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EU and Russia (EUC Report)

My Lords, I am tempted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom, in his concluding remarks, but that would not be proper in this debate. Suffice it to say that I hold to the view that perhaps what we need to re-examine in building a strong Europe is a more confederal rather than federal approach. We all owe a deep debt of gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Roper, and his colleagues for a particularly interesting report. As I listened to him today, I recalled that it is just over 55 years since he and I first met in Yugoslavia and forged a lasting and eternal friendship. I remember him keenly going off on his own to distant and far-flung monasteries to get below some of the facade with which we might have been being presented. He has followed that keen interest in international and global affairs ever since. It is good to see him in the role that he enjoys today. I believe that it is vital to understand and not just to react to Russia. We have a great deal of responsibility ourselves for how Russia has evolved since the demise of communism. We led Russia down the road of romantic ideological market capitalism without giving any serious thought to, or doing any serious work on, as we should have done, how you actually move from A to B—what fabric of society you must have if accountable capitalism within a democratic framework is to work. The noble Lord, Lord Roper, was also right to dwell on the possibility of a sense of humiliation in Russia. I have always had anxieties about the comparison with Versailles after the First World War. There was a very high price to pay for Versailles. But we must understand a bit more than that; we must go back into the history of Russia. There has always been this dichotomy, this dilemma: what is the Russian identity? There was Peter the Great trying to follow and emulate what he saw as the great strengths of Europe—there is St Petersburg itself. In the 18th century, we saw an extraordinary period when the Russian elite spoke French, adopted French culture and it was totally unacceptable to participate in Russian society at their level without speaking in French. After that infatuation with Europe and European culture, there was some sort of backlash in the 19th century, when members of the elite thought that that was not fulfilling. They had experienced the loyalty of the peasantry in conflict and wanted to get back to what they believed was the heart of Russia, the peasantry. They went off to join the peasantry, but, unfortunately, it was a rather disillusioning experience because the peasantry did not turn out to be what they had romantically thought they were. Then things in the elite moved back to a more European-oriented approach. That is reflected in culture, music, literature and art, in the interplay between European aspirations and the great mysterious realities of Russia, vast as it is. In the story of Russia, as has been emphasised already in the debate, there is the ongoing reality—it was the reality in pre-revolutionary Russia and during the Communist decades, and has been since—of a tradition of a self-perpetuating authoritarian elite and a constant drive to be taken seriously as a world power. That elite and that continuity is demonstrated in what I have personally encountered as the very strong KGB-FSB school, which operates at almost every critical part of decision-making. The interdependence of Russia and Europe is inescapable. It is there in economic and financial realities, in the realm of energy, in global warming, in vast wider issues such as Iran and in security and the threat of international terrorism. I have always held that Putin is absolutely right when he talks about Russia being in the front line of the interface with global militant extremism, but in Chechnya, Ingushetia and elsewhere, the paradox is that the brutality and cruelty of direct and, more sinisterly, indirect oppression has been totally counterproductive. It has strengthened the appeal of extremism to many people. We should not be misled by perceived relative order and security in Chechnya today. I am convinced that it is the order of tyranny and fear and I am fairly certain that many of the young are still being attracted by the militants. The issues are not resolved. Chechnya is of far greater significance than just for Chechnya alone. If I have one criticism of the report it is that it did not give nearly enough prominence to the significance of Chechnya in the equation. Chechnya has become a rallying point. Russian policy, coupled with the disgraceful equivocation of Europe and the West has, as I said, strengthened the appeal of extremism to many exasperated and disempowered people. However, if we criticise we must look to our own credibility. Here I could not agree more strongly with what the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, said. The Kremlin's cry of double standards must be taken seriously. We desperately need—and the current global financial crisis is a very good time to do it—to regenerate the post-Second World War practical idealism forged from the experience of devastating and bitter global conflict—the idealism of internationally agreed norms and standards for which we are all striving together. Those standards and norms are in the realm of eliminating indiscriminate use of force—and, for example, the use of torture—and embrace a fundamental commitment to the protection of human life, something that we need to remember as we go about our business in Afghanistan and Iraq. They are about human rights not just as a qualitative option but as an essential, central pillar of a stable, secure society. They are enshrined in an unyielding determination to uphold the international rule of law so badly undermined by the manner of our intervention in Iraq. There has been reference to Georgia. We must be honest with ourselves. Are Russian charges about the role of the West totally without foundation? How far did we meddle in the election and try to control events? What were our motives for doing that? What was the significance of the energy card? To pose those questions is in no way to condone the Russian action, but to recognise the grounds—however cynically exploited by them—of Russian concern. If we are endeavouring to look at events through Russian eyes, I am sure that the expansion of NATO up to the Russian borders can be seen by them as provocative—it is certainly exploited by them as being provocative, if not threatening. We need to realise that in our policy towards Ukraine that consideration must be in the forefront of our minds. A shared and, yes, muscular approach to securing our common interests is indispensable. The European Union has a vital role to play in this. Nevertheless, anxiety about Russia’s behaviour in Chechnya, Ingushetia and elsewhere, and about the aspirations of the Chechen and Ingushetian people, must in logic mean a similar anxiety about South Ossetia and Abkhazia and their people in their relationship with Georgia. Real and genuine self-determination and cultural identity must surely apply there as well. If we are to build, as we must, a sense of common interests and common struggle with the Russians, as opposed to drifting back into confrontation, it will be soundly achieved only on a basis of honest, tough and uncompromising candour about our own analysis. This must apply to Chechnya and Ingushetia, as it must—the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom, was absolutely right about this—to the total unacceptability of ruthless, barbaric and cruel murder in London and a trail of radioactivity across the capital. The report refers to the OSCE and the Council of Europe. I have no doubt whatever that the Russians prefer the Council of Europe, but we must beware the danger of the Council of Europe becoming a Russian poodle. Russia is a grand payeur, and as such has influenced the institution quite considerably. It is worth remarking that, with the expansion of the Council of Europe, instead of a substantial and established political and value culture, the institution has moved much more into the realm of aspiration. However, we need to meet the anxieties of the Russians head on, for example by introducing into the Council of Europe the concept of the universal monitoring of all member states and not simply the rather arrogant monitoring of certain states that still include Russia. One part of the Council of Europe deserves far more attention—the European Court of Human Rights. This has been an outstanding international institution, disastrously underfinanced. When one sees the scope of its responsibilities, it is extraordinary what it achieves with so little financial support. Let us remember that the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly elects the judges. There might be a moment of anxiety about that, but it has been fascinating historically to see how those judges grow into their international responsibility and how a culture and mores are established. It is very impressive. If we recognise the significance of the European Court of Human Rights, let us be very cautious about moving into alternative institutions in the same area in the European Union. That could be a terrific own goal; it could aid and abet the concept that human rights are about European culture and European standards. The great thing about the European Court of Human Rights is that it extends beyond European Union boundaries to encompass Russia. That is a very strong position, so I am glad to end my remarks by paying the warmest possible tribute to the judges in the European Court of Human Rights and to all those who serve it so faithfully.