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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, on securing this debate and I thank him for introducing it with the commitment and erudition that we have come to expect of him. Many noble Lords have talked about the mechanism of interdepartmental co-operation and staffing within the FCO. I had hoped to do the same, but in light of the fact that many noble Lords have already covered these issues with far greater experience than I have, I shall concentrate on issues that have got neglected, one or two of which were referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, in her elegant speech. It is important to bear in mind that resources are designed to achieve certain objectives. Therefore, we should ask ourselves: what are the major goals that our foreign policy should aim to achieve? The Foreign Secretary, whom I greatly admire, has set out those goals with great clarity, and in some respects they are new. They are new in that after the Second World War—certainly, during the past 20 years—our foreign policy has come to be haunted and influenced by three images. First, we want to be a bridge between Europe and the United States; secondly, we want to give leadership to Europe; and, thirdly, we are told that we must become a beacon to the world. Mercifully, the new Foreign Secretary’s thinking is free from these hubristic ambitions. We cannot be a bridge because there is no chance that the United States will outsource its diplomacy to us. We cannot be a bridge between two institutions if we are already an integral part of one; namely, the European Union. We are not a semi-detached member of the EU. We are very much at its heart. We share its values and interests. Therefore, the first important lesson to bear in mind is that we must make the European Union a vital pillar of our foreign policy. This could take a number of forms, some of which would involve a reduction in expenditure. We should think, as we are rightly doing now, in terms of a common foreign and security policy in many areas. We cannot have embassies in all 191 countries. Therefore, a collective European Union representation in certain matters could be explored. Likewise, we could pool our consular services and ensure that there is greater co-operation between the European embassies in different parts of the world so that each one does not duplicate the efforts of others. As I say, that should release quite a large number of resources for other purposes. My second point is that happily, so far, we are a minor major power and have not yet become a major minor power. As a minor major power we cannot rely on hardware. We can rely only on our soft power. Soft power always results, as Robert Nye and others have pointed out in the American context, from the trust that we are able to secure in other parts of the world in the judgment and wisdom of the policies that we follow. If others begin to feel that our understanding of world problems is intellectually more coherent and morally more persuasive, it is very likely that in the battle for ideas we might be able to influence the way in which they think about the world, which is the greatest impact that any foreign country can hope to make, and therefore join us in pursuing certain common causes. The question is: how can we make sure that our foreign policy is wise and inspires trust and confidence in different parts of the world? I am afraid that this has not been the case in relation to either Iraq or Afghanistan. We need to make sure that culture is at the centre of the formulation of foreign policy in an increasingly volatile and culturally diverse world. For example, in the context of Afghanistan, we need to understand its society and culture. We need to understand the economy of the drug market. We also need to understand how, in a society like this, institutions graft, and which ones have a hope of success and which ones do not. This means that our FCO would need to rely on anthropologists, historians, economists and a number of other specialists. It also means that our foreign policy has a greater chance of being wise if it is not merely left to the experts but also involves NGOs with considerable experience at grass-roots level. In the context of Afghanistan and Iraq, if NGOs with experience in those areas had been consulted, some of the mistakes that have been made would not have been made. The third point I want to make is this: the Foreign Secretary has talked about four priorities, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, rightly referred. In those four priorities I do not see any reference to two things which are absolutely crucial. The Foreign Secretary rightly talks about terrorism and preventing conflicts. At the root of all conflicts and terrorism lie poverty and a sense of humiliation in certain parts of the world. Therefore, global justice, understood both in economic and political terms, should be at the centre of our foreign policy. Economically, global justice would involve fighting poverty, and offering better terms of trade and well directed foreign aid. A just foreign policy would be an even-handed foreign policy, so that we do not end up doing things in other parts of the world that lead to disaster, or have a blowback domestically, so that we end up spending a lot of money dealing with the consequences. The other important thing for a minor major power to bear in mind is that the world will listen to us and take us seriously if they think that we offer sensible advice. In this context, I am rather surprised that, in a multi-ethnic society like ours, very few of our diplomatic representatives seem to come from ethnic minorities. I do not have the figures and hope the Minister will provide them for high commissioners, ambassadors and senior officers in our foreign diplomatic missions, and, for that matter, the FCO itself. What kind of input is made by people from different backgrounds with, therefore, different kinds of expertise? This is where the United States scores a very important point. Although lots of countries find it hegemonic, they know that there would be no American delegation going abroad without black Americans and lots of other nationalities. That inspires confidence in the country. We ought to think about that. Briefly, my last point is that our foreign policy naturally operates in collaboration with, and is articulated through, the British Council and the BBC. I want quickly to say three things about the British Council, on the basis of my considerable experience of what it has done and is doing in India. There are three ways in which it might need to reconsider some things that it is doing. First, it should not confine its offices merely to major centres where they have been traditionally based but should try to identify and reach out to new areas that are becoming important in a particular country. For example, in India it would not be just Ahmedabad, Delhi, Calcutta or Chennai, while there are other places, such as Baroda and many others, which are becoming extremely important in terms of foreign policy and economic interests. We should be concentrating on them as well. It is also important that the British Council should be thinking not merely in terms of educational and cultural exchanges, but also of shaping the thinking of people within the country in the limits of neutrality. This can be done by organising workshops, conferences, debates, and bringing the intellectuals of the nation together so that they are able to arrive at a form of consensus. That will be seen as a contribution made by the British Council to the thinking in the country. At the international level, it would do us no harm at all if we were to take the initiative in encouraging a global dialogue between different parts of the world, especially with Muslims, by organising some kind of international conference. The United Kingdom could certainly take the lead in organising a conference to which leading Muslims and others could be invited. We could then start thinking about new principles of global order.