---

Syria in 2026: Minority religious and ethnic groups after Assad

Following the fall of President Assad in 2024 and the end of Syria’s 13-year civil war, there have been several instances of extensive violence targeting or involving minority religious and ethnic groups in Syria. This includes in Alawite coastal areas (March 2025) and in the Druze-majority Suweyda province (July 2025).

The interim government has said that those responsible for the violence, which reports suggest included some members of the interim authorities, will be held to account for their actions.

In 2026, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom reported that religious freedom in Syria has “continued to worsen” since 2024, citing attacks on Alawites, Druze, Christians and threats from Islamic State/Daesh.

After the fall of Assad, Ahmed al-Sharaa, leader of one of the major rebel forces, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, was declared Syria’s transitional president in January 2025. In 2026, an interim parliament has been selected to draft a new constitution and met for the first time in July 2026.

This briefing describes the violence reported against religious minority groups in Syria, transitional government actions relating to minority religious and ethnic groups, and the UK and international response.

Who are Syria’s minority ethnic and religious groups?

While Arab Sunni Muslims constitute most of Syria’s population, there are many minority ethnic groups and minority religious groups (the below is not exhaustive, and the figures are often based on pre-conflict estimates):

• Kurds are the country’s largest minority ethnic group, constituting around 10% to 15% of the population. Most are Sunni Muslims. During the civil war, the Kurdish-led Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) was established in northeast Syria. Following fighting in January 2026, it has agreed to integrate with the interim government.
• Alawites are a branch of Shia Islam and may constitute around 10% to 15% of the population. President Bashar al-Assad was a member of this group.
• Christians constitute up to 10% of the population, though numbers are estimated to have fallen over the last decade.
• Druze number around 3% and are concentrated in southern Syria.

What violence has been reported?

Since Assad fled, there have been several major acts of violence targeting and involving minority communities.

March 2025 violence against Alawites

In March 2025, around 1,400 people, mostly civilians, were killed in violence in coastal regions in western Syria. Alawites were the primary targets and conflict monitors reported instances of “revenge attacks”.

Reuters news agency and rights monitor Amnesty International alleged that some militias affiliated with the interim Syrian authorities, as well as the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, participated in the violence.

The transitional authorities established an investigation, which reported in July 2025. This said that pro-Assad “remnants” had caused the violence and that some members of interim government forces did commit violations, but as “individuals” and under “no official authority”.

The independent UN Commission Syria Inquiry reached a similar conclusion that some interim forces participated in the violence, and raised concerns for a lack of central control over them.

The violence in March 2025 followed earlier reports of “door-to-door interrogations and select executions” against Alawites carried out by forces affiliated with the transitional government, according to the US Commission on Religious Freedom.

Violence and discrimination against Alawites have also been reported in Damascus. In November 2025, there were also violent tensions between Alawites and Bedouin in Homs (Syria’s third largest city). Three people were also killed in December 2025 protests in Alawite coastal regions.

In 2026, BBC Monitoring analysis has found a rise in anti-Alawite sentiment on Syrian social media since the fall of Assad, often linking the group to the former regime.

April and July 2025: Druze and Bedouin

On 29 and 30 April 2025, sectarian violence in a Damascus suburb largely populated by Druze reportedly killed at least 100 people, including security forces.

Extensive violence was also reported in mid-July 2025 in the southern Suweyda province between Druze and Bedouin armed groups, and some tensions and protests have continued in 2026. Interim government security forces also intervened.

In a 2026 report, the UN Syria Commission said around 1,700 people were killed and 200,000 displaced during the violence. It reported that Druze armed groups, interim government forces and tribal groups may have all engaged in:

murders, direct and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, arbitrary arrests and abductions, torture and ill-treatment, pillage, attacks on civilian property, sexual and gender-based violence including rape, and outrages upon personal dignity, and attacks on buildings dedicated to religion accompanied by discriminatory sectarian insult.

