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Armed Forces Personnel

I see the hon. Gentleman nodding. That is not the way that we should be using our armed forces personnel—sending them into danger. There was a lack of clarity in that mission, as well as mission creep, and there was no strategy. I visit Afghanistan and Helmand province regularly, as do other hon. Members, and I have got the message that there was almost a conspiracy of optimism—telling us what we wanted to hear. I am afraid that that comes down to the level of interest, direction and clarity from Whitehall. It is all very well for our armed forces to do an incredible job in creating an umbrella of security, but we have to be concerned about what happens underneath it. There are two aspects to counter-insurgency: working on economic development and reconstruction and on governance. Neither of those things happened while our service personnel were in Helmand, and in that vacuum they have had to do that job themselves. Our platoon commanders have been going into villages and townships, setting up jirgas with the elders and trying to get local and district governance working. That is way beyond what a platoon commander is instructed or taught how to do at Sandhurst. It has taken a long time for the Department for International Development to recognise its role in providing support for governance and reconstruction and development—getting roads built so that the locals can use them and we win over hearts and minds. I am pleased to say that the culture in DFID has changed completely. That is not only because of what happened in the latter years of the previous Government but because of the leadership of the new Secretary of State for International Development. If we are to task our service personnel with going into these places, there must be a coherent plan—a strategy. We must bear in mind what we do with our armed forces these days. It is not simply about kinetic war fighting. When there is a foot and mouth outbreak here in the UK, it is the Army we lean on. When the fire brigade goes on strike, it is those personnel who drive the Green Goddesses or the fire engines. If there is an earthquake in Haiti, that is not about war fighting—it is very much about support and humanitarian work—but it is the military we lean on. The skill sets that our service personnel now require are quite varied, and we must bear that in mind. I have three observations to make about that. First, the versatility that we now expect from our armed forces is quite staggering and very different from years gone by. Secondly, given that we must now conduct operations that are not limited to the armed forces alone, we need to think about more interoperability with other agencies and Government Departments. Thirdly, we must focus a little more on strategy—on educating our officers and soldiers about these aspects. General Charles Krulak wrote about the ““three block war””, in which soldiers in an operation move from war fighting to peacekeeping and then to nation building. Nation building requires an understanding of how the United Nations, non-governmental organisations and the Department for International Development operate. Those are skill sets that we need to expand on. At the moment, we are just touching on those areas and there is work to be done. On interoperability, I believe that winning the war fighting is only half the battle. We should remember President Bush standing on the USS Abraham Lincoln on 1 May 2003 and saying, ““Mission accomplished,”” in reference to Iraq. How many years later did we actually get some peace there? We need to think about post-conflict operations and planning. We need to arm our service personnel with the skill sets they need to achieve that and to work with other organisations. My final point is about improving strategy. We used to be very good at that. I ask the Minister, how can we hang on to knowledge after a conflict? How can we keep an open mind in dealing with the latest conflict and not use the strategy, tactics and doctrine from the last conflict, which might be out of date? How can we better prepare for the next conflict, wherever that might be? There are various ways in which we could do that. I would like to see an improvement in the role of the defence attaché. At the moment, they are like the major character in ““Fawlty Towers””. They get sent to various embassies as passed-over senior officers to see out the end of their careers, but the role of the defence attaché is pivotal in establishing upstream relationships, as my hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes North (Mark Lancaster) mentioned. Those skill sets are worth developing. How can we select our brightest and best, which is not necessarily the same as the most academic, to develop those strategy skills sets? How can we nurture the next Alan Brooke, Ismay, Parker, Guthrie or Richards? These are things that we need to get good at. We used to be good at them and we can excel at them again and offer those skills within NATO. It is not just about reading Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, which all military personnel do as they grow up. It is no coincidence that the word for general in Greek is strategos. Strategy is something that we need to work at. I will end where I began in my first intervention: on the damage that there has been to war memorials. I pay tribute to those who have served and who continue to serve in our armed forces. I hope that those thugs who choose to rob the very memorials around which we will gather tomorrow realise what an insult they mete out to those, past and present, who have given so much to our country.