---

Health and Social Care Bill

Under Clause 123, a justice of the peace has the power, following an application from a local authority, to make an order placing requirements or restrictions on a thing or premises that is, or is suspected of being, infected or contaminated. This group of amendments would create a power for a local authority officer to place requirements or restrictions on things or premises prior to any ruling by a justice of the peace. I will deal with the general principles and issues behind the amendments before making some specific points. To begin with, we think it crucial that, when a local authority wishes to isolate a private dwelling or destroy a person’s possessions, even when that is in the interests of public health, there should be independent judicial oversight. The Joint Committee on Human Rights welcomed the Government’s decision to increase the involvement of justices of the peace in the decisions that local authorities take in relation to public health measures. The Local Government Association, with which officials have met and with which there have been many exchanges of letters—I put one of those letters around the Committee yesterday—has expressed concern that having to apply to a justice of the peace to obtain such an order could cause delay and will lead to additional bureaucracy. Although I understand why noble Lords have felt it necessary to raise these issues, I think that the concerns of the Local Government Association are unfounded. The Bill extends these powers to contamination. The LGA has suggested that having to apply to a justice of the peace for an order would make it difficult to deal with a situation like the Alexander Litvinenko contamination incident, where 47 premises needed to be inspected. However, the provisions in the Bill are not intended to replace the existing powers of the local authority to enter and inspect premises under health and safety, food safety or environmental health legislation. It is important to put that on the record. They are intended to enhance those powers, especially where the existing legislation may be weak—for example, with regard to private dwellings, where in the Alexander Litvinenko case the local authority needed co-operation rather than powers. Local authorities will be able to choose the most appropriate legislation to support whatever action they judge it necessary to take. In the Litvinenko case, the local authority had to rely on several different pieces of legislation, as well as voluntary co-operation, to enter and secure several premises. Nothing in the Health and Social Care Bill will prevent them from using those provisions again if that is the most appropriate way to deal with the situation. However, the Bill provides a coherent legislative basis for future cases, where gaps in existing legislation might be more problematic. The LGA has said that Clause 123 would force the local authority at great expense to apply individually for 47 separate orders. That is incorrect. If the local authority chose to use the provisions in the Bill, new Section 45J would allow it to seek a single group order for all premises relating to a single contamination incident. I hope that that will lay to rest any concerns that local government may have about bureaucracy. When we look at the detail of the provisions proposed in these amendments, it appears that a local authority would have the power to ““close”” a person’s home for up to three days without independent judicial oversight. Amendment No. 181A would make it a crime for the owner to enter their own home if the notice said that they should not. We cannot support that. The amendments are similar to the powers set out in health and safety and food safety legislation. However, health and safety legislation and food safety legislation have a different basis from public health legislation. For example, standards for food safety are set out in legislation. When an inspector enters premises, it is to see whether the standards have been breached. In other words, the local authority is entering to see whether a crime has been committed. The owner knows what standards they should be upholding. It is therefore appropriate that the local authority can instantly serve a notice where those standards are not being met. By contrast, it is not a crime under our public health legislation to have the misfortune to possess infected or contaminated things or premises. When a local authority suspects that there is a public health risk, it is not enforcing statutory standards but acting in the interests of public health. Any measures taken must be appropriately weighed against the rights of the individual. That is why we believe that it is appropriate that the decision to place restrictions or requirements on things and premises should be left with a justice of the peace. The noble Baroness again referred to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Section 21(3) makes it clear that emergency regulations under the CCA should be made only where existing legislation cannot be relied on. I think that that will probably not satisfy the noble Baroness. Therefore, I undertake to write a longer letter that outlines and precisely answers her question. With that, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Tonge, will be able to withdraw the amendment.