deterrent, great emphasis is placed on the need for a continuous at-sea presence, yet in respect of Britain's global reach by aircraft carrier we are apparently happy to settle for a presence every now and again. We are building two aircraft carriers but one is to be mothballed, so the second will not be available when it is in refit—or, indeed, when the French are seeking to use it. Therefore, we will have only occasional use of our own aircraft carriers: for us to end up with part-use of one when we are building two does not seem to me to represent the best use of money. There is no guarantee that we will ever have much access to the French carriers. We will be able to use them only when the French are not using them, or when they agree. There will, of course, also be times when a carrier is being refitted. Therefore, although we are going to the expense of building two carriers, we cannot receive a guarantee that we will have a continuous at-sea global presence by aircraft carrier. In defending the implementation of the ““cats and traps”” policy, the Defence Secretary has mentioned that we want to have interoperability with the United States. However, it is unclear whether any agreement has been struck with the United States about our being able to borrow one of its carriers or use its decks, or whether the United States will want to use our carriers if it ends up one short. There is no point in arguing that we want to have ““cats and traps”” for the sake of interoperability with the United States unless some deal has been done whereby that will be a benefit—but no mention has been made of that so far. When the Minister sums up, will he tell us whether catapults are to be fitted to both aircraft carriers? If not, we will have aircraft designed for catapults and traps but only one aircraft carrier they can fly off. On the other hand, if we fit catapults to both carriers, we will end up spending half a billion pounds fitting them to mothballed aircraft carriers. Neither of those options seems to me to represent an effective use of money. It would be helpful if the Minister were to tell us whether the French or the United States had asked us in any way, shape or form to fit catapults and traps to our aircraft carriers, or did this situation arise simply as a consequence of the Air Force's obsession with fast jets? The Government seem to have an unhealthy obsession with fast jets, and to have inadequately appreciated the additional capability provided to us by vertical and short take-off and landing aircraft. Yes, it is true that they carry lighter weights and can fly less far, but they are also much more effective in providing close air support, as our troops who have served in the Falklands and Afghanistan can testify. As the previous Secretary of State, my right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), said, we are giving up this capability not just in the short term but permanently; if we scrap the Harriers or do not upgrade them in future, we will lose that entire capability. To base our entire fast jet defence structure on the concept that we must have generation five because at some point in the future somebody else might have it is to focus too much on one element of need. It would be useful if the Minister told us how much each of the ““cats and traps”” will cost, because if he does not have that figure to hand, this would appear to be a leap in the dark. The lack of political balance in how the British media treat the various parties is nowhere more glaringly obvious than in the discussion about aircraft carriers without aircraft. Can we imagine the meal the press and television would have made if a Labour Government had for one moment proposed that we should have aircraft carriers without aircraft? I am not necessarily the brightest, but I recognise that the secret is in the name: the concept of an ““aircraft carrier”” means something that carries aircraft. The fact that we will have aircraft carriers without aircraft—and that the Government have got away almost scot-free with it—represents something of an imbalance. I am looking forward to hearing the Minister announce that he has devised a new system of guns without bullets, rockets without explosives and so on. Those are equally ludicrous suggestions. The Government have been insufficiently radical in examining structures. I understand that under their proposals the joint strike fighter will be flown off the carriers by joint RAF/Fleet Air Arm groups, crews, pilots and so on. In those circumstances, why do we need a Fleet Air Arm? Why do we need to have RAF pilots flying off aircraft carriers? That is an example of the sort of culture of defence in the forces. I served on the Public Accounts Committee for many years and we constantly got the feeling that the service personnel at the top were all far too cosy, that it was all too much of an old pals act, that they were drawn from too narrow a social base and that they were all scratching each other's backs. Only 7% of children go to a private school, yet 90% of top generals did—so it is difficult to accept that the forces represent the society that they seek to defend. Thinking back to my days in the borders, I recall that in some towns the reaction to any proposed change was ““Aye been””, on the basis that things had aye been like that, so must not change. Although we must be proud of traditions, we should not be prisoners of tradition. There is an unwillingness on the part of the Government to challenge some of the existing structures, be it the Fleet Air Arm or the need to maintain an RAF. There is no evidence that some of those more drastic options have been fully discussed or thought through. I wish to touch on the defence industrial strategy, because there has been a lot of discussion about the terms of business agreement—TOBA—between British Aerospace and the Ministry of Defence. That is an ideal example of good practice, rather than bad practice. People could haggle about the detail of the deal, but the concept of the Government making a plan with a firm in the private sector that gives it a guarantee of work for a period that will allow it to invest, in both capital resources and personnel, in return for that flow of work is sensible. We cannot go on with a system of simply buying off the shelf—one here, one there and one somewhere else. Without question if we had not built aircraft carriers we would never have had the capacity to build Type 45 destroyers. That capacity would simply have been lost, because the work force would have been dispersed. I hope that when the Government come to examine the defence industrial strategy, or whatever their equivalent of that is, they will overcome their tendency simply to buy the cheapest on all occasions, but will look forward and identify what industrial and commercial capacities we want to retain for the long term.