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Commons Briefing paper by Claire Mills. It was first published on Wednesday, 2 September 2026. It was last updated on Monday, 7 September 2026.


What is a 'whole of society' approach to defence and security?

As the world becomes more dangerous and contested, and intelligence agencies warn of a possible Russian attack on a NATO ally within the next four years, questions over the readiness of the UK to deter and withstand any attack are gaining in prominence.

The readiness of the armed forces, and the amount the UK spends on defence has dominated this debate. However, both the 2025 Strategic Defence Review and the National Security Strategy acknowledged that defence and security must become a ‘whole of society’ endeavour, one that uses the resources and capabilities of not just the military but wider government, industry, civil society and the population at large. 

This briefing is intended as a short explainer of a ‘whole of society’ approach to defence and security and how it feeds into broader questions of national resilience. 

It forms part of a collection of Commons Library papers on defence readiness, civil preparedness and resilience ahead of expected defence legislation later in the parliamentary session.

Our security cannot be outsourced only to the armed forces.  We deter by being strong as a nation. That requires a whole of society response. The whole of Britain must step up.

  Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton

Calls for a ‘whole of society’ approach in the 2025 Strategic Defence review and National Security Strategy

Upon taking office in summer 2024 the Labour Government launched a new Strategic Defence Review (SDR) which would examine UK defence requirements over the next ten years. That review was published in June 2025. It made 62 recommendations for how the UK should adapt its approach to defence and deterrence. At its heart was the recommendation that the UK should move toward what has been termed “warfighting readiness”. This envisages technological innovation at “a wartime pace”, strengthened homeland defence, a new partnership with industry and radical reform of the way in which defence equipment is procured.

The SDR also called for a “whole of society” approach to the implementation of its recommendations, including wider societal participation in achieving national resilience. The SDR said that “re-establishing credible national preparations for war, home defence, and industrial mobilisation is a priority”. It also called for a “national conversation” to raise public awareness of the threats to the UK, to reconnect defence and society and to increase understanding of the role that society has to play in national resilience and industrial mobilisation in the event of crisis or war.

That call for a whole of society approach was taken forward in the government’s 2025 National Security Strategy.

What does a ‘whole of society’ approach mean?

The idea that entire societies and economies can be mobilised to prepare for, and respond to, crises and conflict has its roots in the Napoleonic Wars of the early 19th century.

A whole of society approach (what is also referred to as ‘total defence’) transcends the traditional view that the armed forces are the primary means for deterring or responding to threats and challenges to the UK’s national security. It envisages defence and security as a collective endeavour that brings together a strengthened military with wider government at the national and local level, the private sector, academia, civil, voluntary and faith organisations and the population at large.

In doing so, it calls for the mobilisation of the country’s entire resources to strengthen national resilience and enable a response to any crisis or direct attack on the country.  

In the Chief of the Defence Staff’s annual lecture to RUSI in December 2025, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton devoted his entire speech to explaining what he considers a whole of society approach to mean, and what it demands of government, industry and society:

I will argue that the situation is more dangerous than I have known during my career and the price of peace is rising. Our response needs to go beyond simply strengthening our armed forces. It needs a whole of nation response that builds our defence industrial capacity, grows the skills we need, harnesses the power of the institutions we will need in wartime and ensures and increases the resilience of society and the infrastructure that supports it.

While acknowledging that the armed forces are “our first line of defence”, he talked of strengthening the UK’s industrial base, developing the requisite skills particularly among young people, exploiting the power of academic institutions and ensuring resilience within government bodies such as the NHS and in the UK’s critical national infrastructure and supply chains.

He also talked of defence and resilience being “a higher national priority for all of us”, and something that should be “the central organising principle” of everyday life. He supported calls for “a national conversation” that renews the relationship between the armed forces and society but also explains the risks and challenges that the country faces and what that might mean for government decision-making, spending priorities and society as a whole.

How is the government taking this approach forward?

Defence and the armed forces

Following on from the Strategic Defence Review and the National Security Strategy, the government has increased defence spending and published a Defence Investment Plan, setting out the Ministry of Defence (MOD)’s spending priorities for the next four years.

In September 2025, the MOD also published a Defence Industrial Strategy, which sets out how the department intends to reform equipment procurement, innovate “at a wartime pace” and strengthen and expand the UK’s defence industrial base. The MOD confirmed that the defence industrial base in the UK had been redefined in that strategy to include UK-based industry, academic institutions, the financial sector, good and services firms, technology companies and trade unions.

