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Armed Forces Bill

I shall respond to Amendment 147 and then to Amendments Nos. 151 to 156 in this group. Amendment No. 147 would require the court or officer to have particular regard to the welfare of an offender aged under 18. Clause 236(2), based on Section 44 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, already requires that if an offender is aged under 18 the court or officer must have regard to his welfare. The fact that welfare is an additional factor to be taken into account when sentencing under 18 year-olds means that in our view the Bill already sufficiently protects their welfare. The intention behind the amendment may be that where the matter points to one sentence but another sentence would be better for the offender’s welfare, the court or officer must impose the latter sentence—in other words, that the offender’s welfare should be paramount. Obviously this is not the policy because it would not provide sufficient weight for the other objectives in the clause. A sentence for a service offence may consist of or include forfeiture of seniority, reduction in rank or disrating. Clause 247 provides that the court may not pass such a sentence unless the offence or offences are serious enough to deserve them. In considering whether the seriousness of the offence warranted a particular sentence, we are satisfied that, as now, the court would consider the full effect of particular reductions in rank and therefore I do not think that Amendment No. 151 is necessary. When a court or officer imposes a fine, the court or officer is required under Clause 248 to inquire into the offender’s financial circumstances and to take them into account before fixing the amount of the fine. Account must also be taken of the circumstances of the case and the size of the fine must reflect the seriousness of the offence. This reflects similar provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Amendment No. 152 would provide that the court or officer should make such a consideration only if the fine to be imposed is in excess of the equivalent of seven days’ pay. With respect to the noble Lord, this is arbitrary and takes no account of the varying circumstances that might apply to individuals in terms of their rates of pay and, for example, their necessary outgoings in support of a family. As in civilian courts, an assessment of means should be used regardless of the level of the fine to be imposed. Amendment No. 153 also concerns Clause 248 and seeks to leave out subsection (3), which necessarily provides that in fixing the amount of a fine the court must take into account the circumstances of a case, including the offender’s financial circumstances. Subsection (3) is important as subsection (1) is merely a requirement to inquire into those circumstances. It also means that the court must take into account circumstances other than the offender’s financial circumstances and the seriousness of the offence. Subsection (3) is therefore an important provision that mirrors the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and for these reasons I cannot accept the amendment. As I have said, wherever possible the Bill seeks to mirror practice in the civilian criminal courts, in particular changes to sentencing made under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Clause 251 also requires a court or commanding officer, when passing sentence, to explain the reasons for and effect of that sentence as well as any powers of review. It replicates provisions in Section 174 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Clause 251(3) reproduces the power of the Secretary of State at subsection (4) of the 2003 Act to prescribe by order certain exemptions and other detailed provisions. Amendment No. 154 would have the effect of putting the Secretary of State under a duty to make prescription of this type rather than giving him a power to do so. This would be an unnecessary and unhelpful departure from civilian legislation—the same point also applies to Amendment No. 155, which seeks to remove subsection (3) altogether. Amendment No. 156 on a civilian court’s requirement to consider widely the effects of any sentence passed on a member of the Armed Forces is unnecessary. We believe that civilian courts will routinely consider the effects of a sentence on the offender’s career and it would be inappropriate to single out personnel in this way. Nevertheless, I have listened to the example given by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, in respect of driving offences and I will reflect further upon it. Service personnel are invariably accompanied when attending a civilian court by an officer who, on behalf of the accused, can respond to the court’s questions as to the effect of sentence on the individual’s career. None the less, I feel that the noble Earl has made a point in relation to this.