The commission said that the violence “predominantly impact[ed] the Druze and Bedouin communities of the governorate”. It assesses that violence has declined since July 2025, but “not ceased entirely” (some violence has been reported in March and May 2026). Around 155,000 people remain displaced, and the region remains outside the interim Syrian Government’s control.  

In July 2025, Interim President Sharaa said those responsible for the violence would be “held accountable” and that the Druze would be “protected”.

From 2024, Israel has launched a series of military actions in southern Syria, citing protection for the Druze and its demand that southern Syria remains demilitarised (it borders Israel and the occupied Golan Heights). While some Druze leaders have rejected Israeli support, others have welcomed it as part of a move towards greater autonomy or independence.

Christians

In June 2025, a Christian church in Damascus was targeted in a suicide attack, which reportedly killed 25 people and injured 63. It was reportedly the largest attack on Christians in Syria since 1860.

A Sunni Muslim group, Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah, potentially linked to Islamic State/Daesh, was blamed for the attack.

Further violence against Christians has been reported in 2026.  

How is the interim government responding?

Syria’s interim government has launched investigations into the 2025 violence. Minority ethnic and religious groups have a small number of representatives in the interim parliament. Negotiations to integrate Kurdish areas into the state had stalled until 2026, while no agreement has been reached for Druze areas.

Constitutional declaration

In March 2025 a constitutional declaration was issued. In 2026, a parliament has been selected to help draft a new text.

The declaration describes Islam as the “main source of legislation” and that the president must be a Muslim (the interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is a Sunni Muslim).

Analysts have noted concerns from minorities that the constitution refers to protecting the three “heavenly religions” (PDF) Judaism, Christianity and Islam) and for not explicitly mentioning other faith and belief groups. Kurdish groups have also criticised the naming of the state as the “Arab” republic. 

However, while freedom of religion and belief is not more expressly defined, the Lebanon-based Carnegie Middle East Center think tank notes that under the declaration, Syria will implement “all rights” in the international treaties it has signed. This includes freedom of religion and belief.

Representation of minorities in the interim government

The cabinet of the interim government was announced in March 2025. While senior positions are held by those associated with the interim president, it contains representatives from Christian, Alawite, Druze and Kurdish communities.

However, neither the Kurdish nor Druze ministers are from the leading groups for their communities, in the Kurdish northeast or Druze Suweyda. Since the integration agreement with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), reached in January 2026, one senior Kurdish figure has been appointed deputy defence minister.

Syria’s interim parliament, which met for the first time in July 2026, has a small number of Alawites, Ismailis, Kurds, Turkmen and Christians among its members. It has elected a Christian woman as one of two deputy speakers.

Kurdish leaders have described the parliament as unrepresentative. Suweyda province has not participated in the selection process.

Tensions in centralising power and armed forces

The interim government is not the only armed force operating in Syria, nor does its authority extend across the whole country. It has cited the absence of state institutions as one reason for continuing outbreaks of violence and has sought to integrate Syria’s major armed groups under a single command.

While it has reached agreements on unifying the armed forces of the Kurdish-led SDF, as well as the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, progress with the SDF was delayed until 2026. Kurdish leaders are also seeking protection for some issues, including language rights.

Some Druze leaders have continued to push for greater autonomy within the new Syrian state (but some for independence) and to retain their separate forces, given sectarian tensions and uncertainty.

Islamic State/Daesh, jihadist groups and remnants of pro-Assad groups also remain active and claimed some involvement in the violence. The interim government joined the global anti-Daesh/Islamic State coalition in November 2025. In the main, however, Islamic State activity is low in Syria.

Investigations and accountability

In November 2025, the first trials of around a dozen people involved in the March 2025 violence began. The interim government’s prosecutor general has brought charges against around 565 people, including both members of the interim army and pro-Assad groups. Further charges and trials are planned.

A 13-point roadmap was agreed for Suweyda in September 2025 following American and Jordanian mediation. It includes commitments for accountability and for those displaced to return. However, in June 2026 the UN’s Deputy Envoy for Syria said that there had been “no progress” on the plan. Some Druze groups had opposed the 2025 plan.

