Skip to main content

Proceeding contribution from Baroness Scotland of Asthal (Labour) in the House of Lords on Wednesday, 7 December 2005. It occurred during Committee of the Whole House (HL) and Debate on bill on Terrorism Bill.


Terrorism Bill

I agree with the noble and learned Lord’s caution for the reasons he gives. Of course, the notice we are talking about, contrary to the nature of the amendments moved earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, is not an offence; it is a precursor to the commencement of proceedings. If the notice is complied with, nothing flows therefrom. If the notice is not complied with—either because the individual, having looked at the material, does not agree with the assessment that has been made about the nature of the content, or because they agree with the content—the only thing that flows from that, as we discussed earlier in Committee, is that they would not thereafter be able to claim either that they were not aware or that they did not endorse the statements that were made. Further, the noble and learned Lord is right to say that if a judge had made a declaratory endorsement of the publishing of that notice, it would be difficult for anyone thereafter to suggest that the notice was in fact incorrect in its declaration that the matters complained of were indeed of a terrorist content. We do not think it necessary or appropriate for judicial oversight for the reasons given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Cameron, but also because, if one looks at the structure, it would be too burdensome. The effect of these amendments would be to introduce judicial oversight with regard to all notices, and in this instance a notice is issued only if a judge is satisfied that the notice relates to statements or conduct specified in Clause 3(1), requiring the police to satisfy a court that there is evidence to suggest that the conduct in question is an offence. If the construct of the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, was that we were in fact creating an offence, I can see that that might be appropriate, but, since we are not, we do not think it necessary. By its nature, it is a far more burdensome process than the one we have provided for in the Bill as it stands. As the noble Lord has already accepted, the Internet is a fast-moving world. There would have to be good reason for introducing delay in the clause. We assume the intention behind the amendment, by requiring the police to satisfy a court that there is evidence to suggest that the conduct in question is an offence, is that the Bill would provide greater protection to the individual than currently—but this is what is provided under the existing clauses. As I have made clear, if the website host does not comply with a notice, the police will have to choose. They have to elect whether to prosecute under Clauses 1 and 2, providing a full evidence case that satisfies a court, just as would be required under the amendment to Clause 3. Requiring the police to go to a judge before issuing a notice slows down the process at the cost of increasing the risk that the statement, article or record will have a negative effect on those seeing it and delays the speed at which a notice can be issued to a person who may or not be aware of the presence of such material and enable them to remove that material. The net result of this does not provide any more protection of the individual than they already have under the current drafting. Amendment No. 56 also makes provision for the Secretary of State to make regulations to,"““provide for an application to be heard without notice to the relevant person and in his absence””," so that the person on whom a notice is served,"““may apply to a court for the revocation of the notice””." Again, we can see no real benefit to that process. First, as I have said, we do not think the police ought to have to go court before issuing the notice. Secondly, for a person to be able to revoke a notice seems unnecessary. The notice is not intended to be a notice to a person not to commit an offence; it is a notice that there is a statement that possibly comes within those offences, and the person can choose to comply or not. If that person does not think that the statement constitutes an offence under Clause 1 or 2, that person can simply ignore the notice. The only sanction for them not complying is that the person, if prosecuted, does not have the right to claim that he did not endorse the statement. We see no useful role for the revocation process. The amendments are, I suggest with the utmost respect, not necessary.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
676 c676-7 
Session
2005-06
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
Subjects
Disclosure of information Crimes of violence Crimes against property ICT Jurisdiction Incitement Fines Libraries Internet Journalism Police Prosecutions Publications Sentencing Universities Terrorism Training Research Students Academic freedom Propaganda Encouragement of terrorism Bookshops
Legislation
Terrorism Bill 2005-06
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk