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Proceeding contribution from Lord Goodhart (Liberal Democrat) in the House of Lords on Wednesday, 7 December 2005. It occurred during Committee of the Whole House (HL) and Debate on bill on Terrorism Bill.


Terrorism Bill

moved Amendment No. 74:"After Clause 4, insert the following new clause—" ““DEFENCES (1)   Subsection (2) applies where in accordance with a provision mentioned in subsection (3) it is a defence for a person charged with an offence to prove a particular matter. (2)   If the person adduces evidence which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the matter, the court or jury shall assume that the defence is satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not. (3)   The provisions in respect of which subsection (2) applies are sections 1(7), 2(8) and (9) and 3(5).”” The noble Lord said: Amendment No. 74 is very important. Its purpose is to ensure that special defences under Clauses 1 to 3 of the Bill require an evidential burden of proof only and not a full burden of proof. That is a second best to putting an intention test into Clause 2, in which case this amendment would be unnecessary. Without either of these, we are in very deep water. In general, when a defendant is required to prove something as a defence, he has to prove it on the balance of probabilities. Sometimes, however, the standard of proof can be reduced so that all the defendant has to do is show that there is an arguable issue. If so, the burden then switches back to the prosecution to disprove beyond reasonable doubt the claim raised by the defendant, and that is what is known as an evidential burden. There is an important precedent for this in Section 118 of the Terrorism Act 2000. In the case of that Act, the Government accepted that there should be an evidential burden in several cases. They introduced what is now Section 118 in Committee in your Lordships’ House. Section 118 covers a number of offences under the Act. Section 12 makes it an offence for someone to arrange a meeting that he knows is to be addressed by a person who belongs to a proscribed organisation. Under Section 12(4), it is a defence for the defendant to prove that he had no reasonable cause to believe that the speaker would support the proscribed organisation or its activities. The maximum penalty for a breach of Section 12 is 10 years, so this is obviously regarded as a serious offence. Under Section 39 it is an offence to carry out acts likely to threaten a terrorist investigation. Under Section 39(5) it is a defence if the defendant did not know, and had no reasonable cause to suspect, that his acts were likely to affect a terrorist investigation. The maximum sentence for that is five years—again, a serious offence. Under Section 54 there is an offence of providing or receiving weapons training. It is a defence to that for the defendant to prove that the action was wholly for a purpose other than terrorism. That section carries a 10-year sentence. Section 57 makes it an offence to possess a terrorist article. It is a defence to prove that possession was not for a purpose connected with terrorism. The maximum sentence is 10 years. Section 58 makes it an offence to collect information of a kind likely to be useful to terrorists. It is a defence that the defendant had a reasonable excuse for collecting that information. The maximum sentence is 10 years. There are similar provisions in Sections 77 and 103 of the Terrorism Act and in Northern Ireland legislation. Amendment No. 74 applies the same principle to defences under this Bill. The first offence is under Clause 1(7). Following the Government’s acceptance that offences under Clause 1 should be limited to cases of intentional subjective recklessness, I believe that Clause 1(7) is now otiose—as I said yesterday, though the Minister did not accept it—and I will discuss that no further. The remaining defences are those under Clause 2(8) and (9) and Clause 3(5). Clause 2 covers dissemination of terrorist publications, an offence that requires no intent. Clause 2(8) provides a defence that the defendant had not read the publication and had no reasonable grounds to suspect it was a terrorist publication—which, incidentally, is an objective test; it is not open to the defendant to say that he was blind to what was going on—and the defendant must also prove that it did not have his endorsement. Clause 2(9) provides a defence that the publication did not express the defendant’s views or have his endorsement. Clause 3(5) is somewhat more complicated in its operation, and I will not try to explain it in detail, but it raises the same principle. Let me try to analyse what that principle is. First, in the absence of an intention test in Clause 2, and subject to the specific defences in subsections (8) and (9), the offence of disseminating a terrorist publication can be committed by someone who does not know that what he is handling is a terrorist publication. Secondly, the risk is increased by the extreme width of the definition of terrorist publication and by the fact that whether any publication is a terrorist publication depends not only on its content but on the context in which it is disseminated and on the mental effect it is likely to have on the recipients rather than on the actual intention of the defendant. Thirdly, the offence carries a heavy penalty, a maximum of seven years’ imprisonment. When you get into that category of case, it is I believe plain that people should be convicted of such offences only if they have a full mens rea. The fourth aspect of the principle is that there are some circumstances, and I agree that the Terrorism Act 2000 was one, in which it is legitimate to require a defendant to explain his motives or actions rather than allow him simply to rely on silence. For example, someone who receives weapons training cannot under Section 54 of the Terrorism Act 2000 say, ““You have to prove that I was there for a terrorist purpose””. He has to provide an innocent explanation for his presence. But—the fifth point—if he produces an explanation that is not implausible, then under Section 118 it becomes the duty of the prosecution to disprove that explanation beyond reasonable doubt. If the burden of proof remains on the defendant to prove that explanation, there is a real risk of wrongful conviction, and more frequently people will be deterred by the risk of prosecution from disseminating legitimate information. That is what we on these Benches fought for and obtained in the debates on the Terrorism Act 2000. That Act is an exact precedent for this Bill. The Government could of course avoid this problem entirely by accepting the intention requirement for Clause 2. But if they insist that they will not do that, I believe that they must at the very least accept that the burden of proof in special defences should be no more than an evidential burden of proof. If the Government will not accept either of those, then I believe they will face a real risk of wrongful convictions and the certainty of a chilling effect on legitimate discussion of issues relating to terrorism. It is more than likely that it will be held ultimately that this Bill is incompatible with the Human Rights Act. Why is it necessary in a democratic society that people should have to prove their innocence? I beg to move.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
676 c705-7 
Session
2005-06
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
Subjects
Disclosure of information Crimes of violence Crimes against property ICT Jurisdiction Incitement Fines Libraries Internet Journalism Police Prosecutions Publications Sentencing Universities Terrorism Training Research Students Academic freedom Propaganda Encouragement of terrorism
Legislation
Terrorism Bill 2005-06
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk