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Defence in the World

No, as the hon. Gentleman would understand if he had listened to what I said. The Government admit that the Navy’s tasks will have to change due to the reductions that they are making. The Government are having to accept that that is what their reductions involve. For example, when we consider the decommissioning of frigates, HMS Marlborough was 15 years old and HMS Grafton is eight years old. The idea that we should scrap, decommission or sell on to another Navy ships that were commissioned only within such time periods requires serious explanations from the Government that have not been forthcoming. I turn to the RAF. The NAO report refers to the temporary reduction in flying hours for fast-jet pilots from 17.5 hours a month to 16.5 for the duration of 2005–06. The current requirement is already a reduction from 18.5 hours, and the number of flying hours for fast-jet pilots has been reducing over recent years. On Monday, the Minister of State said:"““We intend to increase the hours next year.””—[Official Report, 4 July 2005; Vol. 436, c. 13.]" So, will he tell the House whether that intention to increase flying hours will benefit all our pilots? Will flying time return to 18.5 hours or more? If not, what assessment has he made of the impact of the present reduction on the training of our airmen? Does he agree with the NAO that it could seriously degrade the skills of combat pilots? That is a very serious accusation indeed. The NAO report should shame the Government. I have to say that I feel sorry for the Secretary of State because I believe that his heart is in the right place in relation to defence and our armed services. Certainly, much of what he said today indicated that. However, in the strategic defence review, for which he can take personal credit, the shortfalls that we are dealing with at present were not envisaged. His frustration at the bad stewardship of his predecessor, the current Leader of the House, on whose watch all that occurred, must be as great as mine. I hope that the Secretary of State will not be as supine as his predecessor in the face of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who is really the cause of the trouble. He has never understood the nature of defence and has cared even less. The truth is that at a time when our armed forces are pressured as never before, with deployments constantly above normal levels, the Government have been responsible for a catalogue of disasters that have reduced the effectiveness of our armed forces and cost the British taxpayer millions of pounds. Let me give the Minister a few examples; the first one may be small, but it is indicative. The Ministry of Defence spent £5,000 on torches for the SAS that could not be used because they rattled. The MOD lost track of 200,000 sets of body armour and £241,000-worth of ammunition—in Afghanistan of all places. The MOD accidentally—that is the word that was used—scrapped helicopter rotor blades at a loss of £151,000. It mislaid two huge C130 transport aircraft undercarriage struts at a cost of £296,000. A human centrifuge used to train pilots was scrapped because it was too expensive at £14 million, but the MOD had to pay £14.4 million to scrap it and the Malaysians took delivery of it. The list is endless. Losses and special payments have risen relentlessly under the Government. The amount was £116 million in 2001–02, £260 million in 2002–03, £559 million in 2003–04 and the cost may top £1 billion in 2004–05. That wasted money could instead have been used to avoid some of the damaging cuts announced recently. If those losses and special payments had been brought under control, the Royal Navy could have retained its frigates and the Army its four battalions. It is hardly a record of which to be proud.