In July 2026, Defence Minister Louise Sandher-Jones said the MOD was also “progressing a programme of work” that is aligned with the Cabinet Office-led Home Defence Programme (below), to facilitate a whole of society approach to defence and security.

Wider preparedness and resilience

Threat assessment and resilience planning is the overall responsibility of the Cabinet Office. Individual government departments, including the Ministry of Defence, take the lead on planning for, and responding to, identified risks within their specific remits.

The Cabinet Office Home Defence Programme, established in 2024, brings together and coordinates military and civilian resilience planning efforts. Work under this programme is being accelerated.

Existing framework of threat assessment and resilience planning 

The government’s determination of threats to the UK is set down in the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA), a classified document that is updated several times year and sets out the most serious risks that could impact the country. The National Risk Register, the most recent edition of which was published in July 2026, is the public-facing version of the NSRA. This register identifies 95 potential acute risks to the UK across seven areas:

  • terrorist and state threats
  • geographic and diplomatic
  • accidents and system failures
  • natural and environmental hazards
  • human, animal and plant disease
  • societal
  • conflict and instability

The National Risk Register is supported by the government’s Chronic Risks Analysis, which summarises the risks that are not standalone risks, but pose a continuous challenge and could undermine the economy, communities, British values and way of life and/or national security. It identifies 26 risks in seven areas:

  • security
  • technology and cybersecurity
  • geopolitical
  • environmental
  • societal
  • biosecurity
  • economic

All three documents are owned by the Cabinet Office which leads on preparing for major incidents in the UK. They underpin the National Resilience Action Plan, which was first published in 2025 and sets out the government’s response to building national resilience to potential threats and outlines the steps that individuals, businesses and civil society can take to improve collective resilience. A report on implementation of the plan was published in July 2026.

While the Cabinet Office is responsible for coordinating the government’s overall response, relevant government departments, including the Ministry of Defence, are responsible for planning for the different risks identified. In addition, the Cabinet Office supports preparedness for emergencies across government through:

  • The National Exercising Programme, which conducts simulations of crises designed to test the UK’s capability to manage incidents and emergencies.
  • TheUK Resilience Academy, which provides training and resources to upskill relevant public agencies and other partners to improve preparation for and responses to emergencies.
  • The Prepare website, which provides general information to support the public to prepare for emergencies.

Cabinet Office Home Defence Programme

In 2024 the Cabinet Office also established its Home Defence Programme to build the UK’s resilience in the event of any crisis and potential escalation to conflict. Described as “an evolving and enduring programme of work which provides defence, security and resilience planning” it is focused on bringing together military and civilian efforts, including civilian assistance to the military, in the event of a crisis or hostilities affecting the UK.

Spending targets

As part of the NATO spending commitments agreed at the Hague Summit in 2025, NATO allies have agreed to spend, by 2035, 1.5% of GDP annually on broader defence and security related requirements as part of their obligations under article 3 of the NATO founding treaty on civil preparedness and resilience. While there is no agreed definition of what constitutes this category of spending, it will include investment in the protection of critical national infrastructure, network defence and civil preparedness and resilience measures.

In evidence to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (PDF) in January 2026, the government said it was “confident” that it would meet this spending target in 2027. The chair of the committee, Matt Western MP (Lab), has been critical, however, of the lack of detail from the government on what that spending will entail.

Future plans

In a statement on national resilience in July 2026, the then Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Darren Jones, confirmed that work on the Cabinet Home Defence Programme had been accelerated and work on several new resilience strategies was underway. Chapter 6 of the Strategic Defence Review also set out several recommended future measures for UK defence.

Updating the government’s War Book

As part of home defence planning, the government’s War Book is being updated. Originally formulated after the Second World War, and subject to constant revisions, the War Book set out the actions to be taken by Ministers and officials during a period of war. A key planning assumption of the War Book was that at the outset of a new conflict a new Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill would be presented to Parliament. The War Book was archived at the end of the Cold War when separate arrangements for civil defence and emergency planning were combined and underpinned by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

Further detail on the history of the War Book is available in Commons Library briefing, Home Defence: What is the War Book?

