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Armed Forces Bill

My Lords, there has been much interest in the position of the commanding officer in the military criminal justice system, and I believe that we are all agreed on the importance of this. In recent years, some 95 per cent of cases have been dealt with at summary level. These sorts of cases, minor in terms of the criminal law, cover the low-level misconduct which, if not dealt with, can have a significantly corrosive effect on unit discipline and cohesion. We are convinced, and I am sure that the noble Earl will agree, of the merits of this approach. A key element of our consideration has been to ensure that in the future commanding officers will be able to deal with an appropriate range of offences. We have looked carefully at the different approaches of each of the services. We have done so in anticipation of the requirement in years to come, and therefore against a background of an increasingly expeditionary approach to operations in all our armed services. This has informed our approach to the offences that commanding officers should be able to deal with and the levels of punishment which they should have available. Under the Bill, Army and Air Force commanding officers will be able to deal with a small increase in the number of offences than they can deal with now. These are offences, such as assault occasioning actual bodily harm, which in straightforward cases are regularly dealt with by their naval counterparts and which, if proved, may require greater punishments. We must not forget, of course, that at Clause 239 it is specifically provided for that an accused must be given credit if he admits an offence and has co-operated with service police, and this applies to punishments awarded in the new summary hearing system as well as at the court martial. I am happy to send further detailed examples to the noble Earl of the Navy’s use of this power, but I can give some data on how often it is used. In 2005, Royal Navy commanding officers awarded periods of detention 79 times at summary trial. Of these, eight were for60 days or more, and seven of these followed a guilty plea. In a further 24 cases, commanding officers awarded punishments of more than 40 days’ detention. In 23 of these, credit for guilty pleas may have reduced the punishment from more than the 60 days which this amendment proposes. Removal of the power of 60 to 90 days’ detention for the Royal Navy would therefore generate an unacceptable increase in cases sent for trial by court martial. It would quite simply have an adverse impact on confidence in the system of discipline, and on operational effectiveness. Conversely, by gaining these powers, the Army and RAF might well see a small reduction in the number of cases that need to be dealt with by court martial if accused persons are happy to be dealt with by their commanding officer. There are important safeguards in place over the use of extended powers to deal with the additional offences and the use of sentences of detention longer than 28 days. The powers of punishment available to commanding officers is an integral element of Bill proposals. The amendment would have an immediate adverse affect on the administration of discipline in the Royal Navy, and would remove what would be an important improvement for the Army and Air Force. The proposals in the Bill have been carefully developed to reflect the current and anticipated future requirements for commanding officers, and safeguards appropriate for service personnel. I hope that in light of this explanation the noble Earl will withdraw his amendment.