Proceeding contribution from Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Conservative) in the House of Lords on Thursday, 15 March 2012. It occurred during Committee of the Whole House (HL) and Debate on bill on Scotland Bill.
Scotland Bill
My Lords, this has been a very illuminating debate. I have to say to my noble friend that this principle is bonkers. It says that if a Government take people out of tax by raising the threshold because they think that will help with welfare policy and encourage people to go to work because of the effects of the why-work taper, they follow the example that was given by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, or they cut the top rate of tax—would that they would in order to generate growth and get the economy moving again—Scotland gets a cheque and gets the benefit. So a Treasury Minister trying to find the money to raise thresholds does not just have to find the money to compensate for the loss of receipts but has to send a cheque to Scotland to compensate it. It makes ““We're all in this together”” rather strange because we are not all in this together. There is a different rule. It shows the paradox of this whole Scotland Bill. If anything, it almost makes me become a devo-max person. It almost makes me think that we should go for fiscal autonomy, because it is absolutely bonkers. It is saying that this is not about giving the Scottish Parliament tax-raising powers and accountability for what it does but about taking the block grant and pretending that it is a tax-raising power and, when the tax-raising power does not quite work because of changes in the tax system, topping it up. This is just about recreating the block grant, calling it a tax-raising power and dressing it up as accountability. That is what this principle means. I have studied this quite carefully, and I think that if this principle is to be applied, it is quite shocking that it is not in the Bill, because it is fundamental. It changes the whole architecture. Not many people follow this subject, but I do not believe that among them there is an understanding that changes in the position in England will be compensated for by expenditure north of the border, if, indeed, that is the position. I would like to give an example from ancient times when I was in the Scottish Office. In England, water was privatised; in Scotland, it was not. The result was that there was no expenditure on water services because they were provided by private companies in England. The result was that the Barnett consequences did not come to Scotland. Under the ancien regime, we did not get an extra grant from the Treasury to compensate us for not doing what would have been the sensible thing, which was to privatise water services in Scotland. This is a wholly new, although perhaps I am wrong.
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
- Reference
- 736 c473-4
- Session
- 2010-12
- Chamber / Committee
- House of Lords chamber
- Subjects
- Criminal proceedings Devolved matters Armed forces Aviation Devolution Civil service Air passenger duty Borrowing Aggregates levy Land EU law Income tax Legislative competence Excise duties Landfill Legislation Domicil Large goods vehicle drivers Ministerial powers Powers Members Public expenditure Ministers Public finance Scotland Social security benefits Scottish Parliament Taxation Tax rates and bands Supreme Court Self-employed Development land tax Universal credit Legislative consent motions
- Legislation
- Scotland Bill 2010-12
- Link
- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
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- 2023-12-15 16:06:29 +0000
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