UK Home Defence exercise in 2027

The Cabinet Office’s annual national exercises will also continue as a means of testing the UK’s “whole-of-society preparedness”. As part of that programme, one major “Tier 1” ministerial-led exercise is held every year.

In 2027, that Tier 1 exercise will be a test of the government’s home defence plans (Operation Albiston Shadow).

New resilience strategies

Toward the end of 2026, the government intends to publish an Energy Resilience Strategy, setting out measures to strengthen the resilience of the UK’s energy infrastructure.

The government has said it is also committed to launching a Transport Resilience Strategy in 2026.

A UK Industrial Strategy, a new Trade Strategy and a Critical Minerals Strategy were all previously published in 2025.

Review of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004

To keep pace with future challenges and provide a strong legislative framework that continues to be relevant in meeting those risks, the government has launched a Call for Views on the upcoming review of the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) which is due in 2027. Views are being particularly sought on:

  • strengthening the local resilience system in the context of wider changes to the resilience landscape
  • defining the civil contingency role of Strategic Authorities and Mayors in England
  • considering whether UK government resilience arrangements should be brought under the CCA 2004.

A new public awareness campaign

Towards the end of 2026, the government intends to launch a national resilience public awareness campaign to “inform the public of the small but important steps they can take to be prepared in case of emergencies and disruption”. Developed in collaboration with civil society organisations, the campaign will provide advice for households and include educational resources for schools, colleges, and children and young people.

More broadly the government has said it remains committed to leading a “national conversation with the public about the risks that we face to the homeland” and the rationale for investing more in defence and security in order to strengthen national resilience. That work has been started by the Cabinet Office Home Defence Programme.

A new Reserve-style force for protecting critical national infrastructure (CNI)?

The SDR said that "a more focused and substantive body of work is necessary to ensure the security and resilience of UK CNI across the spectrum from competition through to crisis and conflict".

Recognising that “in many cases, CNI operators do not have the ability to protect the infrastructure they own in the face of such complex and evolving threats" it recommended that the MOD explore, alongside other government departments, "options for a ‘new deal’ for the defence of CNI, rooted in partnership between Defence and private-sector and allied operators of infrastructure that is most critical to the continuity of essential services in the UK”.

One possible suggestion in the Strategic Defence Review is the creation of a new 'Home Guard' style force, modelled on the Reserves, that could protect strategic sites and key CNI, to ensure the protection of energy, food, water, telecoms, medical supplies and transport infrastructure in the event of crisis or conflict:

options should be explored for the development of a new force that is modelled on the Reserves and connects local communities with Defence: recruited and employed locally, with a narrowly defined remit and training commitment. This could be organised under the Reserves Forces structure, led by the Army, and armed and equipped with basic communications, weapons, and technology such as drones. Plans must nest into the Home Defence Programme and be routinely tested and assured as part of the UK’s broader exercise programme.

The SDR suggested that the creation of such a force would increase “resilience and strategic depth by ensuring Regulars and Reserves can concentrate on warfighting, not basic tasks”.

The SDR also recommended bringing forward legislation to strengthen the government’s powers to protect CNI “where necessary”.

Work on the protection of critical national infrastructure (CNI) and countering sabotage during a crisis or conflict is subsequently being undertaken as part of the Cabinet Office Home Defence Programme.

Further detail on proposals for a new home defence force is available in Commons Library briefing, Home Defence: A new ‘Home Guard’?

Increasing the readiness of the Reserves

In January 2026 the government introduced the Armed Forces Bill 2024-26 which contains measures to increase the readiness of the reserves.

Specifically, the bill will increase the recall liability of personnel in the Strategic Reserve up to the age of 65, harmonise the length of recall liability across all three services and enable the Secretary of State to issue recall orders for the Strategic Reserve for ‘warlike operations’.

The bill is currently before Parliament (bill 3 of session 2026-27) and must receive Royal Assent by the end of December 2026 when the Armed Forces Act 2006 expires. Reforms are expected to come into force in spring 2027.

A new Defence Readiness Bill

To enable the transition to war, if necessary, new home defence legislation is expected to be introduced later in this Parliament.

