Proceeding contribution from Justine Greening (Conservative) in the House of Commons on Tuesday, 22 March 2011. It occurred during Debate on bill on Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [Lords].
Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [Lords]
On amendment 2, the Government are committed to increasing transparency in public life. That transparency is essential to good fiscal policy, as the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) said. In fact, the Government already provide the costing methods and assumptions for policy proposals. Those were made available in policy costings documents at the last Budget and spending review, and copies were made available to the House. That is a step change in transparency in fiscal policy making. Specifically in relation to the OBR, the additional transparency referred to in the amendment is already required by the statutory charter for budget responsibility, which says at paragraph 3.9:"““The Budget Report shall provide, at a minimum: an explanation and costing of the impact of all significant fiscal policy measures introduced by the Government since the last Budget and an explanation of the methodology used to cost the fiscal impact of each of those measures””." In relation to the Bill, I draw the hon. Gentleman's attention to clause 4(6), which explicitly refers to the OBR's reports being clear in explaining the factors that it took into account when preparing the report—not only the assumptions that he mentioned but the main risks that it considered to be relevant. So there is a safeguard not only in the charter but in the Bill to ensure that there is transparency about how the official forecasts have been arrived at. On amendment 6, the OBR is accountable to Parliament in order to enhance Parliament's ability to hold the Government to account for fiscal policy. The OBR's forecasts and analysis will be laid directly before the House. The budget responsibility committee will be appointed with the consent of the Treasury Committee, and will be available for scrutiny. There will be separate reporting to Parliament of the OBR's expenditure, and, as many Members have already discovered, relevant written questions will be answered by the OBR. The OBR is also accountable to the Chancellor, reflecting its role in producing the official forecast, which will form the basis of the Chancellor's Budget decisions. Herein lies the challenge to Labour Members. The OBR will provide the Government with timely access to the information necessary to reach policy decisions ahead of fiscal policy events. The Treasury Committee recognised that in its report last year, when it said:"““Involvement In the Budget process necessarily involves close contact between the Treasury and the OBR””." Close working also means that the OBR has access to all Government information to ensure that its conclusions reflect the most accurate and up-to-date information. It is therefore right that the OBR provides the Government with pre-release access to its forecast in order to ensure the accuracy of both it and the Budget documents, which are published simultaneously. It is also right that there is transparency in the approach to the sharing of information. The OBR has chosen to follow the well-established pre-release practices put in place by the Office for National Statistics. I can assure the House that this arrangement does not compromise the OBR's independence. It is an approach that has worked well for the ONS. The OBR has been transparent about when reports have been shared. It confirmed in its November ““Economic and fiscal outlook””:"““We have come under no pressure from ministers, advisers or officials to change any of our conclusions.””" The OBR's access to Government information distinguishes it from other UK forecasting organisations, and ensures that the Chancellor and Parliament are provided with the most up-to-date information regarding the latest UK economy and public finance figures. I understand the rationale behind amendment 6. However, given the practicalities of the OBR's accountability to the Chancellor and its role in producing the official forecasts, we feel that it is better for it to act on its own decision to follow the ONS pre-release guidelines. I will resist both amendments.
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
- Reference
- 525 c914-5
- Session
- 2010-12
- Chamber / Committee
- House of Commons chamber
- Subjects
- Disclosure of information Audit Budgets Fiscal policy Economic growth Powers Public expenditure National Audit Office Public finance Treasury Social policy Office for Budget Responsibility
- Legislation
- Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill (HL) 2010-12
- Link
- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
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