---

Armed Forces Bill

I am grateful to the noble Earl. I will do that. Our discussions across the House during the Bill’s passage have been very helpful, and we have aimed as a matter of policy to circulate our briefing notes as widely as possible. I am happy to continue that. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, says that in service courts, as he describes them, the jury will decide the sentence. I should clarify that, under the Bill, the lay members of the jury and the judge advocate decide together. The judge advocate has a vote on the sentence, and under the Bill he will also have a casting vote. The noble Lord has quoted the Judge Advocate General extensively and cited his deep experience in this area, and it would be helpful if I also quoted him. In his evidence to the Select Committee on the Bill on 26 January, he said: "““In my view, the Court Martial system should reflect the Crown Court in all respects except where there are good operational reasons for differences. And there is a need for some differences””." In his memorandum to the Committee, he also recognised that, "““the requirements of operational effectiveness make the differences indispensable””—" not impossible, as has been suggested. It is the special characteristics of service courts, and, indeed, of the military criminal justice system, which demonstrate that the military context is understood. This, as we have heard, is ““indispensable”” to preserving the confidence of service personnel in it, and directly underpins operational effectiveness. Judge advocates are civilians who may have no service experience. The court must be seen, not least by the accused, to appreciate the factors that have an impact on discipline—and ultimately on operational effectiveness—as well as the unique pressures and responsibilities to which service personnel may be subject. As the service chiefs made clear in their evidence to the Select Committee on the Bill in another place, the military context must be taken into account when sentencing. We believe it is necessary for the lay members of the court to be fully part of the sentencing process. It is not sufficient for them to fulfil only a consultative role. In fact, the Judge Advocate General went on to say in his evidence about the judge advocate sentencing alone that, "““it probably is a step too far at the moment although I think it is an inevitability at some stage in the future provided, of course, specialist judges are judge advocates””." The noble Lord’s view is not shared by all civilians who regularly participate in service proceedings. Mr Mason, a highly experienced defence advocate, told the Select Committee that he was wholly against the idea of a judge advocate dealing with sentencing on his own. He highlighted the important role of lay members with recent operational experience to the sentencing process. Of course, the judge advocate gives advice to the lay members on sentencing. As he indicated, the Judge Advocate General has recently provided guidelines on sentencing, which address one of the points that the noble Lord makes. But we continue to believe that we need to involve the lay members in the sentencing decision. This does not affect the fairness of the process, but gives an assurance that all proper factors are taken into account and given the proper weight when the sentence is determined. On that basis, I hope that the noble Lord will agree to withdraw his amendment.