The Ministry of Defence has said the legislation will ensure that the government has the necessary powers to respond to “the growing threat posed by sub-threshold and hybrid attacks” and that it will provide a framework of reserve powers that can be “activated, if required”, to support an effective response during a national crisis and in the event of escalation towards conflict. Potential legislative measures identified in the SDR (p.91) include:

  • improving the preparedness of key industries, including powers to ensure sufficient supply of services, access to CNI, and resources for defence
  • supporting the mobilisation of wider defence, including industry and reserves
  • improving the resilience of the UK’s warfighting infrastructure by introducing plans to mobilise private and commercial assets
  • ensuring that the UK is ready to operate within a NATO framework
  • enabling external scrutiny of the armed forces’ readiness through the annual publication of key data.

Selected international comparisons

Several countries already adopt a more comprehensive approach to security that brings together the military and central government with local government, civil society, industry and the wider population. Often referred to as ‘total defence’, it is a concept that has, for example, been part of Finland and Sweden’s governance and public mindset since the early years of the Cold War. As such, they are often used as a comparator when discussing a whole of society approach.

Finland

Those areas deemed to be vital societal functions, including functioning leadership, defence, internal security, international relations, the economy, protection of critical national infrastructure, security of supply and psychological resilience, are all delivered collaboratively between the government, the business community, non-governmental organisations and citizens. Between them, they form a network for continuous dialogue, information sharing, setting objectives and commitments and adopting practical measures, including training, to promote preparedness and enhance resilience within Finnish society. Conscription is mandatory for all males between 18 and 65 years, and women can apply for voluntary military service.

The fundamental aim is for the vital functions of society to be safeguarded under all circumstances, including times of crisis. As such, the participation of all elements of society from the government down to individual citizens is considered essential and an integral part of the Finnish Comprehensive Security model. The entirety of Finnish society is expected to be able to rapidly mobilise the necessary resources, recover quickly and adapt its functions based on the lessons learned. As such, the process is one of constant evolution.

Sweden

Sweden has developed and implemented a policy of total defence, applying across society and in which all Swedish citizens aged between 16 and 70 are obliged to participate. Total defence is based on four pillars: military, civil, psychological and economic, and involves ensuring that Sweden has the capacity to defend itself and its population against armed attacks, and defend Sweden’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and contribute to the defence of allies. National service is mandatory for all citizens over 18 years.

In addition to military preparedness and duties of citizens, total defence involves obligations on the state administration, local authorities, organisations and businesses. They must be prepared to maintain the state’s essential functions in times of aggression and war. The state officially recognises 18 voluntary defence organisations which consist of around 350,000 to 380,000 members. They support communications, logistics, medicine and other tasks related to total defence. There is also a programme for young people, aged 15 to20, which teaches survival, land navigation, first aid and basic military skills. Households must also be prepared to survive on their own for at least a week (previously 72 hours).

Various specialised agencies provide institutional support to ensure societal resilience. These include the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA), the Swedish Security Service (SÄPO), and the Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency. In 2022, the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency was established. It is tasked with coordinating resilience-related activities, including identifying, analysing and combatting disinformation.

Useful reading and parliamentary resources

Commons Library briefing, Defence and civil preparedness: A reading list provides a comprehensive list of useful reading and resources on the whole of society approach.

The Defence Select Committee has launched an inquiry into the UK’s obligations under NATO’s Article 3 on resilience and civil preparedness and what measures might be required in the forthcoming Defence Readiness Bill: The UK’s Article 3 obligations and the Defence Readiness Bill. The committee is also due to hold a non-inquiry session on the Cabinet Office Home Defence Programme

The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy is also holding an inquiry into Societal resilience: A national conversation. That inquiry began taking evidence in April 2026 and, at the time of writing, is ongoing.

The House of Lords has also established a National Resilience Select Committee. Its first inquiry into national and local preparedness and resilience was launched in March 2026 and the committee intends to report by 30 November 2026.

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Secondary information

Type
Research briefing
Reference
CBP-11082 
Related items
Civil Contingencies Act 2004
Thursday, 18 November 2004
Public acts
Subjects
Armed forces Defence Armed conflict Civil defence Energy Infrastructure Emergencies Emergency services Finland National security Publicity Risk assessment Reserve forces Civil society Sweden NATO Population Military operations Strategic Defence Review
Legislation
Civil Contingencies Act 2004
Armed Forces Bill 2024-26 to 2026-27
Published by
International Affairs and Defence Section
House of Commons Library
Link
View this Research briefing on researchbriefings.parliament.uk