In November 2025, some members of the interim army were detained over the violence in Suweyda. Trials began in July 2026.

Analysis from policy forum Just Security argues that the local courts lack transparency and have overlooked the sectarian nature of the violence, instead focusing on revenge-killings (many Alawites being associated with the Assad regime). Alawite and Druze have also expressed concern about the independence of interim government courts.

In 2026, the UN Syria Commission has called for “comprehensive reform of the security sector and the judiciary” and says previous recommendations for training and vetting of security forces remain unaddressed.

Society and education

The interim authorities also faced criticism in 2025 for changes to the school curriculum, including the removal of material on pre-Islamic religions in Syria. The changes remain under review. There have also been tensions between teaching the Syrian or Kurdish curricula in the Kurdish-controlled north east, with Christian schools temporarily closing as a result in 2025.

The future of how Kurdish language education will be taught in the Kurdish northeast remains subject to further talks.

In October 2025, the interim government announced Christmas and Easter will be included as official holidays. Some groups, including within HTS, criticised the policy. Citing unrest, major Christian churches cancelled outdoor festivities for Easter in March 2026.

What is the UK and international response?

UN Security Council Presidential statements

In 2025, the UN Security Council issued two presidential statements on behalf of all its members (including the UK), condemning sectarian violence.

In March 2025 the council condemned the “widespread violence” and “mass killings of civilians, particularly among the Alawite community”, while in August 2025 it “strongly condemn[ed] the violence perpetrated against civilians in Suwayda which has included mass killing”.

In both cases, the council called for accountability, welcomed the statements from interim Syrian authorities condemning the violence, and said all Syrians must be protected.

UK Government statements

The UK Government, echoing the positions of others in Europe and the US, has said it will judge the new Syrian authorities “by their actions” and will continue to push for freedom of religion or belief in Syria. It has called for the investigations into the 2025 violence to result in greater “transparency, accountability, security sector reform, and engagement with affected communities”.

The UK Government has raised concerns directly with the Syrian interim authorities, including through visits to Syria in 2025 of the then Middle East Minister, Hamish Falconer and the then Foreign Secretary, David Lammy.

The UK Government also raised the “importance of inclusion and transitional justice for peace and stability in Syria” and “protecting the rights of all Syrians” during Ahmed al-Sharaa’s visit to the UK in March 2026.

UK prioritisation of freedom of religion or belief

Syria is one of the priority countries for UK work on freedom of religion or belief. The government is funding programmes to document human rights abuses and support the trial of those committing sexual violence in conflict.

Following the July 2025 violence, the UK Government announced £1.7 million in aid to support the response in Suwayda. This provided emergency health support to displaced people and specific support for women and girls. It has also announced funding to support accountability and justice in Syria.

Further reading

Introduction to Syria’s minority groups

• Commons Library, Syria in 2026. Collection of briefings on Syria’s transition, including Kurdish integration, UK Government policy, and foreign affairs.

Introduction to Syria’s minority groups

• Minority Rights Groups, Syria.
• BBC News, Guide: Syria's diverse minorities, 2011

Reports on violence and tensions in 2025 and 2026

• Commons Library, Syria after Assad: Consequences and interim authorities 2025, updated July 2025, section 2.2. Includes further information on the violence and reading on religious minorities in 2025.
• US Commission on Religious Freedom, Religious freedom and US policy in post-Assad Syria, July 2025
• US Commission on Religious Freedom, Religious freedom and rule of law in Syria, May 2026
• Amnesty International, Syria: Authorities must investigate abductions of Alawite women and girls, July 2025
• International Crisis Group, Restoringsecurity in Post-Assad Syria: Lessons from the coast and Suweida, November 2025
• Foreign Policy, Suwayda’s Struggle: Syria’s Druze are trapped between Israeli protection and Damascus’s rule, July 2026
• BBC Monitoring, Analysis: Mixed signals of moderation and religious conservatism in new Syria, December 2025 (requires a free account, which can be opened for parliamentary staff).
• Human Rights Watch, Syria: Events of 2